Foreign direct investment, a movement toward investors' centricity, a behavioral perspective by TAN, Jimmy Wee Teck
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open 
Access) Dissertations and Theses 
7-2018 
Foreign direct investment, a movement toward investors' 
centricity, a behavioral perspective 
Jimmy Wee Teck TAN 
Singapore Management University, jimmy.tan.2014@phdgm.smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, International Business Commons, and the Organizational 
Behavior and Theory Commons 
Citation 
TAN, Jimmy Wee Teck. Foreign direct investment, a movement toward investors' centricity, a behavioral 
perspective. (2018). Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access). 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/155 
This PhD Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses 
Collection (Open Access) by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management 
University. For more information, please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, A MOVEMENT TOWARD INVESTORS’ 
CENTRICITY, A BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAN WEE TEK JIMMY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY 
2018 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment, a Movement Toward Investors’ 
Centricity, a Behavioural Perspective. 
 
 
By 
 
Tan wee Tek Jimmy 
 
 
 
Submitted to Lee Kong Chian School of Business in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business (General Management)  
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
Philip Charles Zerrillo (Supervisor/Chair) 
Professor of Marketing (Practce) 
Singapore Management University 
 
Shantanu Bhattacharya 
Professor of Operations Management 
Singapore Management University 
 
  
Rajendra K Srivastava 
Novartis Professor of Marketing Strategy 
Indian School of Business (ISB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Singapore Management University 
 
2018 
 
Copyright (2018) Tan Wee Tek Jimmy  
  
   
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment, a Movement Toward Investors’ Centricity, a Behavioural 
Perspective. By Tan wee Tek Jimmy 
Abstract 
This dissertation proposal studies the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a 
frontier economy from the behavioral perspective of a manager. There are many determinants 
used in determining a Foreign Direct Investment. These determinants range from economic, 
social, institutional, technology, organization, and commercial down to cultural distance. The 
objective of this research is not to duplicate the methodologies of many quantitative research 
studies that have been conducted, in which many economists use quantitative analysis of 
several years of data to determine the many factors that correlate with levels of FDI. The 
behavioral aspect of a manager’s decision is noticeably absent in most economic models. This 
research study surveyed and interviewed managers to understand their mental calculus in 
making Foreign Direct Investment decisions. During our research, we conducted a preliminary 
exploratory survey of the various ways managers tend to make important decisions regarding 
Foreign Direct Investment. A semi-structured questionnaire and interviews were carried out 
with managers. This was done after the initial literature review, to understand the location, 
certainty and investment types of determinants they would consider when investing in 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The data obtained were analyzed, and with further 
literature review, we proposed several hypotheses. These hypotheses were to test the effect of 
the moderating determinants such as the culture, language, ethnic similarity, physical distance, 
economic policies, market opportunity and the legal system relationship between investors 
willingness to invest in two emerging economies; Vietnam and Myanmar. The legal system 
characteristics considered are legal clarity, legal transparency, legal corruption and legal
  
 
enforcement. The results obtained will be useful to develop prescriptive advice to official and 
administrators in crafting Foreign Direct Investment policies in frontier economies
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 The current global economy, which is characterized by intense competition, makes it 
necessary for firms, especially Multinational Corporations (MNC) to search for fresh and 
growing markets and/or inputs such as low-cost resources around the world. They can extract 
these low-cost resources to reduce the costs of manufacturing and achieve a sustainable 
profitability ratio for their respective businesses. A common way to capture a potential market 
in developing countries is by setting up the manufacturing units. Manufacturing establishments 
in the developing countries open up windows to purchase raw materials at a lower cost 
compared to the manufacturing establishments in developed economies. Moreover, due to the 
growing population, gradually rising incomes, and purchasing powers, developing countries 
have now become lucrative potential markets for manufacturing businesses to expand 
dramatically.  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a form of investment made by an individual and a 
firm within a country which it does not reside in but keeps a business interest in. In a modern 
globalized economy, FDI plays a critical role in the growth and expansion of firms around the 
globe. FDI is necessary, especially in developing countries which crave economic growth and 
development. Developing countries also compete with one another to attract FDI which they 
believe will provide technologies, skills, capital, and job opportunities which will seemingly 
benefit the forward growth of their respective countries (Kurtishi, 2013 & DeMello, 1999)  
In host countries, the incidence of FDI can increase domestic levels of investment in 
research and development, productivity, permanent productive capital and steady employment. 
Apart from the growth of capital and technology in a country, people skills of residents in host 
countries are also developed as they experience new technologies processes and systems. This 
eventually increases the host country rate of economic growth. However, all types of FDI will 
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not have similar possible effects. Therefore, host governments must adopt the right policies to 
maximize their gains from different types of FDI. 
Benefits can be reached only by facing the risks that lead to economic growth in the 
host country under some circumstances including a macroeconomic and political setting. 
According to Mwilima (2003), FDI in a country would impact various factors such as the 
sources of finance for FDI, mode of entry, and the impact on the activities of domestic 
companies. At the same time, some opponents indicate that FDI can fetch benefits together 
with some undesirable impact, for instance, the increasing MNC activities can cause large-
scale environmental damage. However, the majority of the researchers support the positive 
impact of FDI within a country because FDI inflow to the manufacturing has a positive effect 
on growth by creating employment opportunities (Tembe & Xu, 2012). While there are 
advantages and disadvantages of FDI inflows within a country, research on the rationale 
concerning investors willingness to invest is also essential. For example the characteristics of 
the legal system of a country. Jensen (2003) study found that the quality of the legal institution 
plays an essential role in attracting FDI.  
FDI is typically made by firms whose origins are from developed countries and are 
seeking to invest in developing countries. Since developing countries have a desire to create 
more profound growth and healthy development in their economies; they set policies that are 
attractive to investors of all natures alike and establish a much more robust relationship with 
them. This attraction of FDI by developing countries in which the policymakers are crafting 
attractive policies and developing strong relationships with foreign investors can be 
synonymous with marketing. Marketing is best termed as the management of exchange 
relationships (Bagozzi, 1975). The benefits of the exchange can take multiple forms. For 
examples tax-free profits and accesses to low-cost and/or natural resources to the foreign 
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investors by host countries in exchange for loans to support some of the economic development 
of the host countries by the investing countries and/or investors. 
At the time of investments, one of the potential pitfalls for investors is that they are 
often unaware of the full range of incentives offered. Recent evidence has nevertheless shown 
that tax incentives may exert a significant impact in attracting FDI when other factors such as 
political and economic stability, and infrastructure and transport costs are more or less equal 
between potential host countries. Investors also need to analyze and be prudent on the legal 
systems of the host country. Some researchers are emphasizing the developing countries with 
common law systems are thereby attracting greater FDI than countries that have a civil law or 
Islamic legal systems (Lee et al., 2014). 
Host countries with reasonably large market size and growth potential often attract 
market-seeking investors and/or companies due to the economy of scale (Kudina & Jakubiak, 
2008) and the sheer market opportunity. Also, market-seeking FDI tends to appear in countries 
which have high trade barriers and cannot be accessed by means other than an FDI (Feils & 
Rahman, 2008). Whereas, resource-seeking companies will locate in countries where resources 
sought are abundant (e.g., natural resources or low labor costs). These resources are not 
available at home or are available at a lower price in a foreign country (Tarvainen & Box, 
2017).  
One of the biggest threats to globalization and internationalization of trades is the trade 
barrier in the form of trade tariffs and/or protectionism. There are also several trade barriers 
across different markets in the world and exporting products from that country might be 
uneconomical, as especially developing countries want to maintain a favorable balance of 
trade, protect their domestic market, and attract FDI. These have been previously achieved 
through increasing trade barriers by charging heavy tariffs on imported goods as well as 
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through Free Trade Agreements among countries. It is therefore essential and urgent for 
companies primarily from the developed economies, to establish manufacturing capabilities in 
these developing countries as long as they have a promising market. There is research that 
found that market size or promising market is an essential determinant of FDI (Petrovic, 2017 
& Chakrabarti, 2001), but not how did this market size interact with a commitment to market 
that will predict FDI.       
However, it has been argued that FDI dependency reduces the country’s autonomy and 
does not help the long-term interest of the domestic market according to Dixon and Boswell 
(1996). Similarly, Kentor and Boswell (2003), opined that FDI has a positive effect on the 
economic growth of the countries for the first five years and then decreases over the next 15 
years. The eclectic theory of FDI developed by Dunning (1998) offers an alternative method 
of figuring out the relationship between FDI and economic growth, which found economic 
growth to be an important determinant of FDI. 
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Chapter 2. Problem Statement & Objectives of Research 
 
The vast majority of research to date on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is at a very 
macro level. There was much quantitative research conducted on the factors (determinants) 
that co-vary and predict FDI, in addition to studies that focus more in-depth on the 
interrelationship of these factors.  A few examples of these determinants are tax incentives, 
economic growth, corruption, the legal system, and cultural distance. While many studies based 
their research by looking at past data as correlates of the level of FDI, the behavioral aspects 
of managers and the micro mediating events that lead to investment decisions are significantly 
lacking in the majority of the economic models. As a result, many theories fail to explain the 
actual choices made by managers in modern days and how they trade off the presence of 
various.  
 There are well developed theoretical arguments that FDI flow depends on the 
characteristics of the legal system but lack robust empirical evidence to suggest such 
relationships exist (Perry, 2000). More research studies are needed to understand how the legal 
system influences FDI in developing countries. There is also a need to bridge the gap between 
economic and cultural based approaches to understand the legal system and how investment 
decisions are calculated and executed. Two fundamental questions remain to be answered 
concerning how cultural values affect the perceptions and expectations of the legal system 
(Perry, 2000 and 2003). 
1. The relative importance which economic actors (these actors are stakeholders such as 
investors, policymakers and corporate decision makers on investment) around the 
world place on the legal system.  
2. The core components of effective legal systems as defined by the economic actors.  
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Thus a systematic integration of existing data and/or theory from cultural distance and 
characteristics of the legal system, reinforced by questionnaire surveys and interviews to test 
the proposed hypotheses will be one of the objectives of this research.           
Also, we do not have the luxury of being able to conduct extended years of in-depth 
research, and we certainly do not want to replicate the quantitative modeling that looks at past 
data presets as a predictor of an FDI. Therefore, we opt to conduct surveys and interview 
decision makers on a) what they felt was important and b) whether they would engage in FDI 
given their assessed level of these factors. We aim to understand when, how and correctly why 
managers prioritize specific factors in their investment decisions. We believe that 
psychological findings on human nature play a vital role in economic theory. It bought into the 
limelight a thoughtful insight, one that contradicts the conventional economic theory. It is not 
by default, human beings (including managers) are compelled to behave either in a rational 
manner or as utility enhancers in a given scenario (Pinheiro-Alves, 2008). Based on this fact, 
we will begin our research on understanding this mental calculus process of a managerial 
decision which later becomes the decision process for the whole firm. The results will provide 
practical prescriptions for policymakers so that they can enhance their performance capabilities 
in understanding where to attract, retain, and increase FDI in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
Internationalization of business in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has 
benefitted many developing countries. Developing countries believe that FDI will become an 
important source of external investment flow within their respective countries. Policymakers 
hope that attracting investments will subsequently boost and develop their financial stature of 
markets. It will also contribute towards creating and increasing the overall economic growth.  
While firms search for economic growth and sustainable profitability, they move from 
developed countries towards developing countries. These may include current emerging 
markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). However, what they fail to understand is 
that the BRIC itself is currently experiencing an economic degradation. As a result, these 
countries have become more expensive as a base for operations, and export & import to and/or 
from these countries have become a difficult task (Musacchchio, 2016). Therefore, firms 
(especially MNCs) are paying more attention to low income generating countries and countries 
with challenging environments, both as new markets for selling their products, manufacturing 
products for domestic consumption, and/or international exports. While locally manufactured 
products are believed to be exported internationally, there persists a higher chance of risk for 
investments to be made in undeveloped countries typically known as the frontier economies. 
Frontier economies are often countries characterized by a weak legal system, poor government 
transparency, a culture of corruption, and low per capita income. In 2016, over half of the FDI 
flowing into ASEAN (All South East Asia Nation) were invested in Singapore, a developed 
economy. While the frontier economies such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia 
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gained only 11 percent of the total of the FDI inflows into the countries in ASEAN (refer to 
Appendix A Table A1). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined FDI as an investment that involves a 
long-term relationship reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct 
investor) with an entity resident in a different economy (i.e., outside of the economy of the 
investor). FDI also allows the transfer of skills and technologies to the host country which 
contributes to the improvement of human capital and will help the continuous economic growth 
of that respective country (De Mello, 1999).  
Despite the efforts of many researchers, on explaining the phenomenon of FDI, there is no 
generally accepted FDI theory (Denisia, 2010). However, theories of FDI may be classified 
under few key headings (Denisia, 2010). 
• Production Cycle Theory of Vernon (Vernon, 1966)  
• Theory of Exchange Rate (Cushman, 1985),  
• Internalization Theory (Buckley & Casson, 2016; Hymer, 1976),  
• The Eclectic Paradigm of Dunning (Dunning, 1988). 
 
3.1.1. Production Cycle Theory 
Production cycle theory developed by Vernon in 1966 which explain certain types of 
FDI made by United States of America’s (USA’s) firms in Western Europe after the Second 
World War in the manufacturing industries. According to Vernon, the first stage is where the 
USA’s firms create innovative products for local consumption before exporting surplus to 
foreign markets. Foreign firms eventually imitate these products and technologies as they get 
exported to their countries. To circumvent and retain market share USA’s firms produce the 
products in international markets by investing in manufacturing capability. Vernon believes 
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there are four stages of the production cycle. These are innovation, growth, maturity and 
decline stages. Innovation and growth stages typically originate from the home country before 
going to host countries during the growth and mature stages. However, some firms depending 
on their business strategy may choose to innovate their new products in host country before 
exporting to other foreign markets.  
 
3.1.2. Theory of Exchange Rate 
This is another theory that tried to explain FDI. Cushman (1985) suggested that real 
exchange rate increase stimulated FDI by USA’s firms while foreign currency appreciation 
will retard firms FDI. Again, the basis of analysis was American firms engaged in FDI.   
Cushman also commented that dollar appreciation would lead to a reduction in USA’s FDI by 
25%. However, currency risk rate theory cannot support simultaneous FDI between two 
countries with a different currency. There are arguments that such investments are made at 
different times, but there are also studies that contradict these claims. Again, the analysis in 
this research looked at the correlation between the exchange rate and the incidence of FDI, not 
how did the exchange rate interact with broad variables such as legal transparency, culture 
origin, language, etc to predict FDI.  
 
3.1.3. The International theory 
This theory tries to explain the growth and motivation of MNCs in FDI. The theory was 
developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1982), and Casson (1983). Hymer in his 
1976 doctoral dissertation identified two significant determinants of FDI, the removal of 
competition and the advantages some firms possess over their competitors. MNCs will develop 
and organize their internal activities so that they have competitive advantages over their 
competitors. Hymer suggested the concept of market imperfection where the firm-specific 
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competitive advantage to outweigh the cost of operating abroad. According to Hymer, FDI 
should be recognized as a firm strategy decision rather than a capital-market finance decision. 
 
3.1.4. The Electric Paradigm of Dunning 
The electric theory develops by Dunning (1988) consists of the mix of three different 
theories of FDI. These are ownership advantages, location, and internationalization (OLI). In 
ownership advantages, a company must have certain advantages that outweigh the cost of 
operating in a foreign market. These could be in the form of monopoly advantages, such as 
patents, trademarks, technology and natural resources. The higher the competitive advantage 
of the investing firms, the more investors are willing to invest in their foreign operations. On 
location, firms must choose a location that its advantages to own and use them than to rent or 
sell to foreign firms. The other factors to considers are economic benefits such as production 
and transportation costs in the chosen location, political advantages such as government 
policies on FDI and social advantages such as the distance between home and host countries, 
cultural diversity, language, and ethnic similarity. The more immobile the natural or created 
resources which firms need to use jointly with their competitive advantage, the more willing 
will be the firms in considering FDI. The last consideration is internationalization where the 
company requires to find different ways to exploits its ownership and location advantages from 
sales of good and services by securing various agreements with customers. This will usually 
be in the form of foreign production than offering license rights or franchise. OLI parameters 
differ from company to company and also depend on the political, social and economic of host 
country which also varies from country to country. This will shape the strategy of a company 
investing in that particular country. 
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3.1.5. Types of FDI    
There are typically two types of FDI.  
• The vertical FDI 
• The horizontal FDI. 
The horizontal FDI enables the investor to provide the same service as it provides 
within their home country. It also captures the market share of the host country. On the other 
hand,  vertical FDI allows the investor to augment their service and manufacturing capacity as 
part of their overall global manufacturing strategy. Both the vertical and horizontal FDI will 
make full utilization of the factors available. For instance, lower operation costs, lower labor 
costs, and the abundance of raw materials and natural resources (Maskus, 2002). 
One of the merits of the horizontal FDI is its ability to iterate manufacturing flexibility 
thereby allowing the exportation of manufacturing work from the host country and vice versa. 
Secondly, its ability to duplicate capacities of both facilities to cope with contingency plans is 
a significant advantage. Though the extra capacity may remain idle most of the time, this excess 
capacity acts as a buffer against strong or increase manufacturing demands from time to time 
without losing revenues or customers. In the case of vertical FDI, the flexibility to cope with 
contingency is limited, and the risk of losing revenues and customers could be high should 
there be an increase in demand and/or manufacturing contingency issue at either facility even 
though operating costs may be more optimized than horizontal FDI. As a result of this, capital, 
skill, and technology transfer, it is envisioned that FDI affects economic growth directly or 
indirectly of the host country. 
Several essential factors determine whether firms will succeed in attracting FDI. These 
factors can be socio-political, the dynamics of a country’s economies, government policies, 
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and the legal system. Among such factors, the existence of trade barriers and free trade zones 
are highly critical factors that influence foreign investors’ decisions directly while establishing 
FDI. A country that has a fair, transparent and legally consistent court is capable of handling 
business cases without favor or being influenced by corruption. It creates a more conducive 
environment for FDI. It is because the foreign investor does not want to be unprofitable in their 
business operations due to a weak legal system. The probability is high that the host country 
may curtail down their investments if foreign investors are not fully aware of what rules, laws, 
or judgment they may be exposed to when carrying out their activities. Often, they succumb to 
choosing trading operations rather than manufacturing ones based on the ground investments. 
For a country to promote FDI, it should ensure to endure a transparent and fair legal regime 
and lay clear strategies for businesses to solve legal issues that arise in the course of business 
operations.  
Kotler (1999) opined that today’s economic landscape is shaped by two powerful 
forces: technology and globalization. As firms currently continue to globalize their operations 
using technology to achieve sustainable profitability, the need for these firms to grow has 
become quite essential. Growth allows them to attract talent, create jobs, provide career 
advancement, satisfy stakeholders, and remain highly competitive. Kotler (1999) also defined 
marketing as an art of finding, identifying, and profiting from opportunities which are 
synonymous with the countries’ policymakers. Policy makers are responsible for crafting FDI 
policies to attract new investments, eventually resulting in business growth.  
3.2. Behavioral Perspective 
FDI requires managers to make some investment decisions. These decisions are 
expected to be made with some degree of risk and uncertainty. Most often, these managers are 
expected to rely on their organizations’ procedures and modulus operandi to have a higher 
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probability of being successful in their investment decisions. A good number of FDI models, 
do not adhere to these outlined decision-making criterions and as a result of this, the models 
are prone to errors and failures. In addition to these various behavioral and emotional 
managerial attributes on FDI, research has proven cultural, social, and political determinants 
are additional factors capable of influencing managers decision on FDI. The literature on FDI 
has already been published. The research emphasizes the various determinants responsible for 
the maximum functionality of the FDI. These determinants could be of economic parameters 
such as income, labor cost, inflation, gross domestic product, and lots more.  
In today’s business world, managers are expected to prioritize their task thereby making 
some tasks more superior than others. This has led to lots of instabilities and failures. 
Invariably, a manager’s ability to make effective, efficient and fast decisions is of great 
importance as these decisions play significant roles in determining the organization's 
performance. Managers should also consider other determinants such as culture, politics, social 
welfare and other human attributes while making these decisions as they are equally of great 
importance. Research shows that one of the sole reasons why these other determining factors 
are most often ignored is because often these MNCs organizations make rational decisions 
which can be explicitly explained by the economic determinants used in making an investment 
decision. 
Hence, only a few economic considerations are put in place in making managerial 
decisions that would influence the direction of FDI in a company. The other reasons are the 
complexity of factoring human behavior as its difficult to analyze, impossible to control, and 
do not sustain for an extended period (Jarbouni and Boujelbene, 2012). According to Hadzic 
(2015), humans do not always act in the sincerest ways. Thus, a quantitative approach may not 
be the most reliable way of arriving at a sound decision due to failing to capture human biases 
in decision making. Hadzic went on to suggest that decision making using analysis-based 
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decision making in a highly uncertain environment is bound to fail. Such environment 
according to him requires manager’s intuition in decision making. This conflicts with the 
mainstream economics which upholds that people make a decision based on the utility of 
maximization functions or benefits with minimum costs. The theory assumes economic agents 
are perfectly rational and emotional influence is out of consideration. In principle, individuals 
think and behave rationally and those situations in which their rationality vanishes are due to 
emotions that take them over the specific situation (Kahneman, 2011). According to Kahneman 
certain thoughts, emotions, and memories that pop up in people’s working memory will distort 
their cognitive functions. This results in the possibility of people making wrong or biased 
decisions due to their cognitive functions being diminished or depleted (Kahneman et al., 
2002).  
Interestingly, three interrelated theories are said to influence managerial decisions on 
MNCs.  Herbert Simon introduced the first being the bounded rationality theory. Herbert’s 
theory is most often referred to as Carnegie School. According to Cyert and March (1963), 
Herbert opined that decision makers are most often constrained by their mental ability, these 
abilities to mentally analyze all the necessary factors or determinants and finally arrive at an 
ideal investment decision. Trevis Certo et al.  (2008) further implied that most managers tend 
to seek satisfactory solutions instead of seeking ways to maximize the various ideas obtained. 
Most often, they end up influencing and complicating issues, most of which are based on 
factors such as personal goals, evaluation criteria, and identity. Kahneman (2011) added that 
people are equipped with inherent laziness and are prone to any questions that come their way. 
Such simplification is called heuristic. Moreover, people tend to rely on heuristic simplification 
when dealing with complex issues. These heuristics can be considered as the anomalies in 
human behavior and will lead to intuitive thinking whose main characteristic is effortless and 
unintentional or biases judgment. According to Kahneman (2011), intuitive thinking is 
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considered as system one thinking out of two separate overlapping systems on thinking in 
human’s mind. System one thinking operates at the subconscious level, while the other system 
which is known as system two thinking operates on the conscious level and is more rational 
thinking. System one thinking is always active while system two thinking occurs intentionally 
and is only active when a person needs or wants it.    
Jarboui and Boujelbene (2012) argued that individuals do not behave rationally due to 
lack of information or information asymmetry, and hence limit the ability to interpret the 
available information correctly. This is also in line with  Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality 
theory.    
The second foundation theory is known as the prospect theory which is based on a 
decision or cognitive biases making which typically results in an inaccurate and inconsistent 
sense of judgment. Researchers have opined that humans tend to reduce their cognitive effort 
as the result of their cognitive process and this often results in making biased decisions 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1984 and Kahneman, 2003). A most common way of making a biased 
decision is by framing that decision. Framing a decision, could lead the organization to either 
gain a lot or lose a lot, thereby leading to different decision outcomes. When an option is framed 
as lost, there is every tendency that decision makers would not want to incur a loss as they 
would be at risk, often know as risk adverse. 
A typical example could be seen when stock investors hold on to lost stocks for a very 
long time and sell off the winning stock too soon. Alternatively, decision makers could decide 
to take the irrational risk often known as “risk-seeking.” This type of risk is usually considered 
when the alternative is an inevitable loss or when the potential pay-out or returns are unusually 
large, for example in cases whereby investors are willing to bet on a lottery scheme when the 
prize money is high, and the probability of winning is extremely low. Thus, the tendency to 
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frame the choices and the decision process present the fundamental challenge to rational 
assumptions of mainstream economists. The same information presented in two different ways 
will lead to different judgment since the way of representation causes certain emotional 
reactions (Kahneman, 2011). 
Thirdly, Rabin (1998), stated theoretical foundation is a decision-making process, 
which lies at the intersection of psychology and economics known as the behavioral economics. 
He further explained the various behavioral lines associated with the advance understanding of 
managers in decision making especially in uncertain environments when considering FDI in 
different countries which have different cultures. Hosseini (2005) upheld that economics need 
to have realistic principles to accurately explain FDI by incorporating Behavioural Economics, 
which study how economic agents function and behave in a real situation (Baker & Nofsinger, 
2002; Thaler, 1993).  Hosseini (2005) also mentioned that traditional economics could not 
address the environments met by firms when they invest directly aboard. Firms going aboard 
not only have to face economic, political, social, and cultural challenges, but they also have to 
deal with higher uncertainty and risk. Barberis and Thaler (2003) concluded in their study that 
people do not like uncertainty and are risk-averse. DK Shull’s (2013) research indicates that 
the market uncertainty is the reason for the difficulties in investment decisions. People have 
the inborn tendency to search for certainty, safe, and reliable situations when making 
investment decisions. Thus, it is evitable that when making decisions in a market fraught with 
uncertainty and risk, one tends to get different answers or even conflicting answers in 
investment decisions.       
These various Behavioural Economic models would complement the current 
conventional economic analysis that is based on the fact that mathematical and information 
formulation and foundations are symmetrical and perfect; and that decisions on investment are 
made rationally without biases. Thus, the use of a model with a rationality assumption will no 
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longer be coherent without considering the theories of bounded rationality, cognitive biases, 
and behavioral theories (Kuhn, 1962).  
New research on the current decision process, has led to a paradigm shift in most 
organizations. Its’ benefits are witnessed in fields of international business where decisions on 
FDI is frequently needed. Aharoni’s Foreign Investment Decision book published in 1966 was 
the first publicized article on the behavioral concept of FDI. It focused on outlining the various 
managerial decisions of a manager. In the Foreign Investment Decision, Aharoni tries to 
adequately dissipate how managers think and how they make an important decision. He 
explains the numerous variables involved and how these variables influence managerial 
decisions. The various motivating factors as well as how these managers undertake decisions 
under an uncertain condition or environment was also explained.  
Foreign investment was explicitly examined in different group levels with an adequate 
focus on each member responsible for making FDI. Managers go a long way to ensure they 
achieve success. They tend not to put their comfort into consideration when making numerous 
managerial decisions. Foreign organizations are expected to have adequate knowledge of their 
host country’s community to cohabitate peacefully with them. This familiarization can thus be 
achieved through social interactions. Many of the constructs on behavioral research are 
considered at the organization level and not at the individual level as many considered. 
Knowledge is being vested in the decision-making system of the organization (Johnson & 
Vahine, 1977). Analysis gathered, proves that it is quite understandable why decisions are 
based on collecting and analyzing of different levels of organizational data, resulting in a 
couple of cognitive inputs that are useful and could be used to improve the quality of the 
decision. These inputs can be obtained by having people come together to analyze the various 
data obtained from different sources with one another (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). 
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Adequate research on decisions by managers at the managerial level could offer a 
variety of insight in the field of FDI thereby maximizing resources and minimizing cost. In 
making policies for FDI, both economic and personal determinants should be put into 
consideration. The manager’s personal experience, knowledge, and tolerance for uncertainty 
and risk should also be a significant determining factor. Similarly, there is an attribute of the 
FDI which the manager also needs to put into consideration commonly known as the cultural 
distance. Adequate consideration of the cultural distance should be made especially in 
situations where these managers come from different cultural backgrounds. This aids in making 
these managers make similar investment choices as far and as close as possible, while this may 
be an unrealistic expectation as suggested by Kaheman and Tversky (1984).  
3.3. Decision Making  
There are two views on decision making, (1) the traditional view where sound decision 
making is done in splendid isolation. (2) The institutionalist view where imperfect decision 
making is done in an imperfect institution (Perry, 1998). In the traditional view, according to 
Perry (1998), policymakers have long been encouraged to believe in the mental checklist at the 
heart of conventional economics. If one does say A, B, and C, the result or consequence will 
be D. This according to Perry is merely the illusion of control and sometimes this is not real. 
As Perry responded to, how to effectively present the complexity of decision makers, we map 
them out in the form of series of the equation based on the specific guideline that is often 
unrealistic due to flaw assumptions. Do we observe them loosely in their natural habitat like 
anthropologist do or do we frame them by a mathematical cage? The choice is central to the 
study of decision making, the study of regulation, and law & economic development. If one is 
to promote economic development, it is important to affect the decisions of those individuals 
who shape it. 
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In the traditional view of the economic framework, the decision makers will choose the 
course of action based on a cost-benefit analysis of all potential options. In here, the 
government needs to create a regulation for who can derive the most benefits other than costs 
from acting in the desired way. It is important to take note of the fact that this traditional view 
has fixed assumptions, such as fixed preferences that others will not easily influence it. The 
traditional view also assumed decision makers make rational choices, have the capacity and 
information to decide on the right choice with the aim of promoting their welfare. There was a 
study done to understand the relationship between law and economic behavior and that the 
notion is that law needs to be clear to persuade the decision maker that the benefits of 
compliance outweigh the costs. However, there is a concern among scholars that it is unclear 
whether we know enough about decision making to implement the right policies to regulate the 
markets or economy efficiently. 
The intuitionalist especially the neoclassical economic criticise that the economic 
theory for being unrealistic, narrow, over mathematizes, and has an abstract view of the world 
(Perry, 2003).  They commented that decision makers do not make a decision in isolation and 
because of bounded rationality where no information is available, they are limited by the ability 
to maximize their welfare (Coase, 1988).  However, the decision maker will take into account 
the costs associated with choosing or engaging in a decision, and the roles of the legal 
institution are to reduce such costs (search, information, bargaining, policing, and enforcing) 
as much as possible. As Coase (1988) explained that the role of the legal institution is to reduce 
these costs, neo institutionalist criticises that legal institutions may themselves add to the 
transaction costs.        
A more radical view underlying the assumptions of the traditional economic theory 
comes from Paul Ormerod’s study (1998) entitled Butterfly Economics. He opined that it is 
more realistic to view the market as living organisms operating on the brink of chaos than the 
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traditional view of the market as a machine. He further commented that the decision maker 
does not have fixed ideas or preferences as to what they want to do and will not make choices 
insolation and as the result of these, they do not make predictable decisions.  According to 
Paul, the decision is made either based on past decisions, from new information received, or 
by preferences made by others. It is hard to identify which fundamental decisions will be made 
and what that decision will be in the short term. In the long term with the right mathematical 
tool, the pattern of choice can be predicted and influenced. Table 1 illustrates the differences 
between the Butterfly, Traditional, and Institutional Economic approaches to decision making.  
Ormerod's butterfly economics raises some questions of more specific interests 
especially in the field of law and economic development. As indicated the criticism that 
traditional economic theory is not able to deal with a complicated interactive version of 
decision making proposed by Ormerod, it is indeed, even more, to deal with especially when 
deciding in a difficult cultural context that varies from country to country in a different 
environment. Geert Hofstede’s study on individualism index suggests that people in a different 
culture may think of themselves as an individual or as a member of a group (collectivism). 
Hence, it could be that collectivism or collectivist societies might be more suited to Ormerod’s 
butterfly economic decision making where decision making is more interactive than 
individualist societies. If decision making in a collective society depends or follows the actions 
of others, then will the content of law become less important than societal norms; this could be 
future research that concerns the relationship between law and development taking into 
consideration the cultural aspects of decision makers.    
3.4. Determinants of FDI 
Many studies discuss the correlation between determinants and FDI. Some of these 
determinants are the tax incentives, economic growth, legal systems, corruption, and cultural 
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distance. The following section reviews existing literature related to such determinants that 
have a direct impact on FDI.   
 
Table 1.  
Butterfly, Traditional, and Institutional Economic approach to decision making.        
 
Source: Perry-Kessaris, A. (2003) ‘Decision-Making in a Regulatory Environment: 
Representing the Butterfly’, Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of Peter Slinn, p. 27. 
 
3.4.1. Tax Incentives 
An increasing number of host countries have emerged providing several forms of 
investment incentives to attract potential FDIs such as the MNCs. These investment incentives 
have gained vital importance with rapid globalization and liberalization of trade around the 
world. Such trades are globally carried out through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
under the supervision of regional agreements of European Union (EU), ASEAN (All South 
East Asia Nations), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). With the internationalization of capital markets, it has limited the 
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successes and possibilities of using the exchange rate policy as an instrument to influence 
relative competitiveness among countries. 
There are many benefits cited in favor of FDI due to increasing local employment in 
the host country and the spillover effect improving the productivity of domestic firms by 
developing their technologies side by side and honing the skills of its employees (Taylor, 2000 
and Easson, 2001). Only then, such local firms may be able to provide forward-end and back-
end support to these foreign investors such as the MNCs. Except for export processing zones 
and industrial zones because in such places infrastructure and land are present in either the free 
form of a lease or subsidized form of a lease respectively. Host countries, especially the 
developing economies, are more likely to base their incentives on tax reductions such as tax 
holidays for several years. Tax incentives also influence decisions on FDI through its 
cumulative effects on the cost of capitals, treatment of debts, equity financing, and return on 
investments. The more favorable these are to foreign investors the higher the possibility of 
investment inflows. 
Most FDI incentives apply to greenfield investments; however, increasing investments 
are mostly in the form of foreign acquisitions or mergers of existing local firms. These make it 
much easier for an MNC to set up supply chains and production networks which can produce 
at lower operating costs. Such operating costs will benefit multinational firms due to leveraging 
of the tax incentives and refining export advantages to international customers. This will 
ultimately benefit foreign investors and the affiliated firms more than making sales to local 
customers.    
However, there are two types of arguments as to whether a host country’s costs for 
providing the incentives are justified, or the foreign investments are yielding the benefits 
(spillovers) more significantly equal to the costs incurred by the host country. Firstly, it is hard 
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to make a reliable calculation on the spillovers’ effect on the costs incurred by the host country. 
The concern is whether foreign investments are attracted to the host country by investment 
incentives rather than economic fundamentals. If yes, then these investments may relocate to 
another host country where incentives are considered more generous. Secondly, if foreign 
investments do not differ much from the local firms such as products, technologies, and skills, 
then subsidizing these investments may reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms. This 
creates significant losses, unemployment, and reduction in social welfares. While these are all 
valid concerns, it is important for policymakers to establish appropriate rules and regulations 
that are not biased or against foreign investors.      
Several researchers discussed the various aspects of spillover effects. MacDougall 
(1960) analyzed the general welfare effects of foreign investment. Corden (1967) looked at the 
impact of Foreign Direct Investment on optimum trade policy. Caves (1971) examined the 
industrial pattern and welfare effects of FDI. These studies indicate that the characteristics of 
the host country and host industry matter and it points to more significant benefits one shall 
reap from an FDI. However, such spillovers do not happen automatically. The spillovers are 
dependent on the motivation of the local firms to engage in learning new knowledge, 
technologies, skills, and other unique capabilities introduced by the foreign investors.   
3.4.2. Economic Growth 
Improvements in productivity primarily drive economic growth per capita. Growth is 
also partly dependent on skills and technological development. Such developments allow 
manufactured goods and services to be produced with fewer resources. Economic growth can 
occur in two ways: via investments and through high savings. Economic growth from 
investments creates jobs, reduce unemployment, and increase disposable incomes which in 
return generate more investments. On the other hand, economic growth obtained through high 
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savings lead to higher output per capita as the capital accumulated by these individuals also 
increases. 
Conventional measurement of growth is the rise in the percentage rate of real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which also signifies that the economy is growing in a positive 
direction regarding investment and employment. Previously, FDI and economic growth 
relationships have widely been studied with questionable results. Empirical, neoclassical, and 
endogenous growth models have been extensively used, involving techniques such as ordinary 
least square, Granger causality, and error correction models to test the benefits of FDI (Almfraji 
& Almsafir 2013).  
As FDI has a direct or indirect impact on economic growth, not only does it increase 
skills, technologies, and human capital improvements, but it also stimulates the domestic 
market investment which in turn creates additional economic growth. Thus, FDI and local 
market investment can be coined as complementary (Kentor 1998). However, a high 
dependency on FDI could slow economic growth in comparison to low dependence. High FDI 
dependency reduces the country’s autonomy and does not help the long-term interest of the 
domestic market (Dixon & Boswell, 1996).   
A study by Li and Liu in 2005, comprises a panel of data analysis in 84 countries for 
29 years (1970-1999). They found that the interaction between FDI and human capital has a 
substantial positive effect on economic growth in developing countries. A study by Bengoa et 
al. (2003) carried out a panel of data analysis in 18 Latin American countries for 29 years 
(1970-1999). He found that for FDI to create a positive impact on economic growth, a country 
must have sufficient levels of human capital, financial stability, and liberalized capital market 
to benefit from long-term capital inflows. 
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3.4.3. Legal System 
There are well developed theoretical arguments that FDI flow depends on the clarity, 
transparency, and predictability of the host country’s legal system. However, there is a 
seemingly lack of robust empirical evidence to suggest that such relationships practically exists 
(Perry, 2000). There is also a lack of sufficient understanding on how a legal system influences 
the FDI in developing countries and regions such as ASEAN. Development agencies regularly 
debate that FDI flow is, to some extent, determined by the effectiveness of the host country’s 
legal system.  The World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Organization 
for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) are firmly committed to provide funding 
and support legal reforms in developing countries to reduce legal system uncertainty. The 
World Bank Report (1997) concluded that the worst damage that a host country can do to the 
prospect of investments is to create an environment of uncertainty. Foreign Investment 
Advisory of the World Group (FIAS) commented that an uncertain legal system of a host 
country would increase the withdrawal of investors. These investors are such who may hold a 
definite intention of investing in that country’s specific economy. This ultimately results in 
minimizing the percentage of other potential investors.  
White et al. (2015), defined legal system uncertainty as for the host country having well 
written and adequate investment and contract codes which are relatively transparent. By 
transparency, it indicates that they must have allowances for international arbitration of 
disputes, legal guarantees against expropriation, and minimal corruption within the judiciary 
institutions. The legal system must have equal treatment of law for both local and foreign firms, 
efficient courts which do not delay in offering legal decisions, and the effective enforcement 
of rules and regulations incoherence to the law. 
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An uncertain legal system not only creates risks, but it also creates more transactional 
costs associated with corrupt judiciaries and governments. This may occur because they may 
be unwilling to enforce the rule of laws and regulations effectively. Sometimes, when these 
countries liberate their markets, there are constant changes to the rule of laws and regulations 
which might hamper investors’ investment spectrums. They become reluctant to commit a 
substantial amount of their resources thus limiting the countries’ ability to attract FDI. 
Therefore, it is theorized that foreign investors are attracted to a country with legal systems that 
are clear, transparent, and are predictable. They are considered free from corruption. Such legal 
systems are believed to reduce transactional costs as the rule of laws are religiously enforced 
within institutions.         
Studies have also shown that MNCs prefer direct investment in markets with sound 
legal systems that do not frequently fluctuate, especially its investment laws. Bevan (2004) 
opined that these foreign investors should be allowed an even playing field with all court cases 
to be resolved expeditiously. However, research has shown that some individual foreign 
investors are only attracted to countries with a certain degree of legal uncertainty, as they firmly 
believe that the risk of the legal system does not necessarily equate to unpredictability as long 
as they have the competencies to deal with the uncertainty itself. A study by Zhou and 
Witteloostuijin (2010) found that such investors may have experience in dealing with the legal 
system uncertainty based on prior experiences. This creates an opportunity for them to 
negotiate investment terms with the government that will give them a competitive edge over 
their competitors. Cuervo-Cazurra and Gene’s (2008) study found that the origin of the investor 
influences investment decisions, especially the one encircling domestic investment. These local 
investors, who probably hold similar cultural backgrounds opined that legal uncertainty is not 
always a hazardous opportunity.   
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This provides a good indication that FDI perception of the host country’s legal system 
will affect the investment decisions. Brouther (2008) found that raw materials & natural 
resources seeking FDI as compared to Market-seeking FDI are more sensitive to adverse 
impact and uncertain legal system, for example, from transparency and corruption. The reason 
is market-seeking FDI investors, will evaluate the trade-off between costs associated with 
uncertainty in the legal system and the market growth potential. This often varies depending 
on the government incentives and the aims of the market seeking FDI investors. However, such 
trade-off as describe does not necessarily apply to all form of FDIs. The ability for the FDI 
Investors to negotiate with the government on pre-emptive opportunities, such as the 
opportunity of being the first investor to invest, which allows the investor to take advantage of 
market inefficiencies caused by legal system uncertainty. This provides an opportunity for an 
FDI investor who seeks to operate in this environment, an edge over the market with their liable 
legal system (Peng, 2003; Roth & Kostova, 2003). However, even when the host country has 
a stable legal system, it is found from experience that investors will still negotiate with the 
government for favorable benefits especially if the investment fits the government core 
economic strategy. From these several types of research, it appears that FDI investors prefer 
two types of legal system environments, one that is attracted to high-level legal system certainty 
and the other an uncertain legal system. 
Neo-institutional economics has further pointed out the potential limitation on the role 
of the legal system and whether it functions as one of the determinants that affect FDI (Perry, 
2000). The debate circulates the factor that it is not necessarily the role of the legal system 
which affects FDI decisions, but there are other causes. For instance, in situations where the 
foreign investor is affected by bounded rationality, the possibility of being able to evaluate all 
factors thoroughly becomes a limitation. This constraint is due to the limitation of human 
beings’ computational capacity. Hence, investor’s perception, rather than the reality of the host 
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country’s legal system, results in a direct impact on the investor’s investment decision. Another 
reason in our opinion is, not every foreign investor prioritizes the host country’s legal system 
as an important investment determinant. Some investors may prefer the legal system to be 
vague or ambiguous so that they can leverage the investment terms to their advantage.  
Hewko’s (2002) study found that the most critical factor attracting an FDI remains the 
focus of business opportunities even if the legal system is inadequate. However, the opposite 
also holds true as having an inadequate legal system which may dissuade foreign investors. In 
many cases, a risk-reward analysis will need to be carried out on the potential return on 
investment by a foreign investor. This includes evaluating the impact on the investor’s firm 
image and reputation within the industry. While, there are debates on whether the legal system 
is a determinant of FDI, there is no study which represents or identifies how, when, and why 
investors allow the situation of the host countries’ legal system to influence their decision 
making. There is certainly a gap between how, when, and why investors’ decisions are 
influenced and how, when, and why they would wish their decisions to be influenced.  
A. Common Types of Legal System: 
A study by Mahoney et al., (2001) finds that countries with legal systems based on 
common law have financial markets that are more developed versus countries that do not use 
common law. As a result, these countries experienced higher economic growth during the 
period from 1960-1992.  Mahoney also presented instrumental variable results that suggest that 
common law produces faster growth due to greater security and protection of property and 
contract rights. 
Building off the recent works (Jensen, 2003 and 2006; Li & Resnick, 2003; Li, 2006; 
Bigliser & Staats, 2010) and drawing the study results from Powell and Rickard (2010), Lee 
(2014) conducted a panel data study on 114 developing countries from 1970–2007. Lee’s 
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research illustrates that countries with common legal systems attract higher foreign direct 
investments than countries with civil law or Islamic legal systems.  The reasons, common law 
is understood to promote the rule of law and protect property rights, has higher efficiency, 
better contract enforcement, more judiciary autonomy, and more market-oriented regulations.          
Powell and Mitchell (2007) in their research seek to understand why some countries 
accept the jurisdiction of the international court of justice more readily than others. The theory 
focuses on the world’s three major legal system: these are civil law, common law, and Islamic 
law. Important characteristics of this legal system are stared decisis (use of precedents), bona 
fides (good faith in contracting) and paste sunt servanda (keeping promises), refer to table 2. 
These legal systems are integrated into an expressive theory of adjudication which focuses on 
how adjudication enhances interstate cooperation by understanding the correlation between 
strategies, constructing focal points and signaling information. Their empirical analyses show 
that civil law states are more likely to accept the jurisdiction of the international court of justice 
than the common law or Islamic law.  
The use of precedents when making a legal judgment is more prevalent in common law 
systems but absent in civil and Islamic law systems. The doctrine of precedents or stare decisis, 
states that a judge is obliged to examine how the previous judges have dealt with similar cases 
when the judge is trying a case. It states that when a judicial decision has previously settled a 
similar case, it forms precedent which no judge should depart from onwards (Opolot, 1980). 
The stare decisis doctrine is not found in a civil law system that is based on Roman ius civile. 
The judge’s task in this civil legal system is considered to be passive and to implement rules 
contained mainly in codes, laws, and statues. The difference is not however as sharp in practice 
as in theory. Civil law court, in fact, consults precedents and the decisions of higher courts 
when necessary (Mahoney et al., 2001). Stare decisis doctrines is also absent in Islamic law 
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where the law is derived based on four principal sources: these are Quran, Sunna, judicial 
consensus, and analogical reasoning (Vago, 2000).    
Table 2.  
Characteristics of Legal Systems 
 
Source: Powell, E. J. and Mitchell, S. M. (2007) ‘The International Court of Justice and the 
World’s Three Legal Systems,’ The Journal of Politics, 69(2), pp. 397–415. 
 Another major difference between civil, common and Islamic law system is the 
principle, bona fides or good faith concerning contracts.  The concept of good faith requires 
parties to a contract to keep their promises to the agreed terms & conditions and to abstain from 
being dishonest or failing to keep to their promises. The principle of good faith of bona fides 
consists of three key elements; these are honesty, fairness, and reason (Zimmermann et al. 
2000).  Common law systems do not generally recognize contracts that are executed base on 
good faith as compared to the civil law and the Islamic law systems.  Common law and civil 
law expect the obligation to keep the promises, or pacta sunt servanda is less paramount as 
compared to Islamic law systems.  Common law systems can release all parties from their 
contractual obligation should an event occurred that might make a contract impossible to fulfill, 
for example, a force majeure as compared to civil law systems. Civil law systems which only 
allow partial release from a contract obligation and to resume when the situation conducive to 
the fulfillment of the contract is restored.             
Common law systems tend to have fewer restrictions from the government on economic 
liberties and allow courts to have the power to enforce rules and laws without being the 
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apparatus of the government. Investors prefer a common law system due to its degree of 
certainty of judgment because of the strate decisis doctrine. As in the case of the Civil law 
system, the judge plays a passive role; the judicial decision is crammed into all factors of the 
cases in existing laws, codes, or statues regardless of the economic consequences and fairness. 
There is no separation between government officials from judiciary authority. Investors less 
prefer this system as judgment is uncertain and could be subject to corruption.     
Some scholars argue that common law’s adversarial adjudication procedures tend to 
result in survival of efficient rules. The unspoken implications are that civil law is less efficient 
than when judges make the law. There is an argument that civil law has incentives to create 
efficiencies and not merely distribute and follow the rules and codes. Common law court does 
promote wealth destroying and rent-seeking ligation that prompt Gordon (1997) to argue in 
favor of the civil law.                 
 
3.4.4. Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance is a widely used construct for international businesses. It is of great 
importance when firms are comparing similarities or difference between cultures while 
considering a foreign investment. Usually, this takes place between the host country and the 
origin country of the investors. Shenkar (2001) classified cultural distance into three primary 
categories. The first category determines the sequence of investment in the Foreign Direct 
Investment decision by MNCs. For instance, investing in regions near the home country before 
moving further into other regions. The second category determines the choice of entry mode. 
For example, its entry mode could be a joint-venture, wholly owned subsidiary and merger or 
acquisition. The last category explains the variables such as culture and language similarities 
needed for MNCs to succeed in their foreign investments. It also determines their performance 
variations. 
 32 
 
Shenkar (2001) concluded that the cultural distance cultural distance construct makes a 
logical illusion of equivalence, where the cultural dimensions are treated by ignoring the 
conceptual significant and meaningful effect of the specific cultural dimensions, he tagged this 
illusion. This explains the inconsistencies obtained on  FDI especially on the three FDI 
categories discussed earlier. Shenkar (2001) analyzed the main illusions on the cultural distance 
to be that of symmetry, stability, linearity, causality, and discordance.  In the case of symmetry,  
investing from country A to country B is not the same as investing from country B to country 
A, though there isn't any support for such assumption.  
Culture is not static as it changes over time, as firms get more experience in a country 
the type of investment mode may change. For instance, the Japanese firm would prefer a joint 
venture in United States of America other than in China as they would gain adequate experience 
and would prefer owning a higher percentage of the subsidiary being invested.  
On linearity, the further the culture distance the worse the performance of an FDI will 
be, as managers or decision-makers would not consider cultural distances that are far apart as 
their top priority even though they may invest at a later stage. Unfortunately, the larger the 
cultural distance, the lesser the control will be even though these are all questionable 
assumptions. Davidson (1980) suggested that firms taking their first FDI will most likely 
choose countries with a similar culture to that organization in advance stages of an FDI. 
Interestingly, culture distance is not the only determining factor that affects investment 
decisions; there are many other attributes such as languages opines by Buckley and Casson  
(2016) and political instability by Thunnell (1977).  
Lastly, the illusion of discordance and the difference in culture generate a lack of fit 
and hence will hinder investment decision. Tallman and Shenkar (1994) suggested that not 
every cultural gap will affect the performance of the investment, the particular aspect may be 
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more or less critical, and the same applies to the ability to transact and operate. Hofseted (1989) 
suggested that some MNCs will expect the performance (masculine) and relationship 
(feminine) to be mutually dependent, thereby creating the impression that another culture’s 
weakness might be some other cultures strength.  
Barkema and Vermeulun (1998) opined that increasing cultural distance makes cross-
border joint ventures most likely to fail. This is further supported by studies of Li and Guisinger 
(1991) and Larimo (1998) who found that the survival rate of a joint venture in a wide cultural 
distance is low. However, a study by Morosini (1998) found that cultural distance, in fact, 
improves the performance of cross-border acquisitions as new business practices are 
implemented within the acquired businesses.     
The use of cultural distance in investment literature is also known as the theory of 
familiarity, which opined that organizations are less likely to invest in culturally distant 
markets. A study by Yoshino in 1976 on Japan’s cultural distance from the West, indicated that 
there were numerous incompatibilities. These incompatibilities were a significant determining 
factor in inhibiting the Japanese firms from investing in the West. Similarly, owing to the 
numerous cultural similarities between the United States of America, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom. There has been a significant amount of substantial investment from the United States 
of America to Canada and the United Kingdom, despite the irrelative smaller market size and 
growth (Davidson, 1980). Dunning (1988) suggested that more considerable cultural distance 
encourages FDI. Ideally, these countries tend to overcome transactional and market failures 
and are spared from organizations’ operational risks. Cultural distance comprises of sub-
variables such as Culture & Language Similarity, Ethnic Similarity, Egalitarianism Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Future Orientation.  
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A. Culture and Language Similarity 
Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from others. Culture is learned and not innate (Hofstede, 2010). 
Research has also found that firms will first invest in countries that they are familiar with and 
usually close to their home country to gain more experience before moving further away. 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) observed that Swedish firms progressively expanded from their 
home country to neighboring countries before moving on to broader cultural distances. This 
study was later known as the Uppsala Model at the Scandinavian School. However, a study by 
Benito and Gripsrud (1992) did not find any relevance to such FDI sequence existence claimed 
by the Uppsala model. Lee et al. (2008) also advised on the various merits associated with the 
importance of culture similarity in the investment decision. Logically, people with similar 
language, cultural heritage, physical appearance, and born in the same region could be 
considered as a subset of cultural similarity. They found in their study that there is a higher 
tendency where a home country is found investing in the host country with similar cultural 
backgrounds. However, it is not entirely clear if this similarity, in any way, assists in 
productivity and performance of an organization.  
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) study also show that foreign investors are attracted to host 
countries that are culturally similar to theirs. Sharing similar values and attitudes will result in 
higher local knowledge of the market, customers, and business practices. Greater cultural 
differences create higher transaction costs of doing business,  obtaining information, and 
dealing with local bureaucracy. Lucke and Eichler’s (2016) study further suggested that higher 
levels of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity have no impact on foreign investment within 
host a country as the investor is attracted to less diversity than their own. High levels of 
diversity can create tension instead of being open-minded and innovative initiatives. Hergueux 
(2012) opined that this seems to be more common in host countries with weak institutions. 
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Language influences the way we behave, as it is a mental model framing activity and 
behavior. This also means culture is inherent in the language itself (Claes, 1995). The common 
language also helps in the transfer of knowledge, for example, laws and regulations, between 
the sender having the ability to transmit the knowledge and receiver having the absorptive 
capacity of the knowledge being transferred. Some may take comfort in knowing the growing 
importance of English as a universal language globally used to overcome the language barrier. 
Whereas, several studies also examine the impact of having common language on foreign 
investments. Speaking the same language reduces misunderstandings involved in conducting 
cross-border business and eliminates information asymmetries (Portes & Rey, 2005; Daude & 
Fratzscher, 2008).  
As the result of sharing a common language, it increases the level of foreign investment 
flowing within a specific country (Andersson 2000). Language plays a critical role in 
intercultural interactions. Having to express oneself in another language means having to adopt 
someone else’s frame of reference. Remaining unknown to the language of one’s country 
residents may result in causing an individual to the miss the subtleties of the culture keeping 
them, relatively an outsider. Language is a vehicle of our thoughts, and it also becomes a ruling 
cause of cultural clashes (Hofstede, 2001). Thus, people speaking the same language tend to 
be more comfortable with each other in social and business groups. The Davidson (1980) study 
found out that trade and consequently investment that occurs between two countries such as 
the United States of America and the other nations are mainly due to sharing similar tastes in 
cultural preferences. Such cultural similarity also encourages investment and information on 
new products to be quickly disseminated. All in all, managers are not entirely ignorant of the 
local market, and therefore exhibit less risk-adverse behaviors.  
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From the discussion on the legal system, cultural distance and culture & language 
similarity, we expect that the clarity of the legal system will affect a manager’s willingness to 
invest. Henceforth, we hypothesize: 
H1: The clarity of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ willingness 
to invest. 
We also expect there is an interaction effect between culture similarity and language 
similarity respectively with the clarity of the legal system further affecting the degree of 
managers’ willingness to invest. These lead us to the state the following hypotheses: 
H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system will 
affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.   
 
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system will 
affect the degree of the manager’s willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language similarity. 
 
In addition to clarity of the legal system, we expect the transparency of the legal system 
will affect the managers’ willingness to invest. Similar to the clarity of the legal system, we 
expect there is an interaction between cultural similarity and language similarity respectively 
with the transparency of the legal system affecting the degree of manager’s willingness to 
invest. We state these hypotheses: 
H2: The transparency of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.    
 
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.   
 
H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the 
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managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of Language 
Similarity.  
 
B. Ethnic Similarity  
It is not uncommon to observe that virtually all societies are made up of diverse ethnic 
groups that vary in power and status. Their struggle to improve status and power is one of the 
most critical aspects of social change (Yinger, 1983). There lies a strong tendency to assume 
that foreign investors with similar cultural, language, society, and common background are 
also known to share the same ethnic similarity where the host country is supposed to perform 
better due to social connection and adaptation. Huang et al. (2013) proved otherwise, as they 
conducted research and found out that non-ethnic Chinese firms in China performed better than 
the ethnic Chinese firms. They classified the ethnic Chinese countries to be Hongkong, Macau, 
and Taiwan.   
These non-ethnic Chinese firms owing to their cultural dissimilarities entered China to 
learn deeply about the market and invest in technology and human capital with a long-term 
plan. Such a plan was mandated to create a long-term impact on their performance as opposed 
to any ethnic Chinese firm. The investment flows from ethnic Chinese firms into China were 
found to be much higher than non-ethnic Chinese firms. However, the reasons for ethnic 
Chinese firms poor performance were due to the short-term outlook of the socially connected 
ethnic firms. What they did not realize was that they neglected to build management procedures 
and practices which some may not profoundly value. This impeded the firms from responding 
to increasing trades, competitions, and changing technologies. The tendency to recruit talent 
based on family and kinship ties instead of managerial and technical skills did not help either. 
As Burt explains in his (1997) study, strong kinship ties may not be suitable as it may hinder 
creativity and be detrimental to firms long-term performances. 
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Jean et al. (2011) were researching 88 Taiwanese firms investing in China, and they 
found that ethnic similarity of top managers matters when deciding the location of an FDI. 
They also found that ethnicities do not improve FDI firms performance in China. They noticed 
that the higher a foreign investor's technology capabilities, the lower the positive effect of 
managerial ethnic on the performance of the firm. Non-ethnic firms were found to possess 
superior resources and practices, but not socially adaptable in the host country. The ethnic 
Chinese firms are more familiar with the local environment and hence more socially embedded 
into the culture of the host country. They can deal with uncertainty much better than ethnic 
Chinese firms which cannot.  
There is evidence to suggest that investors from Western countries are more sensitive 
to the formal legal system than investors from Asia. They are concerned about following the 
laws as their culture places a higher premium on the rule of laws. It has also been observed that 
business relationships between private sectors and countries in Asia are less formalized than in 
Western countries (Perry, 2000). Despite all the laws and regulations that are being laid down 
by host countries, we opined that in Asian countries due to a similar ethnicity, large businesses 
have some degree of pre-emptive involvement in the lawmaking process which is quite similar 
to the lobbying concept in the West. This makes ethnic similarity a significant determining 
factor in investments. 
From the discussion on the legal system and cultural distance (including ethnic 
similarity), we expect that there is an interaction effect between the clarity of the legal system 
and transparency of the legal system respectively with ethnic similarity further affecting the 
degree of managers’ willingness to invest. These lead us to hypothesize: 
H1C:  The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system will 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity.  
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H2C:  The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity. 
 
C. Future Orientiation 
Holmes et al. (2012) asserted that a country with a future-oriented culture emphasizes 
the importance of growing their economy and firms. The government and investors, typically, 
take a long-term view of the various pros and cons of an investment before approving it. Long-
term view means having a culture that fosters the virtues such as perseverance and is thrift 
oriented toward future rewards instead of short-term gains. These attributes will allow the firms 
to grow their market share and GDPs progressively. It also gives the government adequate time 
to establish and refine their long-standing economic policies, governance, and institutions that 
will attract foreign investments and financial intermediaries such as banks to make capitals 
available, thereby influencing capital investments from both, domestic and foreign investors.  
In a time of economic slowdown, the government will also take a long-term view by 
allowing temporary budget deficits, if necessary. They help the firms in the form of tax rebates, 
exploring ways to lower their firms’ operations cost and support firms’ employees for training 
or skill upgrading. Here, the government will partially bear parts of the costs. A future-oriented 
culture does not necessarily reside with the local firms and government of the host country. It 
can also apply to foreign firms that are willing to make long-term investments in exchange for 
investment benefits, such as tax incentives from the governments. These allow the foreign firms 
another cost improvement avenue to remain fairly competitive in the markets. We expect future 
orientation cultures will increase managers’ willingness to invest. 
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D. Uncertainty Avoidance 
Bhardwaj et al. (2007) suggested that cultural value holds the clue to business practices, 
thereby creating a difference in decision making. Such decisions are partially attributed to the 
economic and institutional policy-based framework of the host country. Cultural distance’s 
variables, such as uncertainty avoidance and trust influence the choice of investment locations. 
An uncertainty avoidance culture foster a belief in absolute truth and can, therefore, be 
interpreted as the extent to which the people of a culture feel threatened by an unknown or 
uncertain situation. Uncertainty avoidance is important as its identified attitude towards risk 
and how the allocation of assets are being governed.   
Uncertainty avoidance does not mean risk avoidance. The risk is usually expressed as 
the percentage of probability at which an event will happen, whereas uncertainty cannot be 
quantified because there are no probabilities attached to it. Uncertainty avoidance reduces 
ambiguity but not risk; paradoxically, people sometimes are prepared to engage in risky 
behavior to reduce ambiguities.      
High uncertainty avoidance countries which have this perception that what is different 
is dangerous creates additional roadblock or barrier for foreign investment. They establish rules 
and regulations to the detriment of aspiring investors. They do not trust the foreign investment 
objectives thereby guarding their minds against their various policies in firms, institutions, and 
investors as they expect the event to be interpretable and predictable. This, in turn, weakens 
the trust and relationships, especially with the investors. People in countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance tend to rely on an authority figure and refer to them for guidance. This 
type of culture tends to refuse change, avoid conflict, abide by rules, and have higher work 
stress. In contrast, people living in low uncertainty avoidance will be more comfortable with 
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ambiguity, chaos, and novelty. The culture is more open to change, innovation, and tolerance 
of diversity. 
The foreign firms will prefer to invest in a country with low levels of uncertainty 
avoidance and high levels of trust.  As the degree of uncertainty avoidance increases, the trust 
will be weaker between a foreign investor and the host country. Takeuchi et al. (2000) opined 
that Japan attracted much lower FDI due to its numerous formal rules which often discourages 
FDI. This is because they have a high level of uncertainty avoidance. Takahashi et al. (2000) 
found the Japanese to be less trusting and trustworthy exchange partners as compared to 
cultural Chinese.  The Japanese seek long-term assurance networks while the Chinese use a 
guanxi-based approach to building social networks. Cultural interaction and social exchange 
between members of different societies affect managerial investments and the decision-making 
process. The need for excessive laws and regulation in high uncertainty avoidance cultures can 
be emotional; it tends to lead to rule based behavior that could be purely ritual and even 
dysfunctional. As the result of high uncertainty avoidance culture, we expect a manager’s 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of uncertainty avoidance of the 
host country.     
 
3.4.5. Corruption 
Research on corruption and the relationship with FDI is inconclusive since some studies 
have found corruption to deter FDI while others have found the opposite. Corruption is defined 
in several ways. Roy and Oliver (2009) defined corruption as the abuse of public office for 
personal gain, and this definition can also apply to private sectors or firms. Davoodi et al. 
(2002) defined corruption as an intentional violation of the principle of impartiality in the 
process of decision making to appropriate a benefice. The corruption perception index, a form 
of measurement on corruption, refer to Appendix A table A7 shows the level of corruption in 
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countries around the globe. The higher the index, the higher the perception of corruption. Some 
studies used data from Political Risk Service, World Bank, and World Economic Forum. 
Corruption hurts the ethics and integrity of a country and can adversely affect the desire of 
investors to invest in that country. It may reduce operational efficiency and hence lower its 
ability to compete. It distorts trust in public institutions, affects income distribution, and 
increases poverty. MNCs will typically exercise caution when investing in foreign countries 
with high corruption perception indexes. They might feel insecure knowing there might be 
unnecessary transactions and incremental costs on operations both at the individual and firm 
level and reduce the drive to be competitive.  
While corruption and FDI is a primary concern, this determinant needs to be cautiously 
analyzed. The debate on whether it will reduce or increase investment is a debatable moot point 
as there is no clear evidence that it hinders FDI. Hines (1995) did not find any negative 
relationship between corruption and FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992) did not discover any 
significant negative relationship either. Drabek and Payne (2002) established that FDI was 
negatively affected by non-transparency of the host country, which was a determinant of 
corruption measurement. Mauro (1995), Wei (2000), and Voyer and Beamish (2004) 
conducted studies that found negative impacts on FDI. However,  Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
and Egger and Winner (2005) did not find such adverse impact. Instead, the latter found 
corruption to have a robust stimulus for FDI. Buehn and Schneider (2012) established that high 
corruption increases the shadow economy associated with illegal trade, creates an incentive to 
go underground, and hence deter foreign investors. 
There is a tendency for home countries with a low corruption perception index to avoid 
investing in host countries with a high corruption perception index. Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) found that the difference in host and home country corruption levels has a negative 
impact on FDI. Investors tend to prefer investing in a country with a similar level of corruption 
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as it presents a low level of uncertainty. The facts remain that the degree of uncertainty, 
especially the unpredictability of the judicial system will cause the transaction costs associated 
with corruption to vary depending on the foreign investors’ country of origin.  
Firms which evolved from highly corrupted environments may not be as sensitive to 
the high levels of corruption in the host countries. The reason is that they are either dealing 
with a similar experience from the past and can mitigate transaction costs due to uncertainty. 
They also realized that they could leverage this gap to their advantage by gaining favorable 
investment benefits from the governments for example, in the form of the low tax rate to remain 
reasonably competitive (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Habib and Zurawicki (1992) commented that 
exposure to corruption in the home country provides a learning curve for firms to handle 
corruption abroad. They will acquire the skills to manage corruption and possess a certain 
degree of tolerance to bribery. They might even develop competitive advantages against those 
firms that do not have the skills and face FDI failures.   
A decision to enter a foreign market thru FDI is a function of having the knowledge 
and experience in the new market as these determinants help reduce the level of uncertainty 
(Aharoni, 1966). Insufficient foreign market knowledge and the lack of available information 
are some of the significant challenges in FDI. Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990) categorized 
the psychological and physical distance between home and host country as an essential 
consideration in FDI with MNCs. They tend to enter or expand first to markets that they 
perceive to be psychologically and/or closer from a physical distance. There is also a tendency 
for the firms to be biased by forming a weak perception about the host country for being corrupt 
especially the judiciary institutions when the psychological and/or physical distance from their 
home country is vast. As a result,  it is the foreign investor's perception of the host country’s 
legal system, rather than reality, that will have an impact on their investment decision. Benito 
and Gripsrud (1991) and Engwall and Walenstal (1988) found no support for the theory that 
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first FDI by a firm is made in a country that is psychologically closer or has similar culture, 
language, and ethnic similarity.  
We expect that an increase in corruption level of the legal system will have a negative 
impact on the managers’ willingness to invest. We also expect that the moderation or 
interaction effect of culture similarity, language similarity, and ethnic similarity respectively 
with the corruption of the legal system will affect the degree of managerial willingness to 
invest. From the discussion on ethnic similarity, cultural similarity, and language similarity, 
taken together with the corruption of the legal system, we therefore hypothesize: 
H3: The corruption of the legal system is negatively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.  
 
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.  
 
H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language similarity.  
 
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity.  
 
3.4.6 Enforcement of Legal System 
Hewko’s (2003) study found that investors from a different country have a varying 
degree of tolerance for the imperfection of the host country’s legal system and they bring along 
different values, perspectives, and practices. A foreign investor whose origin is from a country 
with a tradition of corruption and inadequate enforcement of legal systems may have a different 
view and contribution to the legal system than an investor from the opposite side of the 
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enforcement and corruption spectrum. Investors will prefer a legal system that is fair, open, 
and transparent to one where the rule of law is absent. However, the degree of impact on FDI 
decision is unclear due to the lack of empirical evidence. There is also the debate that some 
investors are not sensitive to the legal system no matter the effectiveness and efficacy of the 
legal system. Alternatively, how robust it is being enforced by the owner who is in the host 
country as to what types of investors they want to attract and what kind of legal system and its 
reform if any they intended to institute.        
In addition to unclear, unpredictable, and non-transparent legal systems discussed 
earlier, inadequate enforcement of the legal system also increases transaction costs. Transaction 
costs arise due to the court procedures being delayed and court decisions being subjected to 
bribery. This leads to the unpredictability of the laws and inconsistency in the interpretation of 
the rules.  
Investors who want to invest in a host country with a long-term orientation strategy 
may be more tolerant to deficiencies in the legal system. This strategy, for example, could be 
leveraging on the low-cost resources and/or natural resources with a potentially high rate of 
return in the long-term. These deficiencies in the legal system usually take time to reform and 
sometimes require feedback from the local and foreign investors. Such cycles are typically 
repeated several times until the legal system is near an ideal state that conforms to the standard 
that is required of a market economy. Thus, it is not uncommon to have investors with similar 
ethnicities, cultures, and languages to the host country to be more tolerant of inadequate 
enforcement of the legal system. Therefore, we hypothesize;   
H4: The enforcement of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.   
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H4D: The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of physical distance. 
   
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the 
managers’ willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of psychological 
distance. 
 
We have discussed in the earlier section culture similarity, language similarity, ethnic 
similarity, and the interaction effect that these moderators have on clarity, transparency, and 
corruption of the legal system affecting the managers’ willingness to invest. We would expect 
the same phenomenon to apply to the enforcement of the legal system. Therefore  we 
hypothesize:   
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal System 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.  
 
H4B: The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the 
managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language 
similarity.   
 
H4C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity   
 
3.4.7. Egalitarian society 
Another aspect of cultural dimension that will also affect investment flow and decision 
making is a country’s egalitarian society. Wikipedia (2017) defined egalitarian society as a 
society which believes that all people are equally important and should be treated equally. 
Sigest, Lict, and Schwartz (2011) commented in their research, society’s cultural orientation 
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toward egalitarianism is manifested by intolerance to the abuse of market and political power 
and the desire to protect the weak and needy. Egalitarianism has a direct effect on FDI flows 
which is likely to occur when managers have direct influence over the business contacts. For 
investment flow is entirely independent of the market size therefore for its growth does not 
depend on the market size. Some organizations might be more inclined to invest out of a 
commitment to society and to have a corporate social responsibility as part of their organization 
value. We believe that the host country and managers are key players in making an investment 
decision and are responsible for committing to the society regardless of psychological distance, 
culture differences, language barriers, and environmental uncertainty. 
 
3.4.8. Commitment to Market 
Commitment to market involves the shared obligations of firms investing in the host 
country and does not necessarily include resources, market sizes, and opportunities. It is crucial 
to ensure foreign firms get the needed resources for their foreign investments. For example, 
from their parent firms. However, solely addressing market commitment regarding firms’ 
resources can be inaccurate and limiting. The attitudes, the intention of the managers, the 
relationships between firms, and the psychological obligations are just as equally important. 
Commitment is a multidimensional construct that comprises of instruments, psychological, 
attitudinal, and temporal components (Gundlach et al., 1995).   
Foreign investment processes expect the firms to not only commit to the market but 
commit to acquire market knowledge and commit to being involved in the market. These 
factors are interacting with one another as the result of the dynamic process of growth and 
learning while operating in the host country. Each of these factors cannot operate in isolation 
as foreign investment processes are not static and unidirectional. Market involvement by firms 
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will provide the firms with necessary market knowledge and it, in turn, reflects the level of 
market commitment by the firms (Lamb & Liesh, 2002). Investors might invest in a host 
country for a strategic reason(s) other than just profit maximization in the beginning. Having 
the market knowledge will be essential to their success. It is not unusual for investments such 
as FDI to fail due to lack of market knowledge caused by the lack of market commitment and 
involvement by managers. Managers’ commitment to market will also be depended on market 
size or opportunity. The greater the market size or opportunity, the greater will be the expected 
market commitment. Also, we also expect the two cultural distance’s variables, a future 
orientation of the host country’s economy and an uncertainty avoidance of the host country 
population will also affect a manager’s decision on FDI.  We expect the following proposed 
hypotheses to be valid: 
5H: Commitment to market is positively correlated with the manager’s willingness to 
invest. 
5HA: The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market will 
affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of uncertainty avoidance. 
 
5HB: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market will 
affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of future orientation. 
 
5HC: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market will affect the 
degree of manager’s willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest 
is positively correlated with the degree of market size   
 
3.5. Developing Countries FDI Determinants 
 Masry (2015) observed FDI, to understand if it mattered in developing countries. Here, 
the investigation is about the relationship between FDI and economic growth of Egypt, which 
serves as an excellent indication for developing countries straddling the period from 1961 to 
2012. The results are indicative that FDI is understood through economic determinants but 
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leaves a non-significant impact on the GDP growth of a nation. However, Hunady and Orviska 
(2014) were of the opinion that the inflows of FDI contribute to the economic growth of a 
destination country. FDI is recognized as a source of funding that facilitates economic 
development and witnesses great increase across developed and developing countries.  
 Rjoub et al. (2017) conducted a study to empirically investigate determinants of FDI in 
the context of nations in Sub-Saharan Africa that are considered landlocked from 1995 to 2013. 
Panel data analysis was employed as the method. The result of the study indicated that various 
metrics such as domestic investment, the trade openness, human capital, existing political 
limitations,  natural resources, and the size of the market (taking GDP growth as proxy) have 
a positive impact on determining the FDI flow into countries where the tax structures were the 
only differing index.  
 Khan et al. (2017) examined factors, such as home and host country economic, 
geographical, and institutional aspects that affected the volume of FDI that flowed inward to 
Pakistan from some of the critical investment partners of the nation. The study found that the 
GDP of the host country, the government spending, level of financial development, the shared 
language, and geographical distance played an essential role in driving the extent of FDI that 
flowed intonations. The regulatory environment and an efficient, accountable government are 
also considered as vital to FDI inflows. On the other hand, the availability of infrastructure, the 
current growth rates, and the regular or frequent occurrence of natural calamities have not 
emerged as significantly altering the extent of FDI in a country. Here, distance and linguistic 
similarities are stronger determinants of FDI when compared with the home or host GDP 
figures. 
The relationship among determinants of FDI inflows and those of 68 Emerging Markets 
from 1984 to 2011 were observed by Rachdi et al. (2016). Here, a panel co-integration 
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technique was used, to observe structural breaks as well as cross-sectional dependence 
(Westerlund & Edgerton, 2008). The results of co-integration revealed a positive long-run 
relationship existing between economic growth, openness, and FDI; while a negative long-run 
association is prevailing between inflation, the real effective exchange rates, and FDI.  
BRICS economies group consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
are typically considered as developing among emerging economies. Nistor (2015) analyzed the 
FDI inflows in BRICS economy. The extent of the impact of FDI on the host nation hinges to 
a significant level on the size and structure of inflows. The present economic climate prevailing 
worldwide shows that competition exists among host countries to attract large volumes of FDI 
over the others. Here, the BRICS group presents foreign investors with some benefits that 
include a young labor force, cheap labor, availability of natural resources, and access to large 
market sizes. In emerging economies, it is clear that FDI has a positive impact on contributions 
to development.  
An understanding of the reasons that influence FDI inflows is an essential consideration 
for economists and policymakers. However, the existence of uncertainty around FDI theories 
and empirical approaches combined create ambiguity concerning determinants of FDI. 
Chanegriha et al. (2017) rely on the application of Extreme Bounds Analysis or the purpose of 
identification of robust determinants of FDI by a panel of data comprising both 168 developed 
and developing countries from 1970 to 2006. Here, they take into consideration 58 potential 
economic, geographic, and political determinants to conclude that around one-third are robust. 
The matrices include openness, the extent of government spending, levels of education, the 
status of infrastructure, the experience of conflicts, structures, and corporate tax rate. 
Additional common factors are the availability of natural resources, the exact geographic 
location, efficiency of governance, the number of borders, the coastal location, and language. 
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FDI inflows have been flowing towards developing country since the early 2000s and 
have improved their economies. However, numerous middle-income countries have been stuck 
in the middle-income trap and have failed to transform into high-income levels. Tampakoudis 
et al. (2017) investigated determinants of FDI inflows to the middle-income countries in the 
context of avoiding middle-income traps. They relied on a panel data analysis to investigate 
fifteen middle-income countries by collecting data from the year 1980. Results indicate that 
the significance of trade openness, the GDP, and population explosion on FDI are considerable.  
3.6. ASEAN countries FDI determinants 
 Hoang and Bui (2015) analyzed FDI inflow factors in ASEAN nations from 1991 to 
2009. Results revealed that the size of the market size, the trade openness, the quality of 
infrastructure, the availability of human capital, and the extent of labor productivity are some 
of the main factors that have a positive impact on the extent of FDI inflows. Moreover, the 
policy regarding exchange rates, the rates of real interest, the extent of political risk, and the 
levels of corruption affect the flow of FDI. Interestingly, cheap labor by itself does not attract 
FDI, mainly because foreign investors look at productivity aspects. The Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 did influence the amount of FDI, but it did not have any influence on the nature of FDI 
inflows.  
 Ahmad et al. (2015) determined the attractiveness of Foreign Direct Investment in Real 
Estate (FDIRE) that incorporated real estate, socio-cultural, technological, economic and 
political factors, and the transaction costs in ASEAN countries by relying on the gravity model 
from 1999 to 2010. This gravity model is mainly used to identify various variables that 
highlight the differences among ASEAN countries as hosts to FDIRE. Results indicate that all 
variables are indeed considerable except property prices, real estate transparency, consumer 
price index, and exchange rate. Here, property prices and real estate transparency are clubbed 
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with real estate, whereas consumer price index and exchange rate pertaining to economic 
factors. To attract more FDI in ASEAN countries, it is essential that every country improve 
socio-cultural, technological, and economic aspects in addition to the removal of restrictions 
on real estate registration, apart from doing away with excessive transaction costs.  
Xaypana et al. (2015) witnessed the primary factors that determined FDI in Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam (ASEAN3), apart from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Singapore (ASEAN5). As a result of the different stages of economic development among 
ASEAN3 and ASEAN5, determinants of FDI are significantly different. Here, we found that 
significant positive effects were exercised on the levels of infrastructure, the openness in 
business, while adverse effects of inflation were exercised on FDI inflow in ASEAN3. Here, 
real exchange rate, the gross domestic product, and the net official development assistance 
seemed to have little or no effect on FDI. In ASEAN5 the findings showed that the size of the 
market and the infrastructure facility were crucial determining factors that attracted FDI. Also, 
through an increase in the inflation rates as well as a decrease in levels of openness was 
measured, ASEAN5 was found to be still attractive to investors from foreign nations. 
According to Sjoholm (2013), many nations have FDI shares of manufacturing output of 
around 40 percent, while in the case of Singapore it is as high as over 80 percent.  
Integration in ASEAN continues possessing lower barriers; this makes the region a lot 
more attractive for multinational corporations. Additionally, Myanmar liberalized its economy 
recently, and this resulted in the lifting of international sanctions, and this will result in 
increased FDI inflows into the nation. The other planned economies in the area likewise hold 
the potential to attract large volumes of FDI inward. Therefore, reasons exist to believe that 
FDI will continue to be an essential aspect in the development of the Southeast Asian economy. 
FDI is a vital source of the economic growth of a nation. Myanmar and Vietnam have made 
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considerable efforts to get hold of a large chunk of FDI over the last twenty years. The FDI 
inflow started in Myanmar after it became a market-oriented economy. Similarly, Vietnam has 
also been receiving a considerable amount of direct investment after implementation of the Doi 
Moi policy. Additionally, Myanmar is undergoing a rapid democratic transition. 
 Hein (2014) attempts to analyze the reason behind two nations in attracting FDI and the 
variables that determined the inflow of FDI into these nations from 1989 to 2012 through a 
linear regression analysis. As per their study in the context of Myanmar, the GDP growth rate, 
labor force, inflation rates, and the exchange rates affect FDI inflow. In the context of Vietnam, 
the openness of the trade is crucial statistically at the percentage level, and this implies that 
Vietnam’s FDI policies do have a considerable effect in importing FDI into the nation. 
Singapore remains the most significant overseas investor in Thailand in comparison with other 
countries in ASEAN. Singaporean investors decide to invest abroad and here in the case of 
Thailand, judge by home and host country factors. In the context of the former Singaporean 
FDI in Thailand, it is mainly due to the limited domestic market in Singapore and the changing 
scenario in Singapore. Regarding host country factors, the econometric approach relies on the 
Ratiphokhin (2011) analysis. Results reveal that Singapore’s FDI structure has changed over 
the preceding two decades and outward FDI has played a more significant role than inward 
FDI in the economy of Singapore. It is precisely visible that Singapore’s outward FDI has 
increased exponentially over time with a great deal of direct investment. 
 Donaubauer et al. (2016) conducted gravity-type models to evaluate the effects of 
financial market development among host and home nations on bilateral FDI stocks. Here they 
look at the potential reverse causality through instrumental variable estimations and keep the 
sample restricted to observations wherein reverse causality, if prevalent, would not be very 
relevant in this case. One of their significant findings is that bilateral FDI expands with 
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developed financial markets across both host and home nations. Additionally, in the case of 
developing host nations, there is evidence that financial market development in the source and 
host countries functions and takes the place of each other. 
Prior research has identified the negative impact of corruption on countries’ ability to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, research studies on assessing the investors’ 
home country effects have been limited. Ferreira et al. (2016) studied prior research by 
distinguishing the pervasiveness and arbitrariness of host country corruption and their effects 
on FDI inflows. They also test whether the investors’ home country corruption affects FDI 
decisions. Results show that host country pervasive corruption negatively drives FDI inflows 
but not the arbitrariness component. While the investors’ home country corruption negatively 
impacts the overall FDI outflows, investors from countries with high levels of corruption do 
not seem to be deterred by a high level of pervasive corruption in the host country. These results 
indicate that there may exist some form of capability in dealing with corruption whereby firms 
from countries with high corruption are less sensitive to host country corruption. This also 
suggests 
 Hassan et al. (2016) research on FDI stream in Malaysia has come up with ample proof 
on the capitalist attitude. The study conducted with 56 quarterly investigations between 1998 
and 2011, calculated the total FDI drift in utilizing a vector error correction framework. The 
results indicated an impeccable affirmative tie between the banker attitude and FDI stream in 
both long-run and short-run in the presence of other minimal economic factors. The Malaysian 
FDI flows are also found to be decided by other essential aspects such as currency value, GDP, 
and interest percentage. A two-way granger casualty with banker attitude and the gross 
domestic compound was also characteristic of FDI. The interest rate also affected Granger in 
FDI. On dissolving the sentiment factor in two dimensions, the attitude index is found to have 
more drive on FDI when compared to the market dealing index even though both are 
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momentous. The primary deciding elements of FDI in Malaysia are rounded off to an interest 
percentage, contemplating around the financial market and the assumed financial status of the 
country and region (ASEAN).  
The investment in developing countries by capitalists indicate factors such as exchange 
percentage, coastal areas, communication, transparency, demoralization, education, 
government spending, corporate tax rate, infrastructure, the experience of conflict, democratic 
governance, natural resources, geographic location, and some borders. The research of FDI 
components in developed countries is not as detailed as in developing countries as FDI 
investment in developing nations is preferred because it can have positive impacts on 
education, employment, and ultimately the country’s economic growth. This study also 
suggests that the government not just implement policies to improve macroeconomic condition 
but also to enhance the perception and outlook of Malaysia to foreign investors. Investing in 
the bilateral relations with countries around the regions, creating a conducive regional 
atmosphere for investments inflows. 
 
3.7. Governance Challenges 
 
3.7.1. Vietnam 
Vietnam’s business environment faces high risk due to pervasive corruption.  
Companies from all industry sectors are likely to experience bribery, political interference, and 
facilitation payments which are illegal but common in practice to execute business activities. 
Vietnam has a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework and penal code in place, but the 
enforcement of this legislation remains lacking and problematic, and most indictments of high-
level corruption are perceived to be politically motivated (ICS, 2017). 
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The judicial system is weak and faces a high risk of corruption as the court functions 
are restricted by political influence and lack of transparency (GCR, 2015-2016). Furthermore, 
20% of businesses choose to avoid the Vietnamese court system due to lack of judiciary’s 
independence in settling disputes. Even though the law states that courts should recognize and 
enforce foreign arbitral awards, it is seldom enforced and if it does it usually takes years to 
implement. Vietnam has rectified the New York Convention on recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. A quarter of Vietnamese also believes most of the judges are corrupt 
(ICS, 2017). Also, companies report that police services are unreliable in enforcing law and 
order and they have a significant degree of discretion in their activities (CGR, 2016-2017).  
The public services are also corrupt, two most significant issues faced by companies 
are complying with burdensome regulations and at times inefficient regulations with frequent 
inspections creating an opportunity to exploit informal charges and/or facilitation payments. 
The legal loopholes and weak enforcement causes rent-seeking and facilitation payments to 
remain common practice. The problem is the public sectors are further aggravated by the lack 
of willingness to fight corruption, a lack of transparent and inadequate control of accountability 
resulting in nepotism (CENSOGOR, 2017; PCI, 2016) 
As Vietnam pursue economic reform by introducing the digitizing process in business 
registration, it has made it easier for businesses to enter Vietnam. However, this tends to lead 
to regional differences and interpretations of the investment laws and regulations, although it 
has reduced and streamlined the processing time to get the license(s). A lack of clear guidelines 
may prompt local officials to refer to national authorities which cause additional delays and 
costs.        
Companies have weak trust in the protection of property right in Vietnam. Public 
officials may increase requirements for land use rights for foreign companies when permits 
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must be renewed. There are frequent complaints of corruption delayed compensation and lack 
of transparency and due process of the government’s initiatives of the confiscation of land to 
make way for infrastructure projects (HRR, 2016). While Vietnam is building up a national 
land registration, foreign investors have been cautioned on land disputes when acquiring a local 
company (ICS, 2017).   
The admiration such as tax and customs are at high risk for companies. Companies cited 
irregular payments and bribes as common when making tax payments and customs clearances. 
Additionally, 25% of companies expect to give gifts when meeting tax officials and a third of 
companies reported receiving requests to issue dummy invoices. Where the value of goods or 
services is lower or higher than it is, indicating inappropriate advantages such as bribery, tax 
evasion, and avoidance of customs duties (ES 2015). On custom administration, companies 
also reported cumbersome import and export procedures and tariffs in addition to bribery.  
Natural resources industries also face a high risk of corruption due to the lack of 
accountability and transparency, weak governance, and the close ties between government and 
business (T1, 2017). Vietnam’s licensing department has been criticised for lacking 
transparency (NRGI 2017). The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s survey found 
more than 80% of mining firms admitted to having informal expenses amounting to 10% of 
their revenues and 70% said to rely on the relationship for access to information (Vietnam 
News, August 2016). Many contracts in these sectors (mining and energy) are not publicly 
disclosed except Petrol Vietnam which disclosed some (NGR1, 2017).  
Vietnam’s continuing fiscal deficit and a need to find sources for the revenue are said 
to be the cause of these pervasive corruption challenges for investors seeking investment 
opportunities where the market size cannot be ignored. With the joining of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), Vietnam will be subjected to greater competitive pressure and the country 
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will be forced to become more competitive which may lead to higher economic prosperity, 
social, judicial, and regulatory reforms.   
3.7.2. Myanmar 
Companies doing businesses in Myanmar face the same issue as in Vietnam, high risk 
of corruption. Many investors rate corruption, the weak rule of law, and a non-transparent 
licensing system as a critical set back to investment and trade in Myanmar. Like in Vietnam, 
companies in Myanmar face a high risk of corruption and political interference in Myanmar’s 
judicial system (GCR, 2015-2016). Bribes and facilitation payments in exchange for the 
favorable legal system is common. While the supreme court has taken steps to assert their 
independence following the end of the 50 years military rule, there still is the appearance of de 
facto military and government control over the judiciary (HHR, 2016). The challenges remain 
immense as there is also the lack of resources and inadequate legal education. Complaints are 
often heard about the problem in the legal sector, alleging corruption and that enforcing of a 
contract takes almost twice as long as compared to regional nations (WB, 2017). Also, 
companies perceive the judiciary to be inefficient and ineffective when settling disputes and 
challenging government regulations. While Myanmar incorporates the 1958 New York 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards into its domestic 
legal system, there is no track record that such award has been enforced. 
Nearly half the citizens believe most police officers are corrupt. The control of the 
police force by the government is not effective hence the police act with impunity (HRR, 2016). 
Also, the legal mechanisms to investigate corruption are rarely used and ineffective. About one 
in seven firms indicated they experienced losses due to theft and vandalism. Corruption is high 
when companies seek operating licenses, construction permits, and investment permits. 
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According to investors, connection to top bureaucrats and bribery are more important than 
personal skills in the selection process for civil service (BTI, 2016).  
Businesses also report burdensome government regulation (GCR, 2015-2016). There is 
also lack of regulatory and legal transparency, and the majority of the regulations in the past 
were subject to change without advance or written notice (ICS 2017).  In April 2017, Myanmar 
introduced the investment law with the intent to simplify regulation. Myanmar’s new 
investment laws prohibit nationalization and state that approved foreign investment will not be 
prematurely terminated during the term of the investment (ICS, 2017). Businesses however 
still have lack of trust in the government on protecting their property rights and any dispute 
over land rights which are often not well established following half a century of military 
expropriations and land grabs.   
Bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged in the process of awarding public 
contracts and licenses. An open tender is not a default method of procurements, the law and 
regulation on procurement, notice call for tender, tender documents, and awards are not made 
public which suggest the pervasive lack of transparency in doing business in Myanmar 
resulting in the problems of cronyism and nepotism.  As the results of the lack of transparency 
in the natural resource sector, Denmark has placed an injunction on all Danish companies 
preventing them from selling teak imported on the European market (Denmark-Mongabay, 
2017). 
Myanmar has a legal anti-corruption framework in place, but enforcement to curb 
corruption remains inadequate. The anti-corruption law gives a mandate to Myanmar anti-
corruption commission to address graft and brines. The impartiality is being questioned as this 
commission is staffed by former military officers and members of the ruling party (BTI, 2016). 
Companies need to be aware that the government and courts may not always interpret the recent 
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changes in government and the low level of legal certainty in a consistent manner (Conventus 
law 2016).  
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Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology 
 
4.1 Research Approach 
Grounded theory and mixed methods research methodology are applied in this research 
study. Grounded theory is a qualitative methodology which derives its name from the practice 
of generating theory from research which is "grounded" in data. The theory was introduced by 
the sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in The Discovery of Grounded Theory 
(2017).  This methodology is an alternative strategy to more traditional approaches to the 
scientific inquiry. Which relied heavily on hypothesis testing, verification techniques, and 
quantitative forms of analysis which were particularly popular in the social sciences at that 
time. Whereas many of the central components of grounded theory were outlined in The 
Discovery (e.g., constant comparison, theoretical sampling, and coding procedures), 
subsequent publications by Glaser and Strauss writing alone or with others, began to reflect 
important differences in how these scholars envisioned grounded theory and its use. The 
Grounded Theory approach is applied to studies people experience through interviews, 
personal experience, and collection of qualitative data via a literature review.    
Mixed methods research is a type of research where the researcher combines 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, approaches and concept in a single study 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Its the logic of inquiry that includes the use of induction, 
deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses) and uncovering and relying on one’s best set of 
explanations for understanding one’s results (Waal, 2001). The purpose is to draw on the 
strengths and reduces the weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative research studies in a 
single study. Mixed methods research offer great potential for practicing researchers who 
would like to see methodologist describe and develop techniques and methods that are closer 
to what researcher use in practice.  It can be a bridge between quantitative and qualitative 
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research (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). One of the features of mixed methods research is that 
the methodology frequently results in better research than applying the quantitative or 
qualitative research approach. Grounded Theory approach is used to studies people experience 
through interviews, personal experience, and collection of qualitative data via literature review 
(Strauss, 1987 ). This research approach will be carried out in four phases. Phase 1 of the 
research will include the semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys on managers’ 
FDI decisions. From this survey, feedbacks, personal experiences and the literature review, the 
proposed hypotheses are developed for qualitative testing in Phase 3. Phase 2 consists of an 
additional questionnaire survey to understand whether the number of visits to the frontier 
economy by managers has a significant impact on investors’ willingness to invest. Phase 3 of 
the research will also consist of administering the questionnaire surveys to test the proposed 
hypotheses, and Phase 4 will be a qualitative study via interviews to gather feedback on the 
Phase 3 survey results. Also, this phase is to gather any additional information that managers 
consider when investing in FDI that the survey questionnaire could not have captured, refer to 
figure 1.  
These phases will attempt to look at the reasoning behind the managers’ decisions. In 
particular, we will try to understand when, how, and why managers prioritize specific factors 
in their investment decisions. Moreover, when they are likely to perhaps act in a seemingly 
irrational manner. The survey questionnaires and interviews were targeted at the population of 
managers who influence Foreign Direct Investment.   
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Figure 1: Research Phases 1 to 4  
 
The respondents for the survey are only allowed to participate in one phase. That is if 
respondents who have taken a survey and/or interview will not be requested to participate in 
another survey. For example, a respondent who has taken a survey and/or interview in phase 1 
will not be asked again in the remaining three phases of the study. Respondents in phase 3 are 
entirely anonymous with an option for them to provide their emails address if they would like 
a summary copy of the survey findings. Respondents in phase 1, 2, and 4 are not anonymous 
but their identity will be kept strictly confidential and will not be disclosed in the findings and 
reports.   
 
 4.2 Samples Population    
To execute this study, we will look at the Frontier Economies of Vietnam and Myanmar 
as our sample’s choice. There are 25 relatively low-income frontier economies in the world 
with their markets politically handled by their governments. These governments make dictating 
rules that may not be conducive to foreign investment, thereby dampening investors’ 
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confidence. For instance, they routinely have a weak legal system with seemingly ambiguous 
interpretations. The corruption perception index is high for most of these countries. A majority 
of these frontier countries also have an annual capital income below $1,500 (Musacchio, 2016).   
The Foreign Direct Investment flow to frontier economies such as Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam, are low as compared to other developing and developed countries. 
Both Vietnam and Myanmar’s Foreign Direct Investment to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
ratio in 2016 were 6% and 3% respectively as compared to Singapore which had a percentage 
of 20%. On a per capita basis in dollar terms, Vietnam had $12.6B Foreign Direct Investment 
inflow as compared to Myanmar with $2.2B, while Singapore received $61B with Malaysia at 
$10B. Singapore gained about 60% of total Foreign Direct Investment of $101B inflow of 
resources into ASEAN in 2016, refer to Appendix A table A1 and A2.  An industrial nation, 
with no natural resources, and with a smaller population as compared to Vietnam and 
Myanmar, Singapore continues to attain high levels of investment within the ASEAN grouping. 
This, however, raised numerous questions such as the various determining factors, investment 
strategies, and the legal systems that investors need to prioritize when considering Foreign 
Direct Investment in ASEAN. 
Frontier economies such as Vietnam and Myanmar are also home to some of the 
world’s untapped resources such as minerals and metals. These countries have an annual 
income of $1,159 and $1,962 respectively against Singapore’s $49,776 based on United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2016 data, as displayed in 
Appendix A Table A3. The corruption perception index of 2016 is 136 and 113 against that of 
Singapore which is 7 out of a maximum of 170 as measured by Transparency International 
Organization, displayed in Appendix A Table A7. Vietnam has a population of approximately 
95M whereas Myanmar has a population of 55M people, refer to Appendix A Table A4. These 
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two countries have a significant market size that has potential opportunities to grow. Per the 
UNCTAD forecast year 2020, the population of all South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will 
reach 600 million people and with a labor force of 340 million people; this poses opportunities 
and challenges for ASEAN and her governments, refer to Appendix A Table A5. Both 
Myanmar and Vietnam have started to liberalize their markets, although Vietnam is much 
further along. Vietnam introduced and embarked on wooing private enterprises beginning in 
1986 with its version of Deng Xiaoping’s opening up, known as the Doi Moi. There still exists 
an excellent capacity for Foreign Direct Investment to grow in these countries, which is the 
main reason for choosing to research on these frontier economies; Vietnam and Myanmar.  
 
4.3 Phase 1  
4.3.1 Research Questions 
A survey questionnaire that comprised of three fundamental questions was crafted. 
These questions were as follows:  
(1) What investment location factors are important to managers when making an investment 
decision in a host country?  
(2) What were the important certainty factors that would need to be present in the host country 
to assure them that their investments will be protected and for investment to happen?  
(3) What type of investment would they consider assuming that the investment location factors 
and certainty factors met their expectation? 
We selected three countries for this initial research; these countries were Singapore, 
Vietnam, and Myanmar. Singapore is considered as a developed economy with the perception 
of a high level of legal system certainty and low corruption perception index. Vietnam and 
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Myanmar are considered frontier economies with the perception of a low-level certainty of the 
legal system and high corruption perception index. 
 
4.3.2 Data Analysis 
A total of 25 managers were asked to participate in this initial research, and 21 managers 
responded to the survey questionnaire within the stipulated dateline. Refer to Appendix B1-B4 
for a sample of the survey questionnaire. Managers were asked to select the top three 
investment location factors they considered important, top three certainty factors that must 
exist, and finally the top three types of investment they will invest in these three countries 
(Singapore, Vietnam, and Myanmar) respectively. A list of 21 factors for research question 1, 
15 factors for research question 2, and 14 factors for research question 3 were provided to the 
respondents for consideration with an option for respondents to provide feedback on other 
factors that were not provided on the list. 
 
4.3.3 Results 
Table 3 shows the summary of the results based on the top five highest frequencies of 
the factors selected for each of the three questions. Appendix B, Table B5 shows a sample of 
the plotted histogram. The summary of the survey results indicated that the response by the 
respondents on investment location factors, certainty factors, and types of investments were 
different for the developed economy as compared to the frontier economy.  Some of the key 
highlights from the survey results:  
 (1) A majority of respondents rated human capital factor as an important investment 
consideration in the developed economy as compared to the corruption factor in the frontier 
economy.  
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(2) A majority of respondents indicated that host creditability and accountability was an 
essential factor for all the three countries. Majority of respondents also stated certainty factors 
such as accessibility to low-cost resources and low-cost labors as a critical consideration for 
the frontier economy.  
(3) A majority of respondents preferred high technology and high asset types of investment in 
the developed economy as compared to low technology, low asset, and a joint venture with a 
local partner or government types of investments in frontier economies.  
These preliminary findings indicated that the economic, legal system, technology, 
organizational, and commercial determinants or factors are important to Foreign Direct 
Investment. Some nonstructured interviews were conducted with the respondents. Several 
respondents commented that when investing in developing economies such as Vietnam and 
Myanmar, they wanted to minimize risks as there are many unknown factors. For example, the 
language in both countries could pose some business communication challenges. Coupled with 
the unclear legal system, perceptions on the pervasive corruption, and ethnic clashes (in the 
case of Myanmar) it can be a deterrent to investment and putting assets in these countries. 
Depending on a firm’s strategy and investment motivation, one option will be to do it with low 
cost and low asset investment to recoup the return on investment in shorter durations than one 
would in when investing in a developed economy. The reasons for investing in these countries 
varies, such as for market seeking, natural resource, and/or an efficiency-seeking strategy. 
Others pointed out that on top of the legal system and corruption concerns, the other is the 
political stability of these countries and the quality of the financial institution. Some 
commented that human capital would be a big challenge in this frontier economy and hiring 
locals with the right capability and capacity is quote, “like looking for needles in the ocean.” 
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Thus, providing in-house or firm’s training will be a must, and all of these supplemental 
activities will increase costs of operations.  
Table 3.  
Summary of the results from Phase 1 study.   
 
 
 The data from the surveys and semi-structured interviews suggest that the 
understanding of the mental calculus taken by managers in decision making in the direction of 
investment lacks clarity especially in the area of the legal systems, behavioral, ethnic, and the 
cultural background aspects. This lack of understanding paves the way for additional literature 
reviews, analyses of the proposed hypotheses, and its results by conducting Phase 2, 3, and 4 
of this research.  
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 4.4 Phase 2  
4.4.1 Research Questions: 
A survey questionnaire that was comprised of seven fundamental questions was crafted. These 
questions were as follows:  
1) Is there a relationship between the number of visits to the country and confidence in  
investing? 
 
2) Is there a relationship between the number of visits to the country and willingness to 
invest? 
 
3) Is there a relationship between the number of visits to the country and understanding 
the country? 
 
4) Is there a relationship between the understanding of the country and confidence in 
investing? 
 
5) Is there a relationship between the understanding of the country and willingness to 
invest? 
 
6) Is there a relationship between confidence in investing and willingness to invest? 
7) Are there any differences in the pattern(s) of these relationships between Myanmar and 
Vietnam? 
 
 
4.4.2 Data Analysis: 
In this study, 20 participants were asked four questions about Vietnam, while 23 
participants were asked four questions about Myanmar. These questions were:  
(1) How many times have you visited this Vietnam/Myanmar?  
(2) How well do you understand Vietnam/Myanmar?  
(3) How confident are you in investing in Vietnam/Myanmar?  
 70 
 
(4) How willing are you to invest in Vietnam/Myanmar?   
Each of these questions was answered on a scale of 1-5, with 1 representing the lowest 
value and 5 representing the highest value. That is, if someone responds to question 4 with an 
answer of 5, one is highly willing to invest, whereas someone who responds with a 1 is not 
willing at all to invest. To assess research questions 1-7, we examined correlations across 
responses to all four questions.  
Because responses to each question are an interval in nature (i.e., Likert-type items), 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient is the appropriate test statistic (Field, 2013). Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient does not require any assumptions about the shape of the distribution. A 
positive correlation coefficient represents a positive relationship between the two questions, 
whereas a negative correlation coefficient represents a negative relationship (i.e., as values in 
one variable increase, values in the other variable decrease).   
We will use an alpha level (p) of .05 to determine whether the correlation coefficients 
are statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationship will be interpreted 
by Cohen’s rule of thumb (Cohen, 1988). That is, a correlation of .1 is considered small, a 
correlation of .3 considered a medium-sized effect and a correlation of .5 a large effect size.  
Research questions 1-7 will be discussed separately by country, followed by a cross-country 
comparison. A bivariate correlation was used because the objective was to test the relationship 
between the different pairs of variables.  
To investigate research question 7, a series of Mann-Whitney U Tests were conducted.   
Mann-Whitney U test is used as a nonparametric alternative to the independent samples t-test 
and is used when the dependent variable is internal (Field, 2013). As such, responses to each 
of the four questions will be compared between the two countries. The Mann-Whitney U Test 
compares mean rank scores between two groups (e.g., Vietnam vs. Myanmar). Differences in 
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the mean rank will indicate which group can be considered as having higher scores on each 
particular question. Again, an alpha (p) level of .05 will be used to determine significant 
differences between the two countries. Furthermore, differences between countries in the 
relationships investigated in research questions 1 to 7 will be discussed. 
 
4.4.3. Results: 
 
A. Vietnam 
While there was a strong correlation between how often people visited Vietnam and 
how well they understand Vietnam, there was practically no correlation between the number 
of visits with confidence and willingness to invest. Also, there is a low correlation between 
how well they understand Vietnam and their confidence and willingness to invest. Likewise, 
there was a strong correlation between confidence and willingness to invest in Vietnam, with 
no influence on either “investing variables” from a number of visits or level of understanding, 
refer to Table 4.   
In regards to research questions 1–6, there was no significant relationship between the 
number of visits to Vietnam and confidence in investing in Vietnam (Research Question 1). 
The magnitude of this relationship is almost zero. There was also no significant relationship 
between the number of visits to Vietnam and willingness to invest (Research Question 2) even 
though the magnitude of the relationship is weak with a negative correlation at rₛ =-0.11 while 
p =.962. However, there was a significant and positive correlation between the number of visits 
to Vietnam and understanding of the country (Research Question 3), and there was a positive 
relationship between the understanding of Vietnam and confidence in investing, but not 
significant (Research Question 4). The magnitude of this relationship was small. Furthermore, 
there was a positive relationship between the understanding of Vietnam and willingness to 
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invest, but not significant (Research Question 5). Finally, there is a significant and positive 
correlation between confidence in investing and willingness to invest (Research Question 6).  
Thus, we may conclude that in this sample, as managers visited Vietnam more often 
they had a better understanding of the country. Their willingness to invest is significantly 
positively correlated with their confidence in investing in the country. However, the number of 
visits to Vietnam does not affect managers’ willingness to invest.    
Table 4.  
Vietnam Correlations for all four questions. 
 Vietnam 
 How many 
times have you 
visited this 
country? 
How well do 
you understand 
this country? 
How confident 
are you in 
investing in this 
country? 
How willing are 
you to invest in 
this country? 
How many 
times have you 
visited this 
country? 
 
-- -- -- -- 
How well do 
you understand 
this country? 
 
rs = .458 
  p < .042* 
-- -- -- 
How confident 
are you in 
investing in this 
country? 
 
rs = .000 
p > .99 
rs = .217 
 p = .359 
-- -- 
How willing are 
you to invest in 
this country? 
 
rs = -.011 
p = .962 
rs = .299 
p =.20 
rs = .579 
    p < .007** 
-- 
 
B. Myanmar 
There was a strong correlation between the number of visits to Myanmar and the level 
of understanding of Myanmar. Furthermore, the number of visits to Myanmar was positively 
associated with confidence in investing in Myanmar but oddly, not for willingness to invest.  
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However, there were strong, positive correlations between the level of understanding of 
Myanmar, and both confidence in investing and willingness to invest in Myanmar. Finally, 
there was also a strong positive correlation between confidence and willingness to invest in 
Myanmar, refer to Table 5.   
In regards to research questions 1 – 6, there was a significant, positive relationship 
between the number of visits to Myanmar and confidence in investing in Myanmar (Research 
Question 1).  The magnitude of this relationship was large. However, there was no significant 
relationship between the number of visits to Myanmar and willingness to invest (Research 
Question 2).  However, there is a significant and positive relationship between a number of 
visits and confidence in investing (Research Question 3). There was, however, a significant, 
positive relationship between the understanding of Myanmar and confidence in investing 
(Research Question 4). Again, the magnitude of this relationship was large. Furthermore, there 
was a significant and positive relationship between the understanding of Myanmar and 
willingness to invest (Research Question 5). There is also a significant positive relationship 
between confidence and willingness to invest in Myanmar, and the magnitude of this 
relationship is relatively large (Research Question 6). Thus, we may conclude that in this 
sample, as participants visited Myanmar more often, and had a better understanding of the 
country, their confidence in investing in Myanmar increased which hence increased their 
willingness to invest. However, like Vietnam, the number of visits to Myanmar does not affect 
managers’ willingness to invest in the country.  
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C. Cross-country differences: 
To determine whether responses to each question differed between countries, a series 
of Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted. Regarding question 1, that is, how many times have 
you visited Vietnam/Myanmar, participants visited Myanmar (M = 3.70, SD = 1.52; Mean 
Rank = 25.78) more often than Vietnam and the difference was statistically significant (M = 
2.55, SD = 1.61; Mean Rank = 17.65), Mann-Whitney U = 143, z = -2.20, p = .028. There were 
no differences between Vietnam and Myanmar regarding participants’ understanding of the 
countries, Mann-Whitney U = 221.50, z = -0.214, p = .830. There was a significant difference 
between participants confidence in investing in Vietnam and Myanmar, Mann-Whitney U = 
138.50, z = -2.325, p = 0.020. Overall, participants confidence in investing was higher for 
Vietnam (M = 3.20, SD = 0.89; Mean Rank = 26.58) than Myanmar (M = 2.30, SD = 1.22; 
Mean Rank = 18.02). Finally, there was no significant difference in participants willingness to 
invest in Vietnam or Myanmar, Mann-Whitney U = 190.0, z = -0.99, p = .318, refer to Table 
6.  
Table 5.  
Myanmar correlations for all four questions. 
 
 Myanmar 
 How many times 
have you visited this 
country? 
How well do you 
understand this 
country? 
How confident are 
you in investing in 
this country? 
How willing are you 
to invest in this 
country? 
How many times 
have you visited this 
country? 
 
-- -- -- -- 
How well do you 
understand this 
country? 
 
rs = .488 
p < .018* 
-- -- -- 
How confident are 
you in investing in 
this country? 
 
rs = .471 
 p < .023* 
rs = .720 
    p < .001*** 
-- -- 
How willing are you 
to invest in this 
country? 
 
rs = .290 
p = .180 
rs = .462 
p < .026* 
rs = .664 
    p < .001*** 
-- 
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In regards to differences between countries regarding the relationship between a 
number of visits and understanding of the country, and confidence and willingness to invest, 
there were more significant relationships among the variables about Myanmar, than Vietnam. 
Even though confidence in investing was higher for Vietnam than for Myanmar, confidence in 
investing increased with the number of visits to Myanmar, but not to Vietnam. Likewise, 
confidence and willingness to invest increased as participants’ understanding of Myanmar 
increased, but not for Vietnam. 
Table 6.  
Cross-countries differences. 
 Vietnam Myanmar P value 
How many times have 
you visited this 
country? 
 
17.65 25.78 .028* 
How well do you 
understand this 
country? 
 
22.43 21.63 .830 
How confident are 
you in investing in 
this country? 
 
26.58 18.02 .020* 
How willing are you 
to invest in this 
country? 
 
24.00 20.26 .318 
Note. All questions were responded to on a scale from 1 to 5.  
* represents a significant mean difference between countries.  
 
However, both Vietnam and Myanmar data shows two significant and positive 
relationships, one is between a number of visits and understanding of the country, and the other 
is between confidence and willingness to invest in the country. However, both did not show 
numbers of visit having any significant correlation on a willingness to invest. This indicates a 
willingness to invest cannot be based on a number of visits to the respective countries. 
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There is a lack of several correlations on the research questions for the Vietnam data as 
compared to Myanmar data and may not necessarily be an issue of sample size. The Myanmar 
data has about the same sample size, and stronger relationships were observed. It might have 
something to do with the characteristics of managers interviewed about Vietnam or the 
accuracy of the data collection. There may be some fundamental difference in some key 
variables as compared to the managers interviewed about Myanmar. For example, the numbers 
of managers that responded have a higher number of visits to Myanmar as compared to 
managers who responded on number of visits to Vietnam (note the respondents on Myanmar 
and Vietnam are not the same). To improve the study and for future studies, it is recommended 
to get a more extensive and random representative sample of respondents. Factors such as types 
of industries the respondents are from (e.g., manufacturing or service industry), their working 
experiences, and duration of their visits in each visit should be considered.   
Because the data are ordinal, we chose to do the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test 
instead of a t-test. This test compares the shape of the distribution of rankings for each country. 
The higher the mean ranking, the higher the score on the question. For the question, “How 
many times have you visited the country,” managers who were asked about Myanmar had 
visited Myanmar more often than those who were asked about Vietnam (which also might 
explain the lack of a correlation in the Vietnam data. Also maybe they did not visit the country 
enough).  
Other possible reasons for this difference could be due to the facts that Vietnam has 
been opening up its economy at an increasing pace and for much longer (since 1986) compared 
to Myanmar (since 2016). Information on Vietnam be it positive and/or negative are much 
more readily available as compared to Myanmar. By visiting Vietnam, it may not correlate to 
an increase in confidence and willingness of managers to invest in Vietnam. There may be 
other ways for managers to gain confidence and willingness to invest in Vietnam.   
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Another possibility is that managers do not rely on visits to Vietnam to make investment 
decisions. They may want to find out about Vietnam by talking to relevant investors (who may 
have invested in Vietnam) and agencies that can provide insights about doing business in 
Vietnam including the pros and cons, challenges, and risks. This sort of information may be 
lacking in Myanmar, and hence visiting Myanmar plays a critical aspect in their investment 
decision, first by understanding the country to gain confidence before having a willingness to 
invest.  Detail of analysis and results can also be found in Appendix B.  
In summary, this research study indicates regardless of the number of visits to these 
countries it does not affect managers willingness to invest. However, there is a significant 
relationship between a number of visits and having an understanding of the country. There is 
also a significant relationship between confidence and willingness to invest. More future 
research needs to be conducted to understand better what circumstances and to what degree the 
numbers of visits to a country will have on managers’ willingness to invest in that respective 
country.  
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4.5. Phase 3 
4.5.1. Research questions 
This section describes the statistical analysis and methodology that was chosen to test 
the proposed hypotheses, refer to table 7. 
 
4.5.2. Data Analysis 
 
A. Survey Respondents 
The online anonymous survey questionnaires were sent to respondents using the 
Qualtrics software (refer to table 8 and Appendix D).  The participants invited were Chief 
Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, General Managers, Management Consultant, 
Business Directors, Business professional (Fund Managers, Finance Manager. Etc.), Business 
Development Managers, Regional Managers and Marketing & Sales professional who have 
FDI experiences. Approximately 700 participants were invited from business associates and 
universities’ alumni.  A total of 121 respondents were received and however 100 respondents 
were selected for meeting the qualifying criteria. Amongst other criteria, the participants must 
have related FDI experiences. Table 9 summarizes the demographic characteristics of N = 100 
respondents, based on their responses to the survey questionnaire.  
 
B. Moderation Analysis  
Moderators (e.g., culture similarity, language similarity, ethnic similarity, physical 
distance, psychological distance, market size, uncertainty avoidance, and future orientation) 
are variables that alter the strength and/or direction of the correlation between an 
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independent/predictor variable (e.g., clarity of legal system, transparency of legal system, 
corruption of legal system, enforcement of legal system, and commitment to market)  and a 
dependent/outcome variable (e.g., the manger’s willingness to invest). Figure 2 illustrates the 
model of the constructs for testing the proposed hypotheses. 
Moderation means that the correlation between the independent/predictor variable and 
the dependent/outcome variable is not consistent concerning all values of the moderator. 
Hypotheses involving the evaluation of moderators have traditionally been tested by regression 
analysis based on the computation or ordinary least squares (OLS) (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Hayes, 2013). The moderating effect is computed as the product of the predictor variable 
multiplied by the moderator variable.   
A one sample two-tailed t-test statistic for each path coefficient (β) was computed 
where t = β/SE.  If the t-test statistic was greater than the critical value of 1.96, then β was 
significantly different from zero at p < 0.05.  Significantly different implied that β could be 
greater than zero (i.e., between 0 and 1) or it could be less than zero (i.e., between - 1 and 0).  
The t-test did not specify the direction of the difference between β and zero, because the t-test 
had two tails. Because of t = β/SE, the value of the t-test statistic depends on the relative values 
of β and SE.  
The statistical significance of the path coefficient between the moderating effect and 
the dependent variable computed by OLS regression or PLS path analysis, however, does not 
adequately characterize the effects of a continuous or categorical level moderator on the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The testing for moderation only 
determines if the moderating effect is statistically significant at the conventional p < .05 level 
(Jose, 2013). The linear relationships between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable must be plotted at different categories of the moderator typically high, medium and 
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low, to understand the pattern of the moderating effect fully. The graphical analysis was 
conducted using the “scatterplot with regression and groups” option in Minitab v. 17.3. 
Moreover, using fitted linear regression lines to assist the interpretation of the moderating 
effects (at low, moderate, and high levels of the moderator, where low = scores of 1 to 2; 
moderate = scores of 3 to 5, and high = scores of 6 to 7). Minitab was used because, unlike 
other statistical packages (e.g., SPSS) which produce low-resolution graphics.  The graphic 
analysis using linear trend lines provided a visual method to investigate how the correlation 
between the dependent and predictor variables changed in strength and/or direction concerning 
different categorical levels of the moderators.  
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Table 7: Proposed Hypotheses 
1. Impact of Clarity of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest. 
H1:   The clarity of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest.  
H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture 
similarity.  
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language 
similarity.  
H1C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest.  Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnicity.  
2. Impact of Transparency of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
H2:  The transparency of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest.    
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture 
similarity.   
 H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal system will affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of 
language similarity.  
H2C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system will affect the degree of 
managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of 
ethnicity. 
3. Impact of Corruption of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
H3: The corruption of the legal system is negatively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest.  
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture 
similarity.  
H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language 
similarity.  
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree ethnicity.  
4. Impact of Enforcement of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
H4: The enforcement of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest.  
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture 
similarity.  
H4B: The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal system will affect the degree of 
managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of 
language similarity.   
H4C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system will affect the degree of manager 
willingness to invest. Therefore, managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity   
H4D: The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of physical 
distance. 
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal system will affect the degree of 
managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of 
psychological distance. 
5. Impact of Commitment to Market on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
H5: Commitment to market is positively correlated with managers’ willingness to invest. 
H5A: The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of uncertainty 
avoidance. 
H5B: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market will affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of future 
orientation. 
H5C: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market will affect the degree of managers’ willingness 
to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of market size.   
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Table 8: Survey Questionnaire 
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 Table 9: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (N = 100) 
Question Category n 
Are you born in this country? Vietnam (Yes) 5 
Vietnam (No) 95 
Myanmar (Yes) 1 
Myanmar (No) 99 
South East Asia (Yes) 65 
South East Asia (No) 35 
Other (Yes) 28 
Other (No) 72 
Have you lived in this country? Vietnam (Yes) 11 
Vietnam (No) 89 
Myanmar (Yes) 5 
Myanmar (No) 95 
South East Asia (Yes) 79 
South East Asia (No) 21 
Other (Yes) 39 
Other (No) 61 
Have you worked for a foreign 
multinational enterprise? 
Yes 78 
No 22 
Have you worked in a foreign country 
other than your own home country? 
Yes 69 
No 31 
In the course of your work have you been 
involved in FDI decisions and/or 
operations 
Yes 100 
No 0 
Please indicate your years of experience 0 to 5 years 6 
>5 to 15 years 22 
> 15 years 72 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of Constructs  
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An important assumption of moderation analysis is that the predictor and moderator 
variables should not be multicollinear (i.e., strongly correlated) because multicollinearity 
inflates the standard errors (SE) of the path coefficients (Jose, 2013).  Because t = β/SE, the t-
statistics are lower than expected if the SE is inflated, and so the β coefficients may not be 
significantly different from zero at p < .05 when, in fact, they should be significant if the SE 
was not inflated. SPSS v. 24.0 was used to test for multicollinearity with the VIF statistics and 
Tolerance statistics (1/VIF) that are included in the output for regression analysis (Field, 2013). 
The general rule of thumb is that VIFs > 5.0 and Tolerance statistics < 0.2 reflect moderate 
collinearity. VIFs > 10.0 and Tolerance statistics < 0.1 are signs of very strong multicollinearity 
requiring correction, by eliminating or combining the correlated variables (Yoo et al. 2014). 
The results of the tests in Appendix E (a copy of the SPSS output), indicated no strong 
multicollinearity between the predictor and moderator variables, reflected by VIF statistics < 
5.0 and Tolerance statistics (1/VIF) > 0.2. 
 
4.5.3. Results 
The following section presents the results of the statistical analysis of the proposed hypotheses 
and some key perspectives of the results. Table 10 summarizes the results of the statistical 
analysis.  Results show that 72% of the proposed hypotheses are supported on Vietnam, 41% 
on Myanmar and 45% on the aggregate of both Vietnam and Myanmar.  The statistical analysis 
using SPSS 24.0 and PLS-SEM 2.0 (Smart PLS software) to arrive at these results are found 
in Appendices E and F.  
A.  Results -Research Hypotheses 
1. Impact of Clarity of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest. 
 
H1: The clarity of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ willingness 
to invest. 
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Jensen (2003) found that good quality legal institution plays an essential role in attracting 
FDI. 
Bevan (2004) MNCs prefer direct investments in markets with the sound legal system and do 
not fluctuate especially the investment laws.   
 
Perry (2003) found that there are developed theoretical arguments that FDI flows depend on 
the characteristic of the legal system, but lack robust empirical evidence to suggest such 
relationship exists. 
 
H1(aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the clarity of legal system was not 
significantly positively correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.079, 
t =1.067; p>0.05. H1 is not supported    
 
H1 (Vietnam) found that the clarity of legal system was significantly positively correlated with 
managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.356, t = 2.731; p < 0.05.  H1 is supported. 
 
 
H1 (Myanmar) found that the clarity of legal system was not significantly correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β = -0.046, t = 0.608; p >0.05. H1 is not supported     
 
Based on an aggregate basis of Vietnam and Myanmar, H1 is not supported. 
 
H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and clarity of the legal system will affect 
the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to 
invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.     
 
Lee et al. (2008) research found that logically people with similar language, cultural heritage, 
physical appearance and born in the same region has a higher tendency to invest in host 
countries with the similar cultural background.  
 
Lee et al. (2014) research found that common law attracts higher FDI in developing countries. 
 
Kagut and Singh (1988) study show that foreign investors are attracted to host countries that 
are similar to theirs.  
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     Table 10: Summary of Statistical Analysis; Results at 95% Confidence Limit.             
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H1A (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture 
similarity and the clarity of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ 
willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.482, t = 1.996; p < 0.05. H1A is supported.   
 
H1A (Vietnam) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal 
system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 
-0.466, t = 2.836; P < 0.05. H1A is supported. 
 
H1A (Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the 
legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β = 0.134: t = 1.23; p > .05. H1A is not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H1A is supported. 
 
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system will 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language similarity.  
 
Kim et al. (2010) research found that language is a dynamic instrument for reducing 
transaction charges and have an impact on investors’ choices during capital investment. 
 
Zaheer et al. (2009) research found that ethnic bonds are explicit facets of public networks that 
are featured through a personal relationship, a nation of origin, native language and 
traditional values. 
 
H1B (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between language 
similarity and the clarity of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β= -0.301, t = 1.205; p > .05. H1B is not supported.  
 
H1B (Vietnam) found that the interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the 
legal system significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by 
β= 0.407, t = 2.775; p < .05. HIB is supported. 
 
H1B (Myanmar) found that the interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the 
legal system significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by 
β= -0.607, t = 3.416; p < .05. HIB is supported. 
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Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H1B is not supported.  
 
HIC: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system will 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest.  Therefore, the managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity.  
 
Huang et al. (2003), investment flow to the host country with the similar ethnic background is 
higher than the dissimilar ethnic background.  
 
Goa (2003) research found that there is a significant positive role of FDI in inward FDI of 
ethnic Chinese networks proxied by the population share of ethnic Chinese in the investing 
country.   
 
H1C (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity 
and the clarity of the legal system significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to 
invest, indicated by β= 0.003, t = 1.978; p < .05. H1C is supported.  
 
H1C (Vietnam) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal 
system significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β= 
0.403, t = 2.272; p < .05. H1C is supported.  
 
H1C (Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal 
system significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β= 
0.882, t = 5.367; p < .05. H1C is supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar; H1C is supported. 
 
2. Impact of Transparency of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
 
H2:  The transparency of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.    
 
Jensen (2003) research found that good quality legal institution plays an essential role in 
attracting FDI. 
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Drabex and Payne (2002) research found that transparencies of policies are important to 
reduce unplanned transaction costs, protection of property right, positive influence on business 
attitudes, mergers and or acquisition and establish a good condition for capital inflows. 
 
H2 (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the transparency of legal system was not 
significantly positively correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.113, 
t =1.298; p >0.05. H2 is not supported. 
 
H2 (Vietnam) found that the transparency of legal system was not significantly positively 
correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.053, t =0.680; p >0.05. H2 
is not supported. 
 
H2 (Myanmar) found that the transparency of legal system was not significantly positively 
correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.039, t =0.445; p >0.05. H2 
is not supported    
 
Based on an aggregate basis of Vietnam and Myanmar, H2 is not supported. 
 
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.  
 
Lee et al. (2008) research found that logically people with similar language, cultural heritage, 
physical appearance and born in the same region has a higher tendency to invest in host 
countries with the similar cultural background.  
 
H2A (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture 
similarity and the transparency of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.598, t = 2.014; p < 0.05. H2A is supported.  
 
H2A (Vietnam) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.663, t = 2.709; p < 0.05. H2A is supported.   
 
H2A (Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.197, t = 1.604; p > 0.05. H2A is not supported.   
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Based on an aggregate basis of Vietnam and Myanmar, H2A is supported. 
 
H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system will affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the 
managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language 
similarity.  
 
Kim et al. (2010) research found that language is a dynamic instrument for reducing 
transaction charges and have an impact on investors’ choices during capital investment. 
 
Kaplan et al. (2007) research found that higher entrepreneurship in the country with great 
official structure but venture capitalist that do not use United States’ styles of contracts fail 
significantly more often than does that follow. 
 
H2B (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between language 
similarity and the transparency of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= -0.441, t = 1.343; p > 0.05. H2B is not 
supported.  
 
H2B (Vietnam) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0.496, t = 2.916; p < 0.05. H2B is supported.  
 
H2B (Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0.390, t = 2.745; p < 0.05. H2B is supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H2B is not supported. 
 
H2C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity. 
 
Huang et al. (2003) research found that investment flow to the host country with the similar 
ethnic background is higher than the dissimilar ethnic background. 
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Jean et al. (2011) research found that ethnic similarity of top managers matters when 
deciding location choice of FDI.  
 
Estevez et al. (2003) study found that many ethnic minorities behave more negative attitude 
regarding the legal system and its legitimacy as compared to the majority group.  
 
H2C (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity 
and the transparency of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ 
willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.039, t = 0.194; p > 0.05. H2C is not supported.  
 
H2C (Vietnam) found that the interaction between language similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.082, t = 0.537; p > 0.05. H2C is not supported.  
 
H2C (Myanmar) found that the interaction between language similarity and the transparency 
of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.713, t = 3.446; p < 0.05. H2C is supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H2C is not supported. 
 
3. Impact of Corruption of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest. 
 
H3: The corruption of the legal system is negatively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.  
 
Mauro (1995) and Wheeler et al. (1992) research found that corruption and relationship with 
FDI are inconclusive. Some studies found it deters; others do not. 
 
Zhou et al. (2010) research found that some investors are only attracted to developing 
countries with the inadequate legal system as this gives them the opportunity to negotiate for 
better terms.  
Cuerov-Cazurra et al. (2008) research found that corruption results in relatively higher FDI 
from countries with high level of corruption. 
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H3 (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the corruption of legal system was not 
significantly negatively correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.084, 
t =0.748; p >0.05. H3 is not supported. 
 
H3 (Vietnam) found that the corruption of legal system was significantly negatively correlated 
with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.401, t =3.507; p < 0.05. H3 is supported. 
 
H3 (Myanmar) found that the transparency of legal system was not significantly negatively 
correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.058, t =0.729; p > 0.05. H3 
is not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H3 is not supported.  
 
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.  
 
Lee et al. (2008) research found that logically people with similar language, cultural heritage, 
physical appearance and born in the same region has a higher tendency to invest in host 
countries with the similar cultural background.  
 
Habib and Zurwicki (2002) found differences in host and home country corruption level has a 
negative impact on FDI. 
 
Cuerov-Cazurra et al. (2008) research found that corruption results in relatively higher FDI 
from countries with high level of corruption. 
 
H3A (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture 
similarity and the corruption of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.018, t = 0.355; p > 0.05. H3A is not 
supported. 
 
H3A (Vietnam) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.297, t = 1.886; p > 0.05. H3A is not supported. 
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H3A (Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.037, t = 0.349; p > 0.05. H3A is not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H3A is not supported. 
 
H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language similarity.  
 
Kim et al. (2010) research found that language is a dynamic instrument for reducing 
transaction charges and have an impact on investors’ choices during capital investment. 
Hofstede (2011) research found that people speaking the same language tend to be more 
comfortable with each other in social and business groups. 
 
Vidal Suarez et al. (2003) study found that there is a tendency to avoid acquisitions as 
investment mode when the language distance between host and home country is high.   
 
H3B (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between language 
similarity and the corruption of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β=-0.064, t = 2.545; p < 0.05. H3B is supported. 
 
 H3B (Vietnam) found that the interaction between language similarity and the corruption of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0.268, t = 2.122; p < 0.05. H3B is supported. 
 
H3B (Myanmar) found that the interaction between language similarity and the corruption of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.369, t = 2.574; p < 0.05. H3B is supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H3B is supported.  
 
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity. 
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Huang et al. (2003) research found that investment flow to the host country with the similar 
ethnic background is higher than the dissimilar ethnic background. 
 
Jean et al. (2011) research found that ethnic similarity of top managers matters when 
deciding location choice of FDI.  
 
Estevez et al. (2003) study found that many ethnic minorities behave more negative attitude 
regarding the legal system and its legitimacy as compared to the majority group.  
 
Tyler (2006) research found that minority group tends to possess negative opinion and show 
distrust and less confidence in the judicial system as a whole.  
 
H3C (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity 
and the transparency of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ 
willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.118, t = 1.247; p > 0.05. H3C is not supported.  
 
H3C (Vietnam) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the 
legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= -0.234, t = 3.882; p < 0.05. H3C is supported.  
 
H3C (Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.202, t = 1.249; p > 0.05. H3C is not supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate Vietnam and Myanmar, H3C is not supported. 
 
4. Impact of Enforcement of Legal System on Managers’ Willingness to Invest. 
 
H4: The enforcement of the legal system is positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest.  
 
Staats and Biglaier (2005) study found that judicial performance and enforcement of rules 
increase FDI 
 
La Porta et al. (2008) study found that countries that have well established legal systems, rules 
of laws regulate social systems and transactions are generally orderly and efficient.  
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Du (2010) research compared the effective implementation in the enforcement of laws in the 
stock exchange of 49 countries. The research proposed both public and private enforcement 
work together to provide security of shareholders and growth of stock exchange.   
 
H4 (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the enforcement of legal system was 
significantly positively correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.383, 
t =2.095; p < 0.05. H4 is supported. 
 
H4 (Vietnam) found that the enforcement of legal system was significantly positively 
correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.645, t =3.518; p < 0.05. H4 
is supported. 
H4 (Myanmar) found that the enforcement of legal system was not significantly positively 
correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.108, t =0.932; p >0.05. H4 is 
not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4 is supported. 
 
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is positively correlated with the degree of culture similarity.  
 
Hofstede (2011) research found that people speaking the same language tend to be more 
comfortable with each other in social and business groups. 
 
Staats and Biglaier (2005) study found that judicial performance and enforcement of rules 
increase FDI. 
 
H4A (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture 
similarity and the enforcement of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.676, t = 2.543; p < 0.05. H4A is supported. 
 
H4A (Vietnam) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.005, t = 0.042; p > 0.05. H4A is not supported. 
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H4A (Myanmar) found that the interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0.165, t = 1.469; p > 0.05. H4A is not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4A is supported. 
 
H4B: the interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of language similarity. 
 
Hofstede (2011) research found that people speaking the same language tend to be more 
comfortable with each other in social and business groups. 
Portes et al. (2005) study found that speaking the same language reduces misunderstanding in 
conducting cross-border businesses and eliminate information asymmetries.  
  .  
H4B (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between language 
similarity and the enforcement of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= -0.370, t = 1.504; p > 0.05. H4B is not 
supported. 
 
H4B (Vietnam) found that the interaction between language similarity and the corruption of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β=-0.705, t = 4.216; p < 0.05. H4B is supported. 
 
H4B (Myanmar) found that the interaction between language similarity and the corruption of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0.262, t = 1.430; p > 0.05. H4B is not supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4B is not supported. 
 
H4C: the interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of manager willingness to invest. Therefore, managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of ethnic similarity   
 
Estevez et al. (2003) study found that many ethnic minorities exhibit more negative attitude 
toward the legal system and its legitimacy as compared to the majority group.  
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Tyler (2006) research found that minority group tends to possess negative opinion and show 
distrust and less confidence in the judicial system as a whole.  
 
Perry (2009) research found Asian countries due to similar ethnic similarity; large business 
has some degree of pre-emptive involvement in the lawmaking process. This makes ethnic 
similarity a significant determining factors in investments.  
 
H4C (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity 
and the enforcement of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ 
willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.562, t = 2.344; p < 0.05. H4C is supported.  
 
H4C (Vietnam) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the 
legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= 0.445, t = 2.412; p < 0.05. H4C is supported.  
 
H4C (Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.774, t = 4.317; p < 0.05. H4C is supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4C is supported.  
 
H4D: the interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of physical distance. 
 
Johanson (1990) research found that investors tend to invest closer to home and that foreign 
perception of the host country legal system rather than reality impact FDI. 
 
Davidson (1980) study suggested that firm taking their first FDI will be most likely to choose 
countries that are closer to them and or have a similar culture. 
 
Li and Guisinger (1991) research found that survival rate of a joint venture in a wide cultural 
distance is low   
 
Dow (200) study found geographic distance is found to be a significant predictor but its effect 
mostly independent of psychological distance.  
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H4D (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between physical 
distance and the enforcement of the legal system significantly affected the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β=- 0.907, t = 3.986; p < 0.05. H4D is supported.  
 
H4D (Vietnam) found that the interaction between physical and the enforcement of the legal 
system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 
-0.998, t = 7.305; p < 0.05. H4C is supported.  
 
H4D (Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of 
the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= -0421, t = 2.498; p < 0.05. H4D is supported.  
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4D is supported. 
 
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system will affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of psychological distance. 
 
Bhardwaj et al. (2007) research found that cultural value holds a clue to business practices 
thereby creating differences in decision making on investments. 
 
Vahle (1977) categorized that psychological and physical distance between home and host 
country is an essential consideration in FDI with MNCs. 
 
Engwall and Walenstal (1998) research do not found the support that on the theory that 
investors will invest in host country close to home from physical and psychological 
perspectives.     
 
H4E (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between psychological 
distance and the enforcement of the legal system did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β=0.383, t = 1.687; p > 0.05. H4E is not supported.  
 
H4E (Vietnam) found that the interaction between physical and the enforcement of the legal 
system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 
0.384, t = 2.719; p < 0.05. H4E is supported.  
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H4E (Myanmar) found that the interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of 
the legal system significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest 
indicated by β= 0.394, t = 2.155; p < 0.05. H4C is supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H4E is not supported. 
 
5. Impact of Commitment to Market on Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
 
H5: Commitment to market is positively correlated with managers’ willingness to invest. 
 
Gundlash et al. (1995) study found that commitment to market is a multidimensional construct 
comprises of inputs, psychological, attitudes, and temporal dimensions. 
 
Lamb and Lish (2002) research found that commitment to market requires firms to be 
committed to acquire market knowledge and be involved in the market. 
 
H5 (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the commitment to market was 
significantly positively correlated with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.429, 
t =3.999; p < 0.05. H5 is supported. 
 
H5 (Vietnam) found that the commitment to market was not significantly positively correlated 
with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β =0.010, t =0.092; p > 0.05. H5 is not 
supported. 
 
H5 (Myanmar) found that the commitment to market was significantly positively correlated 
with manager willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.429, t =4.088.; p < 0.05. H5 is supported. 
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H5 is supported. 
  
H5A: the interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market will 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness 
to invest is negatively correlated with the degree of uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Greet Hofstede et al. (2010) research found that high uncertainty avoidance host country has 
lower trust with foreign investors, this may impede investments. 
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Porter et al. (2002)  study found that Japan attracted lower FDI due to numerous formal rules, 
this is due to they their high level of uncertainty avoidance culture. 
 
Greet Hosftede et al. (2010) study also suggested that uncertainty avoidance as a culture where 
people feel threatened by an unknown or uncertain situation. This has an impact on FDI. 
 
H5A (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between uncertainty 
avoidance and the commitment to market did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β=-0.057, t = 0.485; p > 0.05. H5A is not 
supported.  
 
H5A (Vietnam) found that the interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment 
to market significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated by 
β= -0.261, t = 7.318; p < 0.05. H5A is supported. 
  
H5A (Myanmar) found that the interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment 
to market did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= -0.057, t = 0.471; p > 0.05. H5A is not supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H5A is not supported. 
 
H5B: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market will 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated with the degree of future orientation. 
 
Holmes et al. (2013) asserted that a country with a future-oriented culture emphasizes the 
importance of growing the economy.  
 
Mitic et al. (2016) research found that the most significant impacts on the size of organizational 
commitment are the dimensions of future orientation and performance orientation. 
 
H5B (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between future 
orientation and the commitment to market did not significantly affect the degree of the 
managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β=0.039, t = 0.612; p > 0.05. H5B is not supported.  
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H5B (Vietnam) found that the interaction between future orientation and the commitment to 
market did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= 0.350, t = 1.537; p > 0.05. H5B is not supported.  
 
H5B (Myanmar) found that the interaction between future orientation and the commitment to 
market did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= 0.089, t = 0.640; p > 0.05. H5B is not supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H5B is not supported. 
 
H5C: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market will affect the 
degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the managers’ willingness to invest 
is positively correlated with the degree of market size.   
Petrovic-Randelovic et al. (2017), and Chakrabarti (2001) research found that market size is 
an essential determinant of FDI. 
 
Hewko 2003 study found that the most critical factor attracting FDI remains the present of 
business opportunities even if the legal system is inadequate. 
  
H5C (aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar) found that the interaction between market size and 
the commitment to market significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to 
invest indicated by β=0.182, t = 2.274; p < 0.05. H5C is supported.  
 
H5C (Vietnam) found that the interaction between market size and the commitment to market 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated by β= 0.497, 
t = 2.359; p < 0.05. H5C is supported.  
 
H5C (Myanmar) found that the interaction between future orientation and the commitment to 
market did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest indicated 
by β= 0.182, t = 1.255; p > 0.05. H5C is not supported.  
 
Based on an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, H5C is supported. 
 
4.5.4 General perspectives  
1. Impact of Characteristics of Legal System and Managers’ Willingness to invest. 
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The statistical analysis of this dissertation study offers few perspectives especially to 
the policymakers on FDI. There is evidence from the results that the managers ‘willingness to 
invest is correlated to the characteristics of the legal system. These characteristics are legal 
clarity, legal transparency, legal enforcement and legal corruption or reliability.  
In Vietnam, two out of four legal system characteristics, that is the legal clarity, and 
legal enforcement are statistically significant and positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest. Regarding the other legal characteristic that is the legal corruption the 
study found to be significant and negatively correlated with the managers’ willingness to 
invest. This indicates that as a corruption of a host country increases, FDI to the host country 
decreases, and the rate of decrease depends on the investors’ investment motivation and the 
characteristic of their home countries. 
On Myanmar, none of the four characteristics of the legal system are statistically 
significant with the managers’ willingness to invest. Two out of these four legal system 
characteristics that are the legal corruption and legal enforcement are positively correlated with 
managers’ willingness to invest.  In the case of legal corruption, as corruption increases the 
managers’ willingness to invest increases (β = 0.058) which contradict the Vietnam findings.    
On an aggregate basis of Vietnam and Myanmar, out of these four characteristics of the 
legal system only one legal characteristic, that is legal enforcement is statistically significant 
and positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest.    
These results confirmed some of the conflicting results from past research. For 
example, a study by Egger and Winner (2005) found corruption to have robust stimulus 
(helping hand) for FDI. While the study by Zhou et al. (2010) found that investors are only 
attracted to developing countries with an inadequate legal system as this provides them with 
an opportunity to negotiate deals with favorable terms and conditions. Another study by Mauro 
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(1995) found corruption and relationship with FDI to be inconclusive; some studies found it 
deters while others did not. Host country with good quality legal system institution gives 
greater confidence to investors, which reinforced Jensen (2003) study that legal institution 
plays an essential role in attracting FDI. A good quality legal system will increase managers’ 
willingness to invest as they perceived the risk on their investments to be lower.   
Investors consider a broad range of factors or determinants to invest as discussed in the 
literature review section; regardless of their motivation on investments,  these motivations 
could be market seeking, efficiency seeking and or natural resource seeking.  Kusek’s (2017) 
study found that 86% of the respondents surveyed; rated legal and regulatory environment as 
critically important (40%) and important (46%) when deciding on investment in developing 
countries including frontier economies, refer to table 11.  Policymakers need to be mindful 
when implementing FDI policies that legal system characteristics play a critical role in 
investors’ FDI decision.   
 In the early day's, investors tend to invest within the neighboring region or near their 
home countries because they are familiar with the culture, language, and ethnic similarity of 
that country, in the case of Vietnam and Myanmar, the investors will mostly be from ASEAN 
and China.   Lee et al. (2008) concluded from their study that logically people with similar 
language, cultural heritage, physical appearance and born in the same region have a higher 
tendency to invest in host countries with the similar cultural background. For investors that are 
far away from Vietnam; as an example, they tend to be overseas Vietnamese due to culture, 
language, and ethnic similarity.  Johanson’s (1990) study found that investors tend to invest 
closer to home, partly due to cultures, languages and ethnic familiarity. Moreover, that foreign 
investors perception of the host country’s legal system rather than reality impacts on FDI (Perry 
2000).   
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Table 11: Importance of Country Characteristics ( Source: Kusek, 2017) 
 
Policymakers also need to focus on attracting investors that are closer to their country 
as their top priority as they began their economic endeavors. The rate of success in attracting 
investors from neighboring region will be higher, and this success will lead to more investment 
inflows. On a longer-term strategy, policymakers need to attract investors from far away 
countries to grow their FDI. Hence their understanding on culture, language, and ethnic 
differences will allow them to strategize among other determinants; a good quality legal and 
regulatory environment or framework that will increase investors’ confidence and their 
willingness to invest.  
2. The Interaction between Culture Similarity and Characteristics of Legal System and 
its effect on the degree of  Managers’ Willingness to invest. 
 
This dissertation study found that there is an interaction between culture similarity and 
the four characteristics of the legal system but only two of these characteristics the legal clarity 
and legal transparency significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest in 
Vietnam.  It also illustrates that when culture similarity is at low and/ or moderate levels the 
barrier to managers’ willingness to invest is higher than when it is at a high level, reflected by 
the upward sloping regression line (see an example, figure 3). This indicates that investors 
expect the legal system of the host country to protect their investments before they are willing 
to invest. The results also suggest that there is the tendency for investors to be less sensitive to 
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the quality of the legal system and maybe more comfortable when the culture similarity is high 
as compared to investors with a low and or moderate level of culture similarity.  The results 
also show that when the culture similarity is high the managers’ willingness to invest is 
negatively correlated with the clarity of the legal system reflected by the downward sloping 
regression line. This could be due to some investors in the survey sample prefers to invest in 
the host country with an inadequate legal system which supports Zhuo et al. (2014) findings; 
that investors are only attracted to developing countries with an inadequate legal system with 
an opportunity to negotiate favorable terms.  
On Myanmar, the study shows that there is an interaction between culture similarity 
and characteristics of the legal system affecting the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, 
but none is statistically significant. On an aggregate basis, only legal transparency and legal 
enforcement are statistically significant and positively correlated with managers’ willingness 
to invest.  
Culture is defined in a variable way across research, including but not limited to belief, 
morale, categories, cognitive frames, deeply seated assumption about how the world operates 
or response to the social situation (Saguy et al., 2008). Law, in turn, is alternatively 
conceptualized as statues, case law, legal categories or how everyday people think about 
legality. (Saguy et al., 2008). FDI requires managers to evaluate the attractiveness and market 
potential of a host country in addition to other determinants discussed. To determine the 
viability of an investment, managers will thoroughly review data on demographics, economic, 
legal matters and more. Managers must be thoughtful enough to analyze the culture of the host 
country; as failure to adequately address this will increase the risk of investments failure.  
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Figure 3:  The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
Many policymakers recognize that an increase in domestic activity accompanies the 
increase in foreign FDI. Moreover, an understanding of culture and its ties to FDI is essential. 
By having a quality legal system, it reduces ambiguity in the interpretation of the laws and 
regulatory requirements and would be valuable information for policymakers (both host and 
home countries) to determine the potential partners and/or countries for international 
businesses.  Some investors acknowledge the importance of culture, but in theory, many do not 
incorporate it into their analysis. Some merely search for partners that are culturally close to 
themselves with the feeling that one can best do business with those like themselves.  Cultural 
influences in decision making are especially important whenever people from different cultures 
wish to influence and or to convince each other’s behavior through persuasive communication 
(Noble et al., 2000; Varner et al., 2014). 
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It is often assumed that investing in the foreign country carries a higher risk than 
trading, especially when the countries are culturally different. This is due to added cost of risk 
for having to assimilate the business and operation culture of the country assuming all else 
being equal.  This is not always true as some differences do not make it riskier in investing as 
the foreign perception of the host country legal system rather than reality impact FDI 
(Johanson, 1990).  The aspects of culture that make investment safer abroad, increase 
profitability and reward performance will attract FDI. Bhardwaj et al. (2007) suggested that 
cultural value hold a clue to business practices and is thereby creating differences in decision 
making. In short, the effect on culture in FDI is not homogenous. By default, investors choose 
to trade unless it is culturally compelling reason to do FDI (Raymond Mac-Dermott, 2015). 
The influence of culture on investments and business communication has been 
researched for many decades, starting with Geert Hofstede in 1980 and Edward Twitchell Hall 
in 1976.   Culture does not act in a silo; it is intimately connected to law. Culture influence law 
and law influence culture. For example, an egalitarian culture may establish a law that respects 
and protect the right of the individual. Culture does change, and it changes may be slow.  With 
the pervasive use of social media platform due to the improvement in technology we would 
expect cultural gaps between countries to be reduced significantly. This has great ramification 
on globalization and FDI.  
3. The interaction between Language Similarity and the Characteristics of the Legal 
System and its effect on the degree of Managers’ Willingness to invest.  
 
This dissertation study illustrates that the interaction between language similarity and 
the characteristics of the legal system is statistically significant affecting the degree of 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (except for characteristics of the 
legal system, legal enforcement). Similar to culture similarity it also demonstrates that when 
language similarity is at low and/ or moderate levels the barrier to managers’ willingness to 
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invest is higher than when it is at a high level. This indicates that investors expect the 
characteristics of the legal system of the host country to protect their investment interest due to 
the language differences before they are willing to invest (see an example, figure 4). The results 
also suggest that there is the tendency for investors to be less sensitive to the quality of the 
legal system and maybe more comfortable when the language similarity is high as compared 
to investors with a low and or moderate level of language similarity.   
The results also show that when the language similarity is high the managers’ 
willingness to invest is negatively correlated with the transparency of legal system reflected by 
the downward sloping regression line. This could be due to some investors in the survey sample 
preferring to invest in the host country with an inadequate legal system which supports Zhuo 
et al. (2014) findings; that investors are only attracted to developing countries with an 
inadequate legal system with an opportunity to negotiate favorable terms.  On an aggregate 
basis, only the interaction between legal enforcement is statistically significant.   
 
Figure 4: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
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The ability for international arbitration of disputes as an alternative to local arbitration 
is important when there is language, cultural and ethnic differences between investors and host 
countries.  It will create increased confidence in investors with investing in a country. This 
includes how transparent local arbitration settles business-related disputes.  In a host country, 
language also plays an influential role in investor willingness to invest.  
Language is at the heart of business communication such as business contracts, and 
negotiation (Oh et al., 2011).  A study by Kim et al. (2010) suggested that language is a dynamic 
instrument for reducing transaction charges and it can have an impact on investors choice 
during capital investment.  Vidal Suarez et al. (2013) study found that there is a tendency to 
avoid acquisitions as investment mode (method) when the language distance between host and 
home country is high. When the legal system is transparent despite the languages differences, 
investors will be more willing to invest even though the transaction costs to support maybe 
high. Speaking common language is essential in FDI rather than trade. As assets are being 
invested in FDI, investors will be sensitive to legal transparency to ensure their assets are 
protected from confiscation. At the same time, if there is a dispute, they will get a fair hearing. 
Legal transparency also means that the judiciary institution is independent and are not corrupt. 
It is essential for policymakers to adopt a standard language or target languages as the 
more the target language is spoken, the more attractive it will be for a native speaker to learn. 
In the case of Vietnam as an example, having English as the target language will increase 
investors’ willingness to invest than using the Vietnamese language. Investors do not always 
feel comfortable when business contracts are written in the Vietnamese language that is not 
universal, e.g., English or when business negotiation is conducted in a different language that 
warrants an interpreter.  
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4.  The interaction between Ethnic Similarity and the Characteristics of the Legal System 
and its effect on the degree of Managers’ Willingness to invest.  
 
On ethnic similarity, the interaction between ethnic similarity and the characteristics of 
the legal system is statistically significant affecting the managers’ willingness to invest; except 
for legal transparency in Vietnam and legal corruption in Myanmar. This suggests that the 
investors prefer to invest in location among developing countries where ethnic similarity is 
high unless there is a compelling reason(s) to do otherwise (see example figure 5).  This 
dissertation study also found that the interaction of ethnic similarity with legal corruption is 
statistically significant affecting the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam but not 
Myanmar. Regardless of the degree of ethnic similarity, investors are sensitive to corruption in 
the legal system and its predictability & reliability. The rate of willingness to invest increase 
much more when this similarity is higher than when it is lower; as corruption decreases (see 
example figure 6). 
Research by Huang et al. (2003) indicated that investment flow to the host country with 
the similar ethnic background is higher than dissimilar. There is a concern by investors 
regarding the possible privileges favoring some ethnic groups over others in a particular 
country. This negatively influences perception about fairness and legitimacy of the country 
legal system, legal authorities and its compliance with established business practices. Many 
ethnic minorities behave with a more negative attitude regarding the justice or legal system and 
its legitimacy as compared to the majority group. (Estevez et al. 2013)  
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Figure 5. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
 
Figure 6: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
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Minority groups tend to possess negative opinion and show more distrust and less 
confidence in the police and the judicial system as a whole. Tyler (2006) has guided most of 
the research on attitudes toward the justice and legal system from a  psychological perspective. 
He opined that people would accept decisions and distributive results from the justice system 
more willingly when they believe that the authorities are using fair procedures base on true 
motivations. Perception of fairness and proper treatment are therefore critical aspects for 
compliance with legal authorities while abusing of authority and disrespectful behavior will 
produce negative attitudes toward the authorities. This consequently lowers the desire to 
comply with the decisions and actions. (Tyler et al. 2002 and Wortley et al., 1997). 
People judge fairness in term of two principal issues, procedural justice, and distributive 
justice. Procedural justice refers to judgments about neutrality and impartiality in the decision-
making process. The motives of the authorities and respect for investor rights be treated with 
fairness are essential. Six rules apply, these are consistency, bias suppression, the accuracy of 
information, correctability, representation, and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). Distributive 
justice can be perceived as the fairness of the outcome received. Distributive justice exists 
when the allocation of the outcome is accepted as appropriate and consistent with the implicit 
norm such as equity and equality.  Both procedural and distributive justice shape investors’ 
confidence when making an investment decision and investing in the particular country of 
interest.  
In the recent year, the globalization process has been challenged worldwide by several 
factors, the most serious is ethnic similarity which has been found through such expression as 
patriotism, self-determination and ethnic chauvinism (Akwara et al., 2013). The study finds 
that racial sentiment aims at protecting the sovereignty of the countries involved, giving their 
citizens more significant control over national economies and those of other nations and is 
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therefore expressed by both developing and developed countries. Aggressive national posture 
can be reduced if the globalization process gives people a reasonable degree of control over 
their developments and if the barriers are removed against the movement of people from 
developing countries to developed countries.  
Globalization process has been riddled with many problems the most concerning is that 
of ethnic similarity. Ethnic influences arise as the results of discriminatory economic policies 
which defy the basic tenets of free-market globally. The discriminatory trade policies and 
elements of protectionism that move toward monopoly capitalism (Lenin, 1917). Evident exists 
to show that investor wants stable economies and repressive governments to eliminate the 
ethnic influence in the globalization process especially in the developing countries where such 
influenced seem to be more pronounced.  FDI should be in an area that would benefit people 
of the regions and not just the investors, e.g., healthcare, education, and transportation.  The 
degree of managers’ willingness to invest varies in the case of Vietnam and Myanmar, which 
support some of the past studies.  
Habib et al. (2002) found that differences in host and home country corruption level 
have a negative impact on FDI. Hewko (2003) study found that the most critical factor affecting 
FDI despite an inadequate legal system is a business opportunity and the opposite holds true. 
He commented that no research had been conducted to identify when and why investors allow 
the legal system to influence decision making. We hope this study complement some of this 
concern.  Pinto (2016) found that FDI is indeed associated with a higher level of corruption in 
less developed countries as compared to developed countries. 
For policymakers, building off the recent works (Jensen 2003, 2006; Li & Resnick 
2003, Li, 2006;  Bigliser & Staats 2010)  and drawing the study results from Powell and Rickard 
(2010), Lee (2014) conducted a panel data study on 114 developing countries from 1970 – 
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2007. Lee’s research illustrates that countries with common legal system attract higher foreign 
direct investments than countries with civil law or Islamic legal system.  The reasons, common 
law is understood to promote the rule of law and protect property rights, has higher efficiency, 
better contract enforcement, more judiciary autonomy and more market-oriented regulations. 
Staats and Biglaier (2005) found that judicial performance and enforcement rules increase FDI. 
Policymakers also need to be mindful of the power of ethnic similarity and need to 
ensure to have investment policies that welcome all ethnicities, and there should not be any 
favorable treatment of one ethnic group over another.   Jean et al. (2011) found that the ethnicity 
of senior managers matters when deciding location choice FDI. They tend to favor a location 
that is ethnically similar to theirs.   
5. The interaction between Physical Distance and Psychological Distance respectively and 
Legal Enforcement and its effect on the degree of Managers’ Willingness to invest. 
 
On moderators, physical distance and psychological distance, its interaction with legal 
enforcement is statistically significant and its effect the degree of managers’ willingness to 
invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (see example figure 7 and figure 8). This reaffirms that 
investors are more willing to invest in the host country that is nearer to their home countries 
(Johanson, 1990) and that they understand the culture of doing business in the host country ( 
Shenkar, 2001; Bhardwaj et al., 2007).  Referring to figure 7 and figure 8, when physical 
distance is high it means closeness to the home country, and when the psychological distance 
is high, it means high familiarity with the business culture in the home country. 
Investors would expect the legal system and the rule of law in the country to be enforced 
for example in business contracts, property rights, and investment assets to give them higher 
confidence in investing in the host country. As language is dissimilar, it can create a business 
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dispute as to the interpretation of contracts intents due to different cultures and business 
practices in the host country vary. Also, if the host and home country are far apart, management 
control will be an issue from home country, and the more rigorous the rule of laws are honored 
the higher will the managers’ willingness to invest (Jensen, 2003). 
It essential to policymakers that to attract investors that are located far away they need 
to build confidence and demonstrate that their countries rule of laws is being enforced 
rigorously and that in any disputes, the judicial system will be fair and honest and that the 
procedural and distributive justice are respected.  On practical firms implication, it is essential 
to ensure that their employees in key management positions are familiar with the country 
languages and business cultures of the host countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam.
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Figure 8.  The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
6. The impact of Commitment to Market on Manager’s Willingness to Invest. 
Our study also found managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated with 
market commitment, but its statistical significance is conflicting. Vietnam analysis shows the 
correlation between managers’ willingness to invest is positively correlated but not significant 
while Myanmar analysis suggests otherwise.  A study by Lamb et al. (2002) found that 
commitment to market require firms commitment to acquire market knowledge and being 
involved in the market. While Gundlash et al. (1995) found that commitment to market is a 
multidimensional construct that comprises of inputs, mental attitudes, and temporal 
components.  On an aggregate of Vietnam and Myanmar, commitment to market is statistically 
significant and positively correlated with managers’ willingness to invest.    
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This dissertation study also illustrates that the moderators market size, uncertainty 
avoidance, and future orientation interact respectively with a commitment to market and this 
affects the degree of managers’ willingness to invest. However, of the three moderators, the 
interaction is not statistically significant for moderator future orientation in the case of 
Vietnam, and for all moderators in the case of Myanmar which is somewhat conflicting.  
In this study, the interaction of future orientation is not statistically significant with a 
commitment to market and but its effect on the degree of managers’ willing to invest is still 
positively correlated with the future orientation regardless of the moderation level; for both 
Vietnam and Myanmar. This might suggest while that future orientation of a host country may 
not be investors immediate or top priority when making an investment decision even though it 
is necessary(see example figure 9).  Holmes et al. (2013) found that a country with future-
oriented culture emphasizes the importance of growing their economy.  
On uncertainty avoidance (UA) the study found its interaction with a commitment to 
market is statically significant and positively correlated affecting the degree of managers’ 
willingness to invest in Vietnam. For Myanmar, it also shows a positive correlation between 
managers’ willingness to invest and commitment to market when uncertainty avoidance 
(receptive to change)  is improving except the interaction is statistically not significant (see 
example figure 10).  This study shows that investors prefer to invest in the host country where 
people are not threatened or resistant to change or uncertain situation. A high uncertainty 
avoidance host country tends to have lower trust with foreign investors (Greet Hofstede et al., 
2010). This may impede managers’ willingness to invest.  
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Figure 9. The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
The interaction of market size with a commitment to market is statistically significant 
and has a positive effect on managers’willingness to invest in Vietnam study. This suggests 
that investors place great emphasis on market size when considering investing in the host 
country, Vietnam. In the case of Myanmar, the interaction is not significant, regardless of the 
moderating level of market size the commitment to market is positively correlated with 
managers’ willingness to invest (see example figure 11). Petrovic et al. (2017) and Chakrabarti( 
2001) found that market size is an essential determinant of FDI. In the case of Vietnam, while 
the interaction is statistically significant, the results suggest that when the moderating level of 
market size is low, the correlation between commitment to market and willingness to invest is 
steeply negative. This suggests that commitment to market no longer matter and will not 
improve the degree of managers’ willingness to invest.  
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Figure 10. The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
The results from Vietnam and Myanmar concerning the interaction of the moderators 
(Future Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Market Size) and commitment to market and 
the effect on the managers’ willingness to invest is conflicting. This is due to the strength of 
the correlation between commitment to market and managers willingness to invest. In the case 
of Vietnam, the β = 0.001 (weak correlation), t = 0.092 at p >0.05 whereas for Myanmar the β 
is 0.429 ( strong correlation) and t = 4.088 at p < 0.05. This suggests that in the case of Vietnam 
other moderating factors were more important than commitment to market as compared to 
Myanmar where commitment to market takes precedence against all other moderators. On an 
aggregate basis, market size is statistically significant. 
It is essential for investors and policymakers to be mindful that commitment to market 
involved shared obligation of investors’ firms and host countries. Commitment to market is not 
just about resources, having market sizes or opportunities and market shares. The drive to 
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commit to market by engaging and involving both parties (host and home countries) is 
essential. Even when the firms already have a substantial market share in the host country, it is 
essential to continue the drive to commit to market. A market share can be eroded if investors 
are not actively engaging the market due to intense competition. The same applies to 
policymakers who must continuously create a pro-business environment, build infrastructures, 
provided proper training such as educations & skill development, good health care services, 
and secure financial institution to attract investors. In short, policymakers must also take a long-
term view to complement their short-term view and create an environment where the people 
are comfortable with changes and innovation to generate growth and market opportunities to 
attract sustainable FDI.  
This dissertation study found that the degree of managers’ willingness to invest is 
affected by the level of culture similarity, language similarity, physical distance and 
psychological distance and its interaction with the characteristics of the legal system, some are 
statistically significant. This study also found that the degree of managers’ willingness to 
invest is affected by the level of future orientation, uncertainty avoidance and market size and 
its interaction with a commitment to market, again some are statistically significant. Of the 5 
sets of proposed hypotheses tested (22 hypotheses)  each for Vietnam and Myanmar 
respectively, 16 hypotheses (72 %) in the case of Vietnam is statistically significant, and 9 
hypotheses (41%) in the case of Myanmar is statistically significant. On an aggregate ( 
Vietnam and Myanmar)  basis, 45% of the proposed hypotheses are statistically significant.  
On the legal system hypotheses (H1-H4) only, the percentage is 78% in Vietnam, 36% in 
Myanmar and 36.4% on the aggregate (Vietnam and Myanmar). On commitment to market 
hypotheses (H5) only, the percentage is 50% Vietnam, 25% Myanmar and 50% aggregate. 
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Figure 11: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
We also conducted the significant test 90% confidence level, that is t = 1.645, p <0.1. 
The result, refer to table 12 shows that the percentage of hypotheses supported on Vietnam 
increase from 72% to 77%, while there is no change on Myanmar. On an aggregate Vietnam 
and Myanmar basis, the percentage of hypotheses supported increase from 45% to 50%   
Results for Myanmar show a lower percentage of hypotheses being significant due to several 
possible reasons. There are : 
1) Majority of respondents not being familiar with doing business in Myanmar. 
2) Myanmar launched free-market economic reforms beginning in 2011 as compared to    
Vietnam’s Doi Moi (economic reforms) since 1976. 
3) Information and managers’ experiences in doing business in Myanmar is lacking. 
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4) The recent Rohingya (stateless Muslim minority from Bangladesh and Myanmar) 
ethnic and refugee crises which cast a poor perception on the legal system of Myanmar 
and market opportunities in Myanmar.    
Taking into the consideration of Vietnam, Myanmar and the aggregate of both Vietnam and 
Myanmar analysis and results, this dissertation study found based on an aggregate of both 
Vietnam and Myanmar : 
1) The interaction between culture similarity and a) legal clarity, b) legal transparency and c) 
Legal enforcement respectively significantly affected the degree of managers willingness 
to invest. Thus H1A, H2A, and H4A are supported. 
2) The interaction between language similarity and legal corruption significantly affected the 
degree manager of managers willingness to invest. Thus H3B is supported. 
3) The interaction between Ethnic and a) legal clarity and b) legal enforcement respectively 
significantly affected managers’ willingness to invest. Thus H1C and H4C are supported. 
4) The interaction between physical distance and legal enforcement significantly affected the 
degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Thus H4D is supported. 
5) The interaction between market size and commitment to market significantly affected the 
degree of managers’ willingness to invest. Thus H5C is supported. 
6) The relationship between legal enforcement and the degree of managers’ willingness to 
invest is positively correlated and statistically significant. Thus H4 is supported.  
7) The relationship between commitment to market and the degree of managers’ willingness 
to invest is positively correlated and statistically significant. Thus H5 is supported.  
The results of this survey provide some critical information that reduces the concern on 
the lack of understanding how legal system influences FDI in developing countries (Perry, 
2000).  It also bridges some of the gaps between economic and cultural based approach to 
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understanding the legal system and managers’ willingness to invest in developing countries 
including frontier economies.     
4.6. Phase 4 
This is a qualitative phase where the results from phase 3 survey were discussed with 
the managers to gain further insight as to what they thought about these results refer to table 
10.  
4.6.1. The key objectives are: 
1. To gather their thought and whether they have an alternate explanation. 
2. To reinforce and validate the findings from phase 3 dissertation research study. 
3. To explore additional knowledge to the results of the quantitative research study as this 
qualitative method would not wholly address the size and scope of the proposed 
research objectives. Quantitative research is confirmatory and deductive while 
qualitative is exploratory and inductive (Trochim & Donnelly, 2001)  
4. To explore future research studies and or ideas that could be an extension of this 
dissertation research study.   
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       Table 12: Summary of Statistic; Analysis at 90% Confidence Limit      
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4.6.2 Qualitative Analysis 
This study is based on 8 interviews with participants who have been involved in FDI. 
Respondents are made up of a co-founder of manufacturing industry, two chief executive 
officers of the services industry, a management consultant, a chief operating officer of 
manufacturing firms and two senior executives of investment corporation. Each participant was 
given a comprehensive overview of the research endeavor so that they can be as objective as 
possible even though no specific method exists to control objectivity. Semi-Structured 
interviews were carried out based on an interview guide and to offer flexibility and 
opportunities for the respondents to highlight other factors that were not mentioned in the 
quantitative survey results.  
The data collected from the interviews were transcripts, analyses, sorted and 
categorized under the different themes identified from the research’s constructs (Moustakas, 
1994; DeNardo & Lopez-Levers, 2002). A summary table of feedbacks obtained and the 
interviews transcripts are illustrated in Appendix G.  The following section discussed the 
findings of the interviews. 
All respondents agreed that an appropriate regulatory and legal environment of the host 
country would entice more FDI as compared to those host countries that do not. However, these 
do not guarantee a risk-free investment in any country including a developed one. Respondents 
opined that legal system is synonymous with a product with quality. Without this, the products 
will not find customers or the products will have a lower value.   Respondents opined that while 
the quality of the legal system provides greater investors confident, the majority think that the 
responsibility lies with the investors to understand the legal and regulatory environment of the 
host country and then to manage the risks. In their opinion, there is no ideal legal system, and 
there is no risk-free investment, it all comes down to having the right knowledge of the legal 
system and the capacity and capability to deal with the unknown that may lead to reducing 
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risks. The legal system should not be too inflexible and neither can it be too vague as it will 
lead to severe corruption and will make enforcement in the rule of law practically non-
existence.  According to one respondent, use the best legal team and reputable law firm(s) from 
the host country as the legal resources to support the FDI and business-related activities.  
On whether the quality of the legal system will entice investors to invest in the host 
country where the culture, language, and ethnicity similarity is low, the feedbacks were 
conflicting. Some feel that differences will not hinder investors investing while other advice 
cautions. The majority agreed that given a choice they would prefer a location that they share 
similarity be it culture, language, and ethnic similarity. Going to invest in host country just 
because it is comfortable to do so is not pragmatic according to some respondents. Familiarity 
and or similarity will not breed profitability. It is the opposite as it forces the investors to drive 
for success than to rely on ‘ guanxi’ (Chinese version of the business relationship) and ethnic 
ties.    
One respondent commented that today’s world is dominated by young people or will 
be eventually; they are receptive to changes and technology is causing changes on a daily basis. 
It is not a question of whether one should or should not invest in a particular location or country, 
it is whether a firm can afford not to due to globalization and greater consumers choice. In his 
opinion there always be the difference in compliance and value in addition to lack of common 
culture. Its require managers today to adapt and manage different cultures, open to learning 
and differences, be culturally sensitive and can deal with ambiguity and improve from being 
unfamiliar such as language and culture to be being familiar. Also, managers, today must be 
proactive in their use of diversity and embrace diversity. So according to him and several 
others, it is complicated and challenging to embark on FDI, but the lack of either or most of 
these similarities issues will not retard FDI movements. It is situational, and it is synonymous 
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with situational leadership where managers can be autocratic, democratic or participative to 
maximize the objectives of the investment.      
Another respondent commented that the pervasive use of social media platforms such 
as Facebook, Instagram, Twitters, and WhatsApp to name a few; are going to bring similarity 
closer even though it is not going to be universal. It is a remote possibility to have a global 
attitude and mindsets, similar to the English language. If we can have this then maybe the 
similarity gaps will be minimized, and the international business relationship will be much 
more cordial, effective and efficient. Business culture varies from country to country although 
there will be some areas of similarity. Managers must learn to adapt and learn the different 
business culture to enable to be more successful in the host country. It is not advisable to rule 
out investing in a host country that has a high uncertainty avoidance culture as the market 
opportunity could be substantial. The majority of the respondents opined that market 
opportunity and production cost are some of the key factors when considering FDI in the host 
country with the assumption that the political and regulatory environments are right. 
Apparently, according to the respondents, the top concern is political stability, while the legal 
system is second in priority. We did not consider the political environment factor in our 
qualitative research as we deemed this is a foregone conclusion where FDI decision is 
concerned.  
Majority of the respondents would prefer to invest in a location that is nearer to home 
such as regional expansion before going further out. This is to allow more rigorous 
management oversights and greater mobility of managers from home to host country vice 
versa. Also, they will be able to monitor any political events and have quicker excess to a real 
understanding of the situation. It is not unusual to expand FDI regionally, build regional 
business experiences before venturing further out. They think the success will be higher and 
this also has to bolt well with the firm’s strategy and human capital resources.    
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Other respondents opined that with the advance of communication and technology, the 
physical distance as a barrier to FDI are gradually being reduced or minimized and should not 
be the critical factor that will impede FDI. This opinion support Cairnross (1997) study, The 
death by distance, which suggested how communications revolution will change our lives.  
Others disagreed that nothing beat being personally involved in the host country’s market by 
being on the ground, touching and feeling the situation. That is one the reason why firms 
relocate some of their talented managers overseas to manage and lead their operations. One 
respondent opined that all the factors discussed are valuable, but one factor he thinks is essential 
but probably hard to explain is intuition. Investors, he said invest sometime based on intuition 
even if their study and the analysis suggested otherwise. The following are the summary of 
knowledge gained from the interviews and the suggestion, opinions, and ideas brought up can 
be explored further for potential research in the area of FDI.         
4.6.3.  Results -The key takeaway from the interviews: 
1. Globalization with drive firms to compete via FDI investments as consumers have 
greater choices than before. 
2. Advances in technology will allow and promote learning of language and 
communication will become much more productive and useful. 
3. To be successful in FDI, managers must be open to learning the differences and 
embrace diversity. 
4. The quality legal institution will invite higher FDI and create investors confident in 
investing but will not guarantee investment success. 
5. Physical distance is drawn closer due to the advance of communication technology and 
transportation. 
6. Adaptability to culture and ethnic differences is a prerequisite for managers involved 
in FDI 
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7. The pervasive use of the social medium platform by the younger generation will 
improve similarity between home and the host country. It will reduce many of the 
complex issue facing FDI due to many differences.     
8. Differences in culture, language, ethnic and legal system is neither good or bad. It is 
highly dependent on how firms’ FDI strategy fits these differences and how firms’ 
capacity and capability to manage these differences.  
The inputs from the managers regarding the results of phase 3 hypotheses tests are 
varied.  Its illustrated the complexity of FDI decision. Managers, however, do agree that the 
characteristics of the legal system of a host country affect their willingness to invest. The 
majority of the managers also agreed that that culture, language, and ethnic similarity have an 
influencing role in their decision-making behavior concerning FDI  as evident by the interviews 
transcripts, but the consensus on the level or degree of similarity varies. This is also evident in 
the phase 3 study which illustrates that the level of the moderator tested affect the degree of 
willingness to invest. Managers’ interviewed have conflicting opinion on the relationship 
between commitment to market and willingness to invest. Some managers opined that market 
size takes precedent against all other determinants while other opined that it depends on a firm’s 
strategy and how this fits the overall characteristics of the host country investment climate. 
This feedback resembles our hypotheses and the conflicting results on the interaction of 
moderators (market size, uncertainty avoidance, and future orientation) with a commitment to 
the market and the effect on managers’ willingness to invest on Vietnam and Myanmar.  
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusion. 
5.1. Limitation and Future Research 
Although this study has practical implications, some limitations of this research must 
be addressed.  One of the limitations of this study was that the online survey in phase 3 was 
anonymous, this prevented the researcher from conducting a more detailed analysis of the 
results.  By not being anonymous it would allow the researcher to have a semi-structured 
interview with the respondents to understand further the rationale for selecting the rating to the 
questionnaire.  The second limitation is that there is a higher proportion of respondents from 
South East Asia which is 61% as compared to other regions; which is 39%/ The third limitation 
is that this study did not categorize the types of industry the respondents are from, for example, 
manufacturing or services industry. The fourth limitation of this study is that researcher does 
not take into account the motivations for FDI motivation of respondents and or firms, these 
motivations could be market seeking, efficient seeking, and natural seeking. Others limitations 
include conducting this study on two frontier economies in South East Asia, and we believe 
there is no reason the results will be any different if it is conducted on the frontier economy in 
Africa, Latin America or Eastern Europe. When using a Likert scales in a questionnaire, 
researchers have to pay particular attention to the coding to fulfill the requirement of 
equidistance. When a Linkert scale is received as symmetric and equidistant, it will behave 
more like interval scale (Hair, 2007). 
Having the same respondents answered the questionnaire on both Vietnam and 
Myanmar, could lead to some degree of biases.  The validity of the results of the moderation 
analysis depended on the truthfulness of the respondents’ self-reported answers to each of the 
self-reported questionnaire items devised to measure the predictor, moderator, and dependent 
variables.  If their responses were biased, because they were careless, or deliberately distorted 
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the truth, then the results of the moderation analysis could be compromised. On average, 
between 5% to 15% of respondents provide biased answers in long surveys (Mead & Craig, 
2011). One way to identify such respondents is to include specific questions to measure 
response bias deliberately (e.g., Lavrakas, 2018; Thompson & Phua, 2005). However, no such 
questions were included in the current study, and therefore the extent of response bias was 
unknown.  The respondent’s answers could potentially be biased for several reasons, including 
(1) the use of single-item measures; (2) social desirability bias; (3) acquiescent response bias; 
(4) extreme response bias; (5) cultural response bias.   
The validity of using single items to measure variables that will be used for inferential 
statistical analysis has been questioned (Bergkist, & Rossiter, 2007). The use of more than one 
item score to measure each variable is important to improve validity by: 
 (a) Avoiding random measurement errors, which are more likely to be canceled out when 
multiple items are used to measure a variable. 
 (b) Sampling more than one facet of the variable, to cover the full range of the meaning of the 
variable. 
(c) Avoiding the respondent's ambiguous misinterpretation of the meaning of a single item. 
(d) Facilitating the use of statistical analysis (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha and Factor Analysis) to 
determine the internal consistency reliability of the variable (Steiner, 2003).   
Social desirability - bias refers to the tendency of some respondents to distort their 
answers self-report questionnaire items or interviews to portray themselves in a good light 
(Holtgreaves, 2004; Thomson & Phua, 2005; Van de Mortel, 2008). Socially desirable 
responders tend to over-report behavior that they perceive to be desirable and under-report 
behavior that they perceive to be adverse. Some respondents who are members of business 
firms deliberately over-report their desirable behavior, and purposely under-report their 
 132 
 
adverse behavior, because they want to safeguard their jobs and/or protect the interests of their 
businesses (Zikmund et al., 2010). 
Acquiescent response bias is the tendency of some respondents to agree to all or most 
of the items in a questionnaire, irrespective of whether or not they do agree to the questions in 
reality.   
Extreme response bias refers to the propensity of some respondents to consistently 
provide polarized answer patterns to questions. They only endorse either one end or the other 
end of the item scale (i.e., either 1 or 7 in the current study). Acquiescent and extreme response 
bias is communication styles that are known to be prevalent in different cultures including 
Asians (Smith, 2004; Baron-Epel et al. 2010; Minkov, 2010) and therefore these sources of 
bias are relevant to the current cross-cultural study. 
Cultural response bias occurs when the respondents’ answers are embedded in the 
organizational norms, values, and beliefs of their own cultures. For example, the GLOBE 
surveys of managers across 62 societies (House et al. 2004) and 23 countries (Chokar et al. 
2007) revealed stereotypical differences between business managers working in different parts 
of the world.  The GLOBE surveys indicated that some managers in Asia might provide biased 
responses to questionnaire and interview questions, for various reasons, including self-
protective traits, self-centeredness, status-consciousness, face-saving, and reliance on formal 
procedures.   
The researcher recommended that future research could entail a bigger sample size to 
have a more balanced representation of respondents across the globe and to categorize the 
respondents by industry types and the types of FDI motivation. Another future research 
suggested will be to understand the impact the differences in culture, language, and ethnic 
similarity have on legal system characteristics and managers’ willingness to invest concerning 
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the size of the firms, for example, small medium enterprise vs. multinational corporation.  
Further research should also examine how social media affect the interaction between the 
different level of language, cultural and ethnicity differences with the characteristic of the legal 
system and its effect on managers’ willingness to invest. Additional research could be 
conducted to understand the interaction between language, culture and ethnic similarity and the 
characteristics of the legal system and it affects managers’ willingness to invest in the high-
tech industry versus intensitive labor industry (low tech industry).  
 Despite these limitations and suggestion for future research, this dissertation study 
revealed that the interaction between culture similarity, language similarity, and ethnic 
similarity with the characteristics of the legal system characteristics of the host country has an 
impact of managers’ willingness to invest. This study also highlights the complexity of 
managers’ willingness to invest and commitment to market. Some of the results are 
contradicting. The moderating effects of future orientations, market size, and uncertainty 
avoidance with a commitment to market and its effect on managers’ willingness to invest vary. 
Moreover, to some extent, depends on the location of the FDI and the characteristics and 
investment climates of the host country. Some of the results between Vietnam and Myanmar 
are contradicting. Thus, the future research suggestions will complement some of the finding 
gaps and or limitation in this study.   
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5.2. Conclusion 
Frontier and developing countries require FDI as it has become one of the most 
significant sources of external in financing surpassing remittances or portfolio investment 
flows. In 2016 more than 40% of the $1.75 trillion of global FDI flows went into developing 
countries, including frontier economies. This provided the needed private capital to these 
economies to fuel their economic expansion and activities. However, the benefits of FDI extend 
well beyond attracting capital resulting in developing countries competing for FDI. Some of 
the potential benefits especially for the local economy including but not limited to technology 
transfers, stronger human capitals, increasing productivity, more job opportunities, better 
income for working citizens, increasing access to foreign markets, option for export 
diversification and the potential to transform the economies through innovation, research, and 
development. These benefits are not guaranteed; nor do all types of FDI such as natural 
resources seeking, efficiency seeking and market seeking have the same potential impact. The 
determinants factors on FDI are varied. These are but not limited to, tax incentives, the legal 
system, a cultural distance which comprises of culture, language and ethnic differences and 
commitment to the market.  
Policymaker must adopt the right policies to maximize their gain for different types of 
FDI and managers motivation. They must be mindful that while structuring, implementing and 
reforming their policies, FDI is not homogeneous. The characteristics of the firms and the 
centricity and behavior perspective of the managers are equally important. Numerous surveys 
and studies have been conducted to understand managers motivation concerning country 
characteristics and important investment climate factors. However, the majority of these studies 
exclude the impact of managers behavioral perspectives in FDI decision making.  
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This dissertation study complemented other existing FDI studies by researching 1) the 
influence of culture, language and ethnic similarity on the legal characteristic of the country 
and 2) the influence of uncertainty avoidance, future orientation and market size on a 
commitment to market; that will affect managers’ willingness to invest. Five sets of hypotheses 
(22 hypotheses) each on Vietnam and Myanmar were proposed to study the effect, following 
the phase 1 and phase 2 studies. The phase 1 study comprises of(semi-structured interviews 
and survey of managers on FDI investments in Singapore, Vietnam, and Myanmar while phase 
2 consists of an online survey of managers on the number of visits to Vietnam and Myanmar 
and their willingness to invest.  
The proposed hypotheses were statistically analyzed following an anonymous online 
survey of managers who have FDI experiences. A sample size of 100 respondents was 
obtained. These 22 hypotheses were tested using SPSS and PLS-SEM,  the aggregate of 
Vietnam and Myanmar results show  45% of these hypotheses to have a significant interaction 
effect on managers’ willingness to invest at 95% confidence level. The results from the phase 
3 study were discussed with several managers under the phase 4 study to further obtained their 
opinion and inputs as the quantitative analysis may not have captured some of the significant 
insights. The consensus of managers was varied but agreed with many of the phase 3 results.  
These phases of this study refer to figure 12, and the results complement earlier research 
on FDI. To maximize the gain from FDI, policymakers such as the country governments must 
adopt effective strategies at the highest political levels that balance the population interests 
with managers preference to ensure the host country truly benefits from FDI. Hence this 
research finding provide an added resources to the policymakers in crafting FDI policies that 
will attract FDI, especially on the enormous challenges in incorporating behavioral insights 
due to many factors to consider with little guidance.  This will yield better prediction on the 
effect of their FDI policies.  
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Figure 12: Integrated Flow Chart of Phase 1 to 4 Study 
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Measure: US Dollars at current prices per capita (Inward Flow). 
 Table: A1      
 
 
 
Measure: Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (Inward Flow).  
 Table: A2 
 
Source: UNCTADstat (United Nation Conference on Trade and Development) 
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Measure: US Dollars at current prices per capita. 
  Table: A3 
 
 
 
Measure: Absolute value in thousands 
 Table: A4 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTADstat (United Nation Conference on Trade and Development) 
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Measure: Absolute Value in thousands 
 Table A5 
 
 
 
Measure: US Dollars at current prices in millions (Inward Flow). 
 Table: A6 
   
 
Source: UNCTADstat (United Nation Conference on Trade and Development) 
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 Table A7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Vietnam – 113 
Myanmar - 136 
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 Table: B1 
 
 
 Table: B2 
 161 
 
 
 Table: B3 
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Phase 2 Results 
Ranks 
Country N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
How many times have 
you visited this country? 
Vietnam 20 17.65 353.00 
Myanmar 23 25.78 593.00 
Total 43     
How well do you 
understand this country? 
Vietnam 20 22.43 448.50 
Myanmar 23 21.63 497.50 
Total 43     
How confident are you in 
investing in this country? 
Vietnam 20 26.58 531.50 
Myanmar 23 18.02 414.50 
Total 43     
How willing are you to 
invest in this country? 
Vietnam 20 24.00 480.00 
Myanmar 23 20.26 466.00 
Total 43     
 
  Table: C1 
 
 
Mann -Whitney Test 
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
  
How many times have you 
visited this country? 
How well 
do you 
understand 
this 
country? 
How 
confident 
are you 
in 
investing 
in this 
country? 
How 
willing 
are you 
to invest 
in this 
country? 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
143.000 221.500 138.500 190.000 
Wilcoxon W 353.000 497.500 414.500 466.000 
Z -2.200 -0.214 -2.325 -0.999 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
0.028 0.830 0.020 0.318 
a. Grouping Variable: Country 
 
 
 Table: C2 
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  Table: C3  
Phase 2 Results 
 
Frequencies 
Country = Vietnam 
 
Statisticsa 
 
How many 
times have 
you visited 
this country? 
How well do 
you 
understand 
this country? 
How 
confident are 
you in 
investing in 
this country? 
How willing 
are you to 
invest in this 
country? 
N Valid 20 20 20 20 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
 
a. Country = Vietnam 
 Table: C4 
 
Frequency Table 
How many times have you visited this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 7 35.0 35.0 35.0 
low 5 25.0 25.0 60.0 
average 3 15.0 15.0 75.0 
highest 5 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
a. Country = Vietnam 
 Table: C5 
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How well do you understand this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
low 10 50.0 50.0 60.0 
average 6 30.0 30.0 90.0 
high 1 5.0 5.0 95.0 
highest 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Vietnam 
 Table: C6 
 
How confident are you in investing in this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
low 2 10.0 10.0 15.0 
average 10 50.0 50.0 65.0 
high 6 30.0 30.0 95.0 
highest 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Vietnam 
 Table: C7 
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How willing are you to invest in this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid low 6 30.0 30.0 30.0 
average 7 35.0 35.0 65.0 
high 3 15.0 15.0 80.0 
highest 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Vietnam 
  Table: C8 
 
Country = Myanmar 
Statisticsa 
 
How many 
times have 
you visited 
this country? 
How well do 
you 
understand 
this country? 
How 
confident are 
you in 
investing in 
this country? 
How willing 
are you to 
invest in this 
country? 
N Valid 23 23 23 23 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
a. Country = Myanmar                          
                                                                            Table: C9 
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Frequency Table 
 
How many times have you visited this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 3 13.0 13.0 13.0 
low 3 13.0 13.0 26.1 
average 3 13.0 13.0 39.1 
high 3 13.0 13.0 52.2 
highest 11 47.8 47.8 100.0 
Total 23 100.0 100.0  
 
a. Country = Myanmar 
  Table: C10 
 
How well do you understand this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 9 39.1 39.1 39.1 
low 2 8.7 8.7 47.8 
average 7 30.4 30.4 78.3 
high 4 17.4 17.4 95.7 
highest 1 4.3 4.3 100.0 
Total 23 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Myanmar 
 Table: C11      
 
 171 
 
How confident are you in investing in this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 9 39.1 39.1 39.1 
low 3 13.0 13.0 52.2 
average 6 26.1 26.1 78.3 
high 5 21.7 21.7 100.0 
Total 23 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Myanmar 
  Table: C12    
     
 
How willing are you to invest in this country?a 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid lowest 8 34.8 34.8 34.8 
low 1 4.3 4.3 39.1 
average 6 26.1 26.1 65.2 
high 4 17.4 17.4 82.6 
highest 4 17.4 17.4 100.0 
Total 23 100.0 100.0  
a. Country = Myanmar 
  Table: C14 
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  Table: C15  
 
 
 
 Table: C16 
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  Table: C17   
  
 
 Table: C18  
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 Table: C19  
 
 
 Table: C20 
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  Table: C21 
 
 Table: C22 
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 Table: C23 
 
 Table: C24    
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Appendix D (Phase 3 Survey Questionaire) 
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Appendix E (SPSS Statistical Analysis) 
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Statistical Methodology 
1. The scores to operationalize the dependent, independent variables and moderator variables 
were imported from Excel into the data editor of SPSS.   
2. The interaction terms (coded as the products of the moderator variables x the independent 
variables) were computed. 
3. The variables were statistically tested for normality using the Kolmogorov Smirnov test. 
4. The variables were visually tested for normality using frequency distribution histograms. 
5. The p-values of the Mahalanobis Distances were computed to check for outliers. 
6. Linear regression analysis was conducted. 
7. The dependent variable was entered. 
8. The predictor variables were entered in three steps. Model 1: Independent variable; Model 
2: Moderator variables; Model 3: Interaction terms.  
9. The following Statistics options were selected: Model Fit, R Square change, and Collinearity 
diagnostics. 
10. The following analysis options were selected: Mahalanobis Distance, Standardized 
Residuals, and Unstandardized Predicted Values. 
 
The results were interpreted as follows assuming a critical statistical significance level 
of α = .05. The criterion to determine if the standardized partial regression coefficients (β) for 
each term in the linear regression model were significantly different from zero was p < .05 for 
the t-test statistics. The value of Adjusted R2 was used to indicate the amount of variance 
explained. A significant R Square change between Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 was 
indicated if p < .05 for the F test statistics.  Significant multicollinearity was indicated if the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics were >5. Significant heteroskedasticity (i.e., non-
homogeneity of variance) was indicated by the distribution pattern of the points in the 
scatterplot of the Standardized Residuals vs. the Unstandardized Predicted Values  
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Preliminary Results 
Table 1 indicates that all but two of the variables deviated significantly from normality (p < 
.05) 
Table 1. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Normality 
 
 N  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
p 
Mean SD 
V01 CLARITY OF LEGAL SYSTEM The legal system in Vietnam is very 
clear? 
100 2.71 2.081 1.536 .018* 
V02 WILLINGNESS TO INVEST I would if presented with a good investment 
option, invest in Vietnam? 
100 4.70 1.817 2.256 <.001* 
V03 LEGAL SIMILARITY The Legal system in Vietnam is very similar to my 
home country? 
100 2.32 1.847 1.988 .001* 
V04 CULTURE SIMILARITY The culture of Vietnam is very similar to my 
home country? 
100 2.64 1.883 2.230 <.001* 
V05 LANGUAGE SIMILARITY The language of Vietnam is very similar to my 
home country? 
100 1.81 1.339 3.036 <.001* 
V06 ETHNICITY The feel Vietnamese is ethnically similar to me? 100 3.07 1.892 2.141 <.001* 
V07 TRANSPARENCY The law in Vietnam is very transparent? 100 2.45 1.743 1.719 <.001* 
V08 CORRUPTION OF LEGAL SYSTEM The level of corruption in Vietnam 
is very low? 
100 2.15 1.598 2.074 <.001* 
V09 ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL SYSTEM The laws in Vietnam are 
consistently enforced? 
100 2.970 2.0073 1.040 .229 
V10 PHYSICAL DISTANCE The physical distance of Vietnam from my home 
country is not far? 
100 4.70 1.845 2.646 <.001* 
V11 PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE I understand the cultural and business 
practice in Vietnam? 
100 3.63 1.931 1.860 .002* 
V12 COMMITMENT TO MARKET I am committed to Vietnam market is there 
are good investment options? 
100 4.77 1.984 2.561 <.001* 
V13 MARKET SIZE Vietnam represents a great market opportunity? 100 5.43 1.533 2.550 <.001* 
V14 UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE Vietnamese are seen to handle uncertainty 
well? 
100 4.07 2.221 1.674 .007* 
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V15 FUTURE ORIENTATION Vietnam's economic policies are based on a 
long-term view of the country? 
100 3.99 2.067 2.419 <.001* 
M01 CLARITY OF LEGAL SYSTEM The legal system in Myanmar is very 
clear? 
100 2.06 1.699 1.641 .009* 
M02 WILLINGNESS TO INVEST I would if presented with a good investment 
option, invest in Myanmar? 
100 4.33 1.923 2.062 <.001* 
M03 LEGAL SIMILARITY The Legal system in Myanmar is very similar to my 
home country? 
100 1.88 1.402 2.159 <.001* 
M04 CULTURE SIMILARITY The culture of Myanmar is very similar to my 
home country? 
100 2.36 1.605 2.287 <.001* 
M05 LANGUAGE SIMILARITY The language of Myanmar is very similar to 
my home country? 
100 1.91 1.311 2.926 <.001* 
M06 ETHNICITY The feel Myanmarese is ethnically similar to me? 100 2.70 1.617 1.774 .004* 
M07 TRANSPARENCY OF LEGAL SYSTEM. The law in Myanmar is very 
transparent? 
100 2.03 1.494 1.780 .004* 
M08 CORRUPTION OF LEGAL SYSTEM The level of corruption in Myanmar 
is very low? 
100 1.83 1.341 1.820 .003* 
M09 ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL SYSTEM The laws in Myanmar are 
consistently enforced? 
100 2.20 1.627 1.989 .001* 
M10 PHYSICAL DISTANCE The physical distance of Myanmar from my home 
country is not far? 
100 4.48 1.936 2.459 <.001* 
M11 PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE I understand the cultural and business 
practice in Myanmar? 
100 2.94 1.994 1.213 .105 
M12 COMMITMENT TO MARKET I am committed to Myanmar market is 
there are good investment options? 
100 4.30 1.957 2.297 <.001* 
M13 MARKET SIZE Myanmar represents a great market opportunity? 100 4.47 1.972 2.560 <.001* 
M14 UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE Myanmar's people are seen to handle 
uncertainty well? 
100 3.53 2.236 1.532 .018* 
M15 FUTURE ORIENTATION Myanmar's economic policies are based on a 
long-term view of the country? 
100 3.28 2.015 1.495 .023* 
Note: * Significant deviation from normality (α = .05) 
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Figure 1. Visually displays the skewness of the frequency distribution (visual test for 
normality)  
Vietnam 
 
Myanmar
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Table 2. Multicollinearity Test 
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Table 3. (indicates that the data set contained five significant multivariate outliers (p ≤ .001)) 
Mahalanobis Distance Test for Outliers 
Respondent# Mahalanobis 
Distance 
p 
6 67.708  <.001* 
99 64.860 <.001* 
80 62.798 <.001* 
85 60.915 .001* 
95 60.088 .001* 
Note: * Significant outlier (α = .001) 
Table 3 presents Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 of the hierarchical linear regression model 
to test H1, using the Vietnam data.   Table 4 presents the R Square Change statistics. 
 
Table 4.  Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model to Test H1 
Model β t p Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)  14.140 <.001*   
V01 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM  
.241 2.460 .016* 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant)  9.281 <.001*   
V01 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM  
.141 1.421 .159 .902 1.109 
V04 CULTURE  .307 2.068 .041* .405 2.467 
V05 LANGUAGE SIMILARITY  -.014 -.117 .907 .596 1.679 
V06 ETHNICITY  .032 .241 .810 .521 1.920 
3 (Constant)  6.132 <.001*   
V01 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM  
.336 1.807 .074 .254 3.931 
V04 CULTURE SIMILARITY  .657 2.632 .010 .141 7.079 
V05 LANGUAGE SIMILARITY  .012 .054 .957 .189 5.282 
V06 ETHNICITY  -.149 -.671 .504 .178 5.625 
VIN01 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM x CULTURE 
SIMILARITY 
-.515 -1.791 .077 .107 9.377 
VIN02 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM x LANGUAGE 
SIMILARITY 
-.079 -.297 .767 .123 8.150 
VIN03 CLARITY OF LEGAL 
SYSTEM x ETHNICITY 
.213 .750 .455 .109 9.156 
Note: * Significant predictor (α = .05)  
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Table 5. R Square Change 
 
Model R Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 p 
1 .241 .049 1.773 .058 6.054 1 98 .016* 
2 .389 .115 1.709 .093 3.462 3 95 .019* 
3 .436 .128 1.697 .039 1.472 3 92 .227 
Note: * Significant R Square Change (α = .05) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Residual Plot 
The scatterplot to display the pattern of the standardized residuals vs. the unstandardized 
predicted values is presented in Figure 2. 
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Clarity of the Legal System was a significant predictor (p < .05) of Willingness to Invest 
in Model 1; however, R2 = .049 indicated that only a small proportion (4.9%) of the variance 
in the dependent variable was explained.  
The three interaction terms in Model 3 were not significant predictors of Willingness 
to Invest (p > .05). Furthermore, there was no significant R Square change when the interaction 
terms were added in Model 3 (p > .05). The data violated the assumptions of linear regression. 
Significant multicollinearity was indicated by VIF statistics > 10. The residual plot reflected 
heteroskedasticity because the residuals were not evenly distributed either side of their mean 
(zero) value. The geometric diamond pattern of the residuals indicated that the variance in the 
dependent variable might not be homogeneous across the predictor variables. A summary of 
the results is presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Summary of Tests for H1 (α = .05) 
 
H1: The Clarity of the Legal System is positively correlated 
with the Manager’s Willingness to Invest 
Supported (p = .016) 
H1A: The interaction between Culture Similarity and the 
Clarity of the Legal System will affect the degree of 
Manager’s willingness to invest 
Not supported (p = .077) 
 H1B: The interaction between Language Similarity and the 
Clarity of the Legal System will affect the degree of 
Manager’s willingness to invest 
Not supported (p = .123) 
H1C: The interaction between Ethnicity and the Clarity of 
the Legal System will affect the degree of Manager’s 
willingness to invest 
Not supported (p = .109) 
 
The interpretations of the statistical inferences based on linear regression analysis were 
limited due to (a) the significant deviation of the variables from normality; (b) the inclusion of 
outliers; (c) multicollinearity among the moderators, and (c) the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
Furthermore, there are five hypotheses to test (H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5) implying that the 
conventional statistical significance level (α = .05) to support the hypotheses must be reduced 
to take into account the inflation of Type I errors when multiple tests are performed on one set 
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of data. Applying the Bonferroni correction means that α should be reduced from .05 to .05/5 
= .01. Applying α = .01 rather than α = .05 means that the Clarity of the Legal System was not 
a significant predictor (indicated by p = .016) of Willingness to Invest, therefore H1 was not 
supported.   
The researcher attempted to test the stated hypotheses with regression analysis using 
SPSS software. However, the results were severely compromised by violations of the 
theoretical assumptions of regression analysis. Consequently, the researcher chose an 
alternative method, using Smart PLS software. 
In the last decade PLS path analysis, based on the computation of partial least squares 
(PLS) has superseded regression analysis based on the computation of OLS.  (Aimram et al., 
2015; Fassot et al., 2016; Wong, 2016). The advantages of using PLS path analysis over OLS 
regression analysis as discussed by Hair et al. (2017) are mainly that PLS has less restrictive 
theoretical assumptions and provides meaningful results when the strict assumptions of 
regression are violated. For example:  (a) PLS is a non-parametric method, therefore, unlike 
OLS regression, it does not assume that the variables are normally distributed; (b) unlike OLS 
regression,  PLS operates with dependent variables having all types of measurement and 
distributional characteristics (e.g. nominal, ordinal, and scale/ interval level) and does not 
assume that the dependent variable is measured at the scale/interval level;  (c) PLS operates by 
optimizing the explained variance between the variables, and all the variance is considered  to 
be explainable, unlike OLS regression, in which consideration has to be given to the residual 
or unexplained variance; (d) unlike OLS regression, PLS  achieves a high level of statistical 
power with small sample sizes, and also operates with data collected using non-probability 
(convenience or purposive) samples,  because the  correlations  (i.e., the mean values of the 
path coefficients measuring the partial correlations between the variables) and the statistical 
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significance of the path coefficients (based on the results of one-sample two-tailed t-tests)  are 
computed by bootstrapping.   
The bootstrapping procedure samples and resamples the data set to collect a total of 
5000 random subsamples. The Monte Carlo algorithm for subsampling is used for the 
bootstrap, meaning that the data are shuffled like a pack of cards in a casino before each sub-
sample is drawn from the data set.   These reasons explain why PLS has been successfully 
applied by many researchers in the last decade to construct statistical models and test 
hypotheses based on survey data collected in American, Europe, Middle East, and Asian 
settings, with applications in organizational and operations management, international 
marketing, and accounting (Henseler et al., 2009; Nitzi, 2016; Peng & Lai, 2012; Wetzels et 
al., 2009; Richter et al., 2015). 
 The path analysis was conducted with SmartPLS version 2.0 software using the 
methods described by Wong (2013; 2016). The item scores were entered into SmartPLS as a 
comma delimited (.csv) file. SmartPLS automatically replaced all the missing values in the 
data file (including zeroes for “No opinion”) into mean scores. Replacement with mean scores 
is the most common method to replace missing values in questionnaire response data (Enders, 
2010). Prior to the analysis, all the item scores were automatically standardized by SmartPLS 
using Z = (X - M)/SD where Z = Z score; X = item score; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.  
The standardized data were sampled by bootstrapping 5000 times, to estimate the mean (β) of 
each path coefficient and the standard error (SE) of each path coefficient. Because the item 
scores were standardized, the path coefficients ranged from -1 through 0 to 1. Results of the 
analysis are illustrated in Appendix F.  
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Table 7. Survey Data
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Appendix F (Statistical Analysis – Vietnam, Myanmar, and Vietnam + Myanmar) 
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VIETNAM 
 
1. Impact of Clarity of the Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam 
 
Figure 1 displays the PLS path model exported from the graphic user interface of SmartPLS to 
examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in 
Vietnam. The path coefficients (β) are displayed next to the arrows joining the variables, which 
are symbolized by circles.  The R2 value = .110, within the circle symbolizing the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated that 11.0% of the variance was explained.  
 
Figure 1. PLS path model to examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 The dependent/outcome variable is the managers’ willingness to invest (WTI).  The 
independent/predictor variable is Clarity of the Legal System (CLS). The hypothesized 
moderators are Culture Similarity (CS) Language Similarity (LS); and Ethnic Similarity (ES). 
The 7-point ordinal scale for each variable ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree.  The three interactions to measure the moderating effects are Clarity of the Legal System 
 203 
 
x Culture Similarity (CLS x CS); the Clarity of the Legal System x Language Similarity (CLS 
x LS); and the Clarity of the Legal System x Ethnic Similarity (CLS x ES).  
The results of the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random 
subsamples to estimate the statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 1 are 
displayed in using the graphics output from SmartPLS in Figure 2.  The path coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96; however, if t ≤ 1.96 the path coefficients 
are not significant (i.e., equal to zero).  Because all of the t-test statistics in Figure 2 are > 1.96, 
all of the path coefficients are significant.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Vietnam  
 
H1:  The clarity of the legal system (CLS) was significantly positively correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest (WTI) indicated by β = 0.355, t = 2.731; p < .05.  
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H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x CS) 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.466; 
t = 2.836; p < .05.  Figure 3 presents a plot to visualize this interaction. When the culture 
similarity was low (score = 1 to 2) or moderate (score = 3 to 5) there was a positive correlation 
between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward 
sloping regression lines; however, when the culture similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there 
was a negative correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, 
reflected by the downward sloping regression line.  
 
Figure 3.  The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
 
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x 
LS) significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.407, 
t = 2.774; p < .05.  Figure 4 presents the interaction plot to visualize this interaction. When the 
language similarity was low (score 1 to 2) or moderate (score = 3 to 5) there was a positive 
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correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, indicated by 
the upward sloping regression lines; however, when the culture similarity was high (score = 6 
to 7) there was a negative correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness 
to invest, indicated by the downward sloping regression line.  
 
Figure 4. The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
 
 
H1C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x ES) 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = - 
0.403, t = 2.272, p < .05. Figure 5 presents the interaction plot. When the ethnic similarity was 
low to moderate (score = 1 to 5) there was a positive correlation between the clarity of the legal 
system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping lines; however, when the 
ethnic similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a negative correlation between the clarity 
of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the downward sloping line.  
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Figure 5.  The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
 
 
2. Impact of the Transparency of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
in Vietnam 
 
Figure 6 displays the PLS path to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. The variables are the same as in Figure 1, 
apart from the dependent/outcome variable, i.e., Transparency of the Legal System (TLS).  The 
R2 value = .084 indicated that 8.4% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-
sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 6 are displayed in Figure 7.   
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Figure 6. PLS path model to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Vietnam. 
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The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96; however, if t 
≤ 1.96, the path coefficients are not significant. 
H2:  The transparency of the legal system was not positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = -.053; t = 0.680, p > .05.  
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.663; 
t = 2.709.  Figure 8 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was low to 
moderate (score = 1 to 5) there was little or no correlation between the transparency of the legal 
system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal lines; however, 
when the culture similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a negative correlation between 
the transparency of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the downward 
sloping line. 
 
Figure 8. The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
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H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.496, 
t = 2.916, p < .05.  Figure 9 displays the interaction plot. When the language similarity was low 
to moderate (score = 1 to 5) there was little or no correlation between the transparency of the 
legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal lines; 
however, when the culture similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a negative correlation 
between the transparency of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the 
downward sloping line. 
 
Figure 9. The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam 
 
H2C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.082, 
t = 0.537, p > .05. The interaction plot in Figure 10 illustrates this non-significant interaction, 
in which all three regression lines appear to be approximately parallel.  
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Figure 10. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam.  
 
3. Impact of the Corruption of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam 
 
Figure 11 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. The variables are the same as in 
Figure 1, apart from the dependent/outcome variable, i.e., Corruption of the Legal System 
(COLS).  The R2 value = .094 indicated that 9.4% of the variance was explained. The results 
of the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to 
estimate the statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 11 are displayed in Figure 
12.  The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
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Figure 11. PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
Figure 12. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Vietnam. 
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H3: The corruption of the legal system was negatively correlated to the managers’ willingness 
to invest, indicated by β = -0.401, t = 0.537, p < .05. 
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system affected 
the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.297, t = 1.886, p ≈ .05. Figure 
13 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was low to moderate (score = 1 to 
5) there was little or no correlation between the corruption of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal lines; however, when the 
culture similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a positive correlation between the 
corruption of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping 
line. 
 
 
Figure 13. The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
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H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.268, t 
= 2.122, p < .05. Figure 14 displays the interaction plot. When the language similarity was 
moderate (score = 3 to5) there was little or no correlation between the corruption of the legal 
system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal line; however, 
when the culture similarity was low (score = 1 to 2) there was a positive correlation between 
the corruption of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping 
line. 
 
Figure 14. The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.234, t 
= 2.330, p < .05. Figure 15 displays the interaction plot. When the ethnic similarity was 
moderate (score = 3 to 5), there was no correlation between the corruption of the legal system 
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and the willingness to invest, reflected by the horizontal line. When the ethnic similarity was 
low (score = 1 to 2), there was a negative correlation between the corruption of the legal system 
and the willingness to invest, reflected by the downward sloping line. When the ethnic 
similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a positive correlation between the corruption of 
the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping line. 
 
Figure 15. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
 
4. Impact of the Enforcement of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam 
 
Figure 16 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. The dependent/outcome variable 
is the managers’ willingness to invest (WTI). 
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Figure 16. PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam (path coefficients and R2) 
 
The independent/predictor variable is Enforcement of the Legal System (ELS). The 
hypothesized moderators are Culture Similarity (CS) Language Similarity (LS); Ethnic 
Similarity (ES); Physical Distance (PHD); Psychological Distance (PSD). The 7-point ordinal 
scale for each variable ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  The five 
interactions to measure the moderating effects are Enforcement of the Legal System x Culture 
Similarity (ELS x CS); the Enforcement of the Legal System x Language Similarity (ELS x 
LS); Enforcement of the Legal System x Ethnic Similarity (ELS x ES); Enforcement of the 
Legal System x Physical Distance (ELS x PHD); and Enforcement of the Legal System x 
Psychological Distance (ELS x PSD).   
 216 
 
The R2 value = .176 indicated that 17.6% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-
sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 16 are displayed in Figure 17.  The 
path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
 
 
Figure 17. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H4: The enforcement of the legal system was significantly and positively correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.645, t = 3.158, p < .05. 
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.005, t 
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= 1.175, p > .05. Figure 18 displays the interaction plot with three almost parallel upward 
sloping regression lines, reflecting the positive correlation with a lack of interaction.  
 
Figure 18. The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H4B: The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.705, t 
= 4.216, p < .05.    Figure 19 displays the interaction plot. When the language similarity was 
moderate (score = 3 to 5), there was no correlation between the enforcement of the legal system 
and the willingness to invest, reflected by the horizontal line. When the language similarity 
was low (score = 1 to 2), there was a positive correlation between the corruption of the legal 
system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping line. When the language 
similarity was high (score = 6 to 7) there was a negative correlation between the enforcement 
of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the downward sloping line. 
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Figure 19. The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H4C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.445, 
t = 2.412, p < .05.  Figure 20 displays the interaction plot. The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest at all levels of ethnic similarity.  The strongest correlation, 
indicated by the steepest upward sloping line, was when ethnic similarity was high. 
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Figure 20. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H4D: The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -.998, 
t = 7.035, p < .05.  Figure 21 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest line, was 
when physical distance was low (score = 1 to 2). The weakest correlation, indicated by the 
almost horizontal regression line, was when physical distance was high (score = 6 to 7).  
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Figure 21. The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.384, 
t = 2.719, p < .05. Figure 22 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest regression 
line, was when psychological distance was low (score = 1 to 2). The weakest correlations, 
indicated by the almost horizontal lines, were when physical distance was moderate to high 
(score = 3 to 5).   
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Figure 22.  The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the 
legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
5. Impact of Commitment to Market on Managers’ Willingness to Invest in Vietnam 
Figure 23 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. The predictor variable is a commitment to 
market (CTM). The hypothesized moderators are Uncertainty Avoidance (UA); Future 
Orientation (FO); and Market Size (MS). The 7-point ordinal scale for each variable ranged 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  The three interactions to measure the 
moderating effects are Commitment to Market x Uncertainty Avoidance (CTM x UA); 
Commitment to Market x Future Orientation (CMT x FO); and Commitment to Market x 
Market Size (CTM x MS). The R2 value indicated that 43.9% of the variance was explained. 
The results of the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping are displayed in Figure 24. 
The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96. 
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Figure 22. PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
  
Figure 23. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the commitment to market on the managers’ willingness to invest 
in Vietnam. 
 
.   
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H5: Commitment to market was not positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to 
invest, indicated by β = 0.010, t = 0.092, p > .05.  
H5A: The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.261, t 
= 7.318, p < .05. Figure 24 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflected the positive correlation between the commitment to market and the managers’ 
willingness. The steepest slopes reflected the strongest correlations between commitment to 
market and the managers’ willingness to invest when uncertainty avoidance was low to 
moderate (score = 1 to 5). The weakest correlation was when uncertainty avoidance was high. 
 
Figure 24. The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to 
market on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
 
H5B: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market did not 
significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.350, t 
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= 1.537, p > .05. Figure 25 displays three regression lines with similar upward slopes reflecting 
the similar positive correlations between future orientation and the commitment to market at 
low (score = 1 to 2), moderate (score = 3 to 5) and high levels (score = 6 to 7) of future 
orientation with no interaction.   
 
Figure 25. The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
 
H5C: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market significantly affected 
the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.497, t = 2.359, p < .05. Figure 
26 displays the interaction plot.  The two upward sloping regression lines reflect the strong 
positive correlations between the commitment to market and the managers’ willingness to 
invest when the market size was moderate to high (score = 3 to 7). When the market size was 
low (score = 1 to 2), however, the downward sloping line reflected a negative correlation 
between commitment to market and the managers’ willingness to invest.  
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Figure 26. The interaction between market size and the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. 
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MYANMAR 
 
 
1. Impact of Clarity of the Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Myanmar 
 
Figure 27 displays the PLS path model exported from the graphic user interface of SmartPLS 
to examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest 
in Myanmar.  The R2 value = .151 indicated that 15.0% of the variance was explained.  
 
Figure 27. PLS path model to examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
 
The dependent/outcome variable is the managers’ willingness to invest (WTI).  The 
independent/predictor variable is Clarity of the Legal System (CLS). The hypothesized 
moderators are Culture Similarity (CS) Language Similarity (LS); and Ethnic Similarity (ES).  
The three interactions to measure the moderating effects are Clarity of the Legal System x 
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Culture Similarity (CLS x CS); the Clarity of the Legal System x Language Similarity (CLS x 
LS); and the Clarity of the Legal System x Ethnic Similarity (CLS x ES). The results of the 
one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 27 are displayed in using the graphics 
output from SmartPLS in Figure 28.  The path coefficients are significantly different from zero 
at p < .05 if t > 1.96. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Myanmar  
 
H1:  The clarity of the legal system (CLS) was not significantly positively correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest (WTI) indicated by β = -0.046, t = 0.608; p > .05.  
H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x CS) 
did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 
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0.134; t = 1.230; p > .05.  Figure 29 presents a plot to visualize this interaction. When the 
culture similarity was low (score = 1 to 2) or high (score = 6 to 7) there was little or no 
correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by 
the approximately horizontal regression lines; however, when the culture similarity was 
moderate there was a positive correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping regression line.  
 
Figure 29.  The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar 
 
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x 
LS) significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -
0.607, t = 3.418; p < .05). Figure 30 presents the interaction plot to visualize this interaction. 
When the language similarity was low (score 1 to 2) or moderate (score = 3 to 5) there was a 
positive correlation between the clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, 
indicated by the upward sloping regression lines; however, when the culture similarity was 
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high (score = 6 to 7) there was a negative correlation between the clarity of the legal system 
and the willingness to invest, indicated by the downward sloping regression line.  
 
Figure 30. The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar 
 
 
H1C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x ES) 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = - 
0.882, t = 5.367, p < .05. Figure 31 presents the interaction plot. When the ethnic similarity 
was low (score = 1 to 2) there was a negative correlation between the clarity of the legal system 
and the willingness to invest, reflected by the downward sloping line; however, when the ethnic 
similarity was moderate to high (score = 3 to 7) there were positive correlations between the 
clarity of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by upward sloping lines.  
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Figure 31.  The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar 
 
 
2. Impact of the Transparency of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
in Myanmar 
 
Figure 32 displays the PLS path model exported from the graphic user interface of SmartPLS 
to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Myanmar. The variables are the same as in Figure 27, apart from the 
dependent/outcome variable, i.e., Transparency of the Legal System (TLS).  The R2 value = 
0.159 indicated that 15.9% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-sample two-
tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the statistical 
significance of the path coefficients in Figure 33 are displayed in using the graphics output 
from SmartPLS in Figure 32.  The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < 
.05 if t > 1.96; however, if t ≤ 1.96, the path coefficients are not significant. 
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Figure 32. PLS path model to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Myanmar. 
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H2:  The transparency of the legal system was not positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = -.039; t = 0.445, p > .05.  
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, 
indicated by β = 0.197; t = 1.604.  Figure 34 displays the interaction plot. When the culture 
similarity was low (score = 1 to 2) or high (score = 6 to 7) there was little or no correlation 
between the transparency of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the 
approximately horizontal lines; however, when the culture similarity was moderate (score = 3 
to 5) there was a positive correlation between the transparency of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping line. 
 
Figure 34. The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar 
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H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.390, 
t = 2.745, p < .05. Figure 35 displays the interaction plot with three upward sloping lines, 
reflecting the positive correlation between language similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system at all levels of language similarity. The strongest correlations, reflected by the steepest 
sloping lines, were when language similarity was moderate (score = 3 to 5) and high (score = 
6 to 7).  
 
Figure 35. The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the 
legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar 
 
H2C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.713, t 
= 3.146, p < .05. Figure 36 illustrates this interaction. When the ethnic similarity was low (score 
= 1 to 2) there was a negative correlation between the transparency of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by the downward sloping line; however, when the culture 
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similarity was moderate to high (score = 3 to 7) there were positive correlations between the 
transparency of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the upward sloping 
lines.  
 
 
 
Figure 36. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar.  
 
3. Impact of the Corruption of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Myanmar 
 
Figure 37 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. The variables are the same as in 
Figure 27, apart from the dependent/outcome variable, i.e., Corruption of the Legal System 
(COLS).  The R2 value = .169 indicated that 16.9% of the variance was explained. The results 
of the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to 
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estimate the statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 37 are displayed in Figure 
38.  The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
 
Figure 37. PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
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Figure 38. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Myanmar. 
 
H3: The corruption of the legal system was not negatively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.058, t = 0.729, p > .05. 
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system was not 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.037, t 
= 0.349, p > .05. Figure 39 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was high 
(score = 6 to 7) there was little or no correlation between the corruption of the legal system and 
the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal line; however, when the 
culture similarity was low to moderate (score = 1 to 5) there were positive correlations between 
the corruption of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the two upward 
sloping lines. 
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Figure 39. The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.369, t 
= 2.571, p < .05. Figure 40 displays the interaction plot. At all three levels of language 
similarity, there were positive correlations between the corruption of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by three upward sloping lines. 
54321
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Corruption of Legal System
W
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 In
ve
st
High
Low
Moderate
Similarity
Culture
 238 
 
 
Figure 40. The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.234, t 
= 2.330 p < .05. Figure 41 displays the interaction plot. At all three levels of ethnic similarity, 
there were positive correlations between the corruption of the legal system and the willingness 
to invest, reflected by three upward sloping lines. The strongest correlation, reflected by the 
steepest slope, was when ethnic similarity was high (score = 6 to 7). The weakest correlation, 
reflected by the lowest slope, was when ethnic similarity was low (score = 1 to 2).  
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Figure 41. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
4. Impact of the Enforcement of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Myanmar 
 
Figure 42 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. The dependent/outcome variable 
is the managers’ willingness to invest (WTI). 
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Figure 42. PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
 
The independent/predictor variable is Enforcement of the Legal System (ELS). The 
hypothesized moderators are Culture Similarity (CS); Language Similarity (LS); Ethnic 
Similarity (ES); Physical Distance (Ph.D.); and Psychological Distance (PSD). The 7-point 
ordinal scale for each variable ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  The 
five interactions to measure the moderating effects are Enforcement of the Legal System x 
Culture Similarity (ELS x CS); the Enforcement of the Legal System x Language Similarity 
(ELS x LS); Enforcement of the Legal System x Ethnic Similarity (ELS x ES); Enforcement 
of the Legal System x Physical Distance (ELS x PHD); and Enforcement of the Legal System 
x Psychological Distance (ELS x PSD).   
The R2 value = 0.275 indicated that 27.5% of the variance was explained. The results of the 
one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate 
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the statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 42 are displayed in Figure 43.  
The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
 
 
Figure 43. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H4: The enforcement of the legal system was not significantly correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.645, t = 0.932 p > .05. 
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.165, 
t = 1.469, p > .05.  Figure 44 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was high 
(score = 6 to 7) there was little or no correlation between the corruption of the legal system and 
the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal line; however, when the 
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culture similarity was low to moderate (score = 1 to 5) there were positive correlations between 
the corruption of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the two upward 
sloping lines. 
 
Figure 44. The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H4B: The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.252, 
t = 1.430, p > .05.    Figure 45 displays the interaction plot. At all three levels of language 
similarity, there were positive correlations between the corruption of the legal system and the 
willingness to invest, reflected by three upward sloping lines. 
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Figure 45. The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H4C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.774, 
t = 4.317, p < .05.  Figure 46 displays the interaction plot. The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlations between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest line, was 
when ethnic similarity was high. The weakest correlation, indicated by the line with the lowest 
slope, was when ethnic similarity was low.  
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Figure 46. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H4D: The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.421, 
t = 2.498, p < .05.  Figure 47 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest line, was 
when physical distance was moderate (score = 3 to 5).  
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Figure 47. The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.394, 
t = 2.155, p < .05. Figure 48 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest regression 
line, was when psychological distance was high (score = 6 to 7). The weakest correlations, 
indicated by the almost horizontal lines, were when physical distance was low (score = 1 to 2).   
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Figure 48.  The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the 
legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
5. Impact of Commitment to Market on Managers’ Willingness to Invest in Myanmar 
Figure 49 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. The predictor variable is a commitment to 
market (CTM). The hypothesized moderators are Uncertainty Avoidance (UA); Future 
Orientation (FO); and Market Size (MS). The 7-point ordinal scale for each variable ranged 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  The three interactions to measure the 
moderating effects are Commitment to Market x Uncertainty Avoidance (CTM x UA); 
Commitment to Market x Future Orientation (CMT x FO); and Commitment to Market x 
Market Size (CTM x MS). The R2 value = 0.575 indicated that 57.5% of the variance was 
explained. The results of the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping are displayed in 
Figure 50. The path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96. 
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Figure 49. PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
Figure 50. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the commitment to market on the managers’ willingness to invest 
in Myanmar. 
 
H5: Commitment to market was positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to 
invest, indicated by β = 0.428, t = 4.088, p < .05.  
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H5A: The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market did not 
significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.057, t = 
0.471, p > .05. Figure 51 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflected the similar positive correlations between the commitment to market and the 
managers’ willingness to invest at low (score = 1 to 2), moderate (score = 3 to 5) and high 
levels (score = 6 to 7) of uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Figure 51. The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to 
market on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
 
H5B: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market did not 
significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.039, t 
= 0.640, p > .05. Figure 52 displays three regression lines with similar upward slopes reflecting 
the similar positive correlations between future orientation and the commitment to market at 
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low (score = 1 to 2), moderate (score = 3 to 5) and high levels (score = 6 to 7) of future 
orientation.  
 
Figure 52. The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
 
H5C: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market did not significantly 
affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.182, t =1.255, p > .05. 
Figure 53 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression lines reflect the 
strong positive correlations between the commitment to market and the managers’ willingness 
to invest at low (score = 1 to 2), moderate (score = 3 to 5) and high levels (score = 6 to 7) of 
market size.  
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Figure 53. The interaction between market size and the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Myanmar. 
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 COMBINED VIETNAM AND MYANMAR 
The item scores provided by N = 100 respondents for each separate question concerning 
investment in Vietnam and Myanmar were aggregated by addition to providing the combined 
data for the moderation analysis in the following final section of the results. Due to addition, 
the scale for each item used in the moderation analysis ranged from 2 to 14 (rather than the 
scale of 1 to 7 provided separately by each respondent concerning Vietnam and Myanmar).  
The 14-point scale was classified by 2 to 6 = low; 7 to 11 = moderate; 12 to 14 = high.  
1. Impact of Clarity of the Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
Figure 54 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the clarity of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar.   
 
Figure 54. PLS path model to examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
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 The R2 value = .073 indicated that 7.3% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-
sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 54 are displayed in Figure 55.   All t-
test statistics > 1.96 indicate significant path coefficients. 
 
 
 
Figure 55. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the clarity of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
H1:  The clarity of the legal system (CLS) was not significantly positively correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest (WTI) indicated by β = 0.079, t = 1.067; p > .05.  
H1A: The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x CS) 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.482, 
t = 1.996 p < .05.  Figure 56 presents a plot to visualize this interaction. When the culture 
similarity was low (score = 2 to 5), there was little or no correlation, indicated by the almost 
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horizontal regression line. When the culture similarity was moderate (score = 6 to 11) or high 
(score = 12 to 14), there was only a weak positive correlation, indicated by the slightly upward 
sloping regression lines.  
 
Figure 56.  The interaction between culture similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H1B: The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x 
LS) did not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 
-0.301, t = 1.205; p > .05. Figure 57 presents the interaction plot to visualize this interaction. 
When the language similarity was low (score 2 to 5) or moderate (score = 6 to 11) there was 
no interaction, indicated by positive correlations between the clarity of the legal system and 
the willingness to invest, reflected by the two upward sloping regression lines  
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Figure 57. The interaction between language similarity and the clarity of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H1C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system (CLS x ES) 
did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 
- 0.003, t = 0.021, p > .05. Figure 58 presents the interaction plot. When the ethnic similarity 
was low or high, there was little or no correlation, indicated by the two almost horizontal, 
sloping lines. When the ethnic similarity was moderate, there appeared to be a positive 
correlation, indicated by the upward sloping line. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical 
significance indicated that there was little or no interaction between ethnic similarity and the 
clarity of the legal system. 
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Figure 58.   The interaction between ethnic similarity and the clarity of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
 
2. Impact of the Transparency of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest 
in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
Figure 59 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. The R2 value = .077 
indicated that 7.7% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-sample two-tailed t-
tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the statistical significance 
of the path coefficients in Figure 59 are displayed in Figure 60.  The path coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
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Figure 59. PLS path model to examine the impact of the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (path 
coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
Figure 60. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the transparency of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
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H2:  The transparency of the legal system was not positively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.113; t = 1.298, p > .05.  
H2A: The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.598; 
t = 2.014, p < .05.  Figure 61 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was low 
to moderate there was little or no correlation between the transparency of the legal system and 
the willingness to invest, reflected by the approximately horizontal line; however, when the 
culture similarity was moderate and high there was a positive correlation between the 
transparency of the legal system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the two upward 
sloping lines. 
 
Figure 61. The interaction between culture similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
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H2B: The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -
0.441, t = 1.343, p > .05.  Figure 62 displays the interaction plot. When the language similarity 
was low to moderate, there were weak correlations between the transparency of the legal 
system and the willingness to invest, reflected by the two slightly upward sloping lines. 
 
Figure 62. The interaction between language similarity and the transparency of the 
legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H2C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.039, t 
= 0.194, p > .05. The interaction plot in Figure 63 illustrates this non-significant interaction, in 
which all three regression lines appear to be approximately parallel.  
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Figure 63. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the transparency of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar.  
 
3. Impact of the Corruption of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam 
 
Figure 64 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal 
system (COLS) on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam.   The R2 value = .169 
indicated that 16.9% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-sample two-tailed t-
tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the statistical significance 
of the path coefficients in Figure 64 are displayed in Figure 65.  The path coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
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Figure 64. PLS path model to examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (path coefficients and 
R2) 
 
 
Figure 65. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the corruption of the legal system on the managers’ willingness to 
invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
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H3: The corruption of the legal system was not negatively correlated with the managers’ 
willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.058, t = 0.748, p > .05. 
H3A: The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal system did not 
significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.037, t = 
0.355, p > .05. Figure 66 displays the interaction plot. When the culture similarity was low, 
moderate, and high, the approximately parallel horizontal lines reflected no interaction.  
 
 
Figure 66. The interaction between culture similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
H3B: The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.369, t 
= 2.545, p < .05. Figure 67 displays the interaction plot. The positive correlation was strongest, 
indicated by the steepest upward sloping regression line when the language similarity was 
moderate.  
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Figure 67. The interaction between language similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
H3C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal system did not 
significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.202, t = 
1.247, p > .05. Figure 68 displays the interaction plot.  When the culture similarity was low, 
moderate, or high, the approximately parallel horizontal lines reflected little or no correlation 
and no interaction.  
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Figure 68. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the corruption of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
 
4. Impact of the Enforcement of Legal System on the Managers’ Willingness to Invest in 
Vietnam and Myanmar      
    
 Figure 69 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. The 
independent/predictor variable is Enforcement of the Legal System (ELS). The hypothesized 
moderators are Culture Similarity (CS) Language Similarity (LS); Ethnic Similarity (ES); 
Physical Distance (PHD); Psychological Distance (PSD). The five interactions to measure the 
moderating effects are Enforcement of the Legal System x Culture Similarity (ELS x CS); the 
Enforcement of the Legal System x Language Similarity (ELS x LS); Enforcement of the Legal 
System x Ethnic Similarity (ELS x ES); Enforcement of the Legal System x Physical Distance 
(ELS x PHD); and Enforcement of the Legal System x Psychological Distance (ELS x PSD).   
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Figure 69. PLS path model to examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (path coefficients and 
R2) 
 
The R2 value = .191 indicated that 19.1% of the variance was explained. The results of the one-
sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping with 5000 random subsamples to estimate the 
statistical significance of the path coefficients in Figure 68 are displayed in Figure 69.  The 
path coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96.  
H4: The enforcement of the legal system was significantly and positively correlated with the 
managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.436, t = 2.095, p < .05. 
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Figure 70. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the enforcement of the legal system on the managers’ willingness 
to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
H4A:  The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.676, t 
= 2.543, p < .05. Figure 71 displays the interaction plot. The strongest correlations, indicated 
by the steepest sloping regression lines, was when the culture similarity was moderate or high.  
The weakest correlation, indicated by the less steep line, was when culture similarity was low.  
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Figure 71. The interaction between culture similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
H4B: The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal system did 
not significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.370, 
t = 1.504, p < .05.    Figure 72 displays the interaction plot.  The two almost parallel upward 
slopes reflected no interaction when the language similarity was low or moderate.  
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Figure 72. The interaction between language similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H4C: The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.562, 
t = 2.344, p < .05.  Figure 73 displays the interaction plot. The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest at all levels of ethnic similarity.  The strongest correlation, 
indicated by the steepest upward sloping line, was when ethnic similarity was moderate.  
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Figure 73. The interaction between ethnic similarity and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H4D: The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
significantly affected the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -.907, 
t = 3.986, p < .05.  Figure 74 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system and the 
managers’ willingness to invest. The strongest correlation, indicated by the steepest regression 
line, was when physical distance was low. The weakest correlation, indicated by the two 
regression lines with lower slopes, was when physical distance was moderate or high.  
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Figure 74. The interaction between physical distance and the enforcement of the legal 
system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H4E: The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the legal system 
did not significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 
0.383, t = 1.687, p > .05. Figure 75 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping 
regression lines reflect the positive correlation between the enforcement of the legal system 
and the managers’ willingness to invest. The three lines are almost parallel, reflecting no 
interaction.  
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Figure 75.  The interaction between psychological distance and the enforcement of the 
legal system on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
5. Impact of Commitment to Market on Managers’ Willingness to Invest in Vietnam 
Figure 76 displays the PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on 
the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam. The predictor variable is a commitment to 
market (CTM). The hypothesized moderators are Uncertainty Avoidance (UA); Future 
Orientation (FO); and Market Size (MS). The three interactions to measure the moderating 
effects are Commitment to Market x Uncertainty Avoidance (CTM x UA); Commitment to 
Market x Future Orientation (CMT x FO); and Commitment to Market x Market Size (CTM x 
MS). The R2 value = .575 indicated that 57.5% of the variance was explained. The results of 
the one-sample two-tailed t-tests after bootstrapping are displayed in Figure 77. The path 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < .05 if t > 1.96. 
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Figure 76. PLS path model to examine the impact of the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar (path coefficients and R2) 
 
 
 
Figure 77. Values of t-test statistics to indicate the significance of the path coefficients to 
examine the impact of the commitment to market on the managers’ willingness to invest 
in Vietnam and Myanmar 
 
.   
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H5: Commitment to market was positively correlated with the managers’ willingness to invest, 
indicated by β = 0.429, t = 3.999, p < .05.  
H5A: The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to market did not 
significantly affect the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = -0.057, t = 
0.485, p > .05. Figure 78 displays the interaction plot.  The three upward sloping regression 
lines reflected the positive correlation between the commitment to market and the managers’ 
willingness to invest.  The three lines are almost parallel, reflecting no interaction.  
 
 
 
Figure 78. The interaction between uncertainty avoidance and the commitment to 
market on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
 
H5B: The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market did not 
significantly affect the degree of the managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.039, t 
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= 0.612, p > .05. Figure 79 displays three regression lines with similar upward slopes reflecting 
the similar positive correlations between future orientation and the commitment to market at 
low moderate, and high levels of future orientation with no interaction.   
 
Figure 79. The interaction between future orientation and the commitment to market 
on the managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
H5C: The interaction between market size and the commitment to market significantly affected 
the degree of managers’ willingness to invest, indicated by β = 0.182, t = 2. 274, p < .05. Figure 
80 displays the interaction plot.  The two upward sloping regression lines reflect the strong 
positive correlations between the commitment to market and the managers’ willingness to 
invest when the market size was moderate to high. When the market size was low, however, 
the downward sloping line reflected a negative correlation between commitment to market and 
the managers’ willingness to invest.  
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Figure 80. The interaction between market size and the commitment to market on the 
managers’ willingness to invest in Vietnam and Myanmar. 
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Table G1. Summary of Transcripts   
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Interview transcript with respondent A 
Respondents have been briefing on the IRB and the confidentiality of the unstructured 
interview. The purpose is to seek their opinion on managerial perception on investing in the 
frontier economy. How will (if any) the legal system affects their decision, Will culture, 
language, and ethnic differences moderate the level of investment. Also, the managerial 
perspective on market size, change adaptability and economic policies moderating the effect 
of market commitment and manager willingness to invest.   
 
Interviewer: Here is the summary of the survey result I did by asking 100 managers who have 
FDI experiences. The objective of this meeting is to discuss FDI, the results and hope to get 
your insights on the results and FDI.  Let's discuss informally, do you have an investment there? 
 
Interviewee: I do have investment overseas.  
 
Interviewer: I know you travel a lot, the last time you at the Salcon, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yup. 
 
Interviewer: So, my question is, if you are to invest in developing countries what are the top 
three things you would consider? What are the things that important to you being a founder? 
 
Interviewee: You are asking me a difficult question. First and foremost, okay, my business in 
the water tank is water related.  
 
Interviewer: If you want to invest in Vietnam or China. What are the things you look for? 
 
Interviewee: First and foremost, I wanna see whether they do require our kind of service or our 
kind of products. 
 
Interviewer: Assume you have. 
 
Interviewee: Assume I have, okay, so right now, is the authority okay, strict in it or they are 
not strict in it?  
 
Interviewer: So, you mean the regulations? 
 
Interviewee: The regulations whether they implement it or they do not implement it. If they do 
not implement it, you can have all kinds of everything, but nothing was done.  
 
Interviewer: Okay, but generally, you say this bottled water system on site assuming when 
affected by manufacturing or something or whatever is this. What are the top three things in 
your mind that you will be looking at before you want to consider investing? Let say you bond 
your money, but you want to decide where to relocate, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes.  
 
 279 
 
Interviewer: So, let say you want to go Vietnam, Myanmar or whatever China or whatever, but 
what are the three things that are very important to you that you have to consider, or you have 
to look for before you can decide? 
 
Interviewee: I think the first thing is accessibility to get there and easily in or not easily, 
whatever you are gonna produce there you can ship it out easily, okay that is number one. 
Because if you are in faraway places, then it takes hours to visit no point, nobody will go to 
work. 
 
Interviewer: So, you invest in original, the physical distance is not so far away. 
 
Interviewee: Accessibility you got highways, you got all these things…Lee Kuan Yew… 
infrastructures like roads, your post everything is there. Things are not there then very cheap 
also useless, then you know… in the rain and flood, so infrastructure is a very important thing. 
 
Interviewer: So, airport, seaport all of these are important. You can fly in and fly out. 
 
Interviewee: Fly in and fly out and all this kind of things is the accessibility you know. 
 
Interviewer: Okay, that is infrastructure. 
 
Interviewee: It does not come fast, and it does not come quickly all right. The next if I will be 
there is also the availability and a constant supply of things like electricity, the utilities. Okay, 
we do not want to go to like India like that sometimes-got electricity sometimes doesn't have, 
sometimes this, sometimes that.  
 
Interviewer: A blackout. 
 
Interviewee: A blackout, very disruptive or in the Philippines even you can access it, but all 
you got the traffic stuck now there also cannot. Because if you have a place and you want to 
go to a place you got traffic jam or every time got blackout, how to work?   
 
Interviewer: And also, you need to have water, electricity, everything right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, you need to have all those things. 
 
Interviewer: What else? 
 
Interviewee: So, these are the two things already. 
 
Interviewer: What are the three things, what's on your mind? Okay, you have the infrastructure, 
you have utility does it mean you are ready to go or what else? You have to wake up every 
night before you can decide to invest. 
 
Interviewee: [Laugh] Of course, after you do your business where you do your set up, how 
easy for you to remit your money back. It is going to be a chore, and you are going to brighten 
your way out. I think you can forget it because what you want to do is that you are taking 
advantage of the area for few things lower cost of operation. Okay, but then again even labor 
may be cheap, but if transport cost is high, whether in the material is high, or outgoing is high 
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it also doesn't make sense, okay? Like a lot place like Johor Bahru like that, you buy a house 
very lovely, very big but people keep coming in what's the point?  
 
Interviewer: Okay, so you mentioned about I can remit my money out easily, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, I must be able to move my money. 
 
Interviewer: I can remit my money. My money is stuck there, right? 
 
Interviewee: My money stuck there.  
 
Interviewer: So, keep in control? 
 
Interviewee: Keep in control. 
 
Interviewer: So, do you see that in Vietnam or Myanmar right now? What do you think? If I 
invest in Vietnam or I invest in Myanmar. The way you remit the money out, is it easy or 
difficult? 
 
Interviewee: Well, of course, it is legal tender. Everything is all legalized. It is not as tricky but 
even in China also the same. Do you know that if I want to simple thing I want to exchange a 
Singaporean dollar for a Renminbi I must show a passport? 
 
Interviewer: So, in China, you want to remit money also have a bit of control? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, they will have control. They say why you are remitting this money of course. 
 
Interviewer: So, if that is the case so why do people still want to invest in China? You make 
sure about capital control, but it is not so easy to remit money out from China, but investors 
are still crawling in. 
 
Interviewee: The last time at Silicon when we go inside we want to sell the system, built in 
Singapore, designed in Singapore and by the things in the exchange. What we do is that...all 
the trades are international trades, and we sell all the good quality products and everything into 
China and then the trade is all through CMG or CMC or whatever. Okay, that means its 
international trade they open directly to Singapore, and we only have an office there, and every 
year we make quite a few million dollars. No event has facilitated to build a plant there. Who 
you want to do that? Sell to you and get out of the place. Get the money its international tender. 
 
Interviewer: So, you paid in Singapore or paid in China? 
 
Interviewee: No, the CMC they will pay through CMC channel, but then again, those people 
down there are also going for the money, corruption, extra money. So, I remember the CMC 
guy we bring him to Singapore okay. We have to entertain him, we got to do everything, send 
him to the US, send him to Europe. Okay, then for the particular plant, let say, we send him the 
special plan. The top engineer, second engineer, third engineer whatever we have to bring them 
for training but let say if the internet comes from France. We will send them to France for 
training. Their training is exercise only. Okay, the rest of it is all fun and game. That is the 
benefits of them. So, you think this is not corruption? I think at the highest level.  
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Interviewer: Do you think they are still practicing...? 
 
Interviewee: Today? I am not sure but-- 
 
Interviewer: I think they care nowadays or there's this kind of benefits anymore? 
 
Interviewee: They still have but not as open as before, now they control. Do you know that all 
those officials right now they cannot get out of the country nowadays unless they are approved? 
So those who… has to seek approval before they can get out of the country. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah, that is Xi Jinping's policy, right? Okay, maybe we touch on this, you 
mentioned about infrastructure, you mentioned about utility, you mentioned about capital 
control as one of the three top factors you will consider, right, before investing in developing 
country. What about the legal system, what about the clarity of the law, the transparency of the 
law, do they enforce the law, do they protect your property right, do they honor the contract, 
how important are these to you? 
 
Interviewee: In today's contract I have seen a few of these, I think Vietnamese thing the legal 
settings are improving a lot. They protect your interest; they will. The legal side they improved 
a lot. I cannot say for 20 years ago.  
 
Interviewer: Do you think it is clear, is transparent I mean when I say clear meaning easily 
understood because you do not have ambiguous interpretation right? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah. 
 
Interviewer: And then transparent is about everybody knows, a good feeling everybody knows 
this is like a bit coming and then do you think that he or she enforce all these rules and 
regulations? 
 
Interviewee: I think in today's context they do. 
 
Interviewer: They do. However, do you think it is important? 
 
Interviewee: It is important of course but then again even they enforce all these rules and 
regulations, but behind the scene play you never know one. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah, I know. So, if I am going to a country where there's a reasonable legal 
structure, then I feel more comfortable right? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, of course. 
 
Interviewer: If I am going to places like Myanmar where still the military rule is still beginning 
where the law in your opinion and my opinion may not be clear, the structure is not there and 
all these things, do you think you want to go in? Even though is opening up. 
 
Interviewee: It all depends on what are you going in for. Are you going in to make something, 
to sell to the locals or are you going in to make something and bring out to export? It is two 
different things. When you say sell to the locals that are easier, but if you want to export and 
are you bringing in high-quality stuff or cheap-cheap stuff.  
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Interviewer: Of course, you take advantage of the natural resources there, maybe low labor cost 
there, and maybe low-tech industry, I do not know.  
 
Interviewee: I just came from the exhibition in China. This guy is doing the electronic cigarette, 
you puff and puff the electronic cigarette-- 
 
Interviewer: In where in China? 
 
Interviewee: In China. 
 
Interviewer: It is low tech industry. 
 
Interviewee: Well, is that a low tech? It is an ionizer or a vaporizer. 
 
Interviewer: There's a market. 
 
Interviewee:  There's a market. When I went to the plant, I looked at these few guys breaking 
some PCB board, the PCB board from somebody's disc and putting it all together that is all.  
 
Interviewer: It is minor intensive. 
 
Interviewee: It is minor intensive. However, sometimes the casing and all they make very nice 
and very classy. 
 
Interviewer: But the problem is not there to automate this, the problem depends on the labor 
cost, right? Depends on rules and rules in the assembly. 
 
Interviewee: And the thing is that the labor is to work minimum 12 hours a day. 
 
Interviewer: Okay. 
 
Interviewee: You know everybody stressed 12 hours a day. 
 
Interviewer: So, you say that legal is important and then with the proper legal system it gives 
you a bit more confidence, it gives you a bit more willingness. 
 
Interviewee: One more thing is that you have to see also the big difference is the cultural 
differences. 
 
Interviewer: That is about the question I want to ask you. So, assuming that legal system is in 
place maybe not perfect, you are willing to consider it right? Moreover, it is one of the factors 
that-- 
 
Interviewee: You must be able to take the Visa. 
 
Interviewer: Just going to the country because there's good legal system. Does it mean you will 
be successful in entering new cultures? You just mentioned about culture, language, and the 
same race. Does it play an important role in your investment decision? I would rather invest in 
China than to invest in Thailand, Philippines or India. 
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Interviewee: Yup. 
 
Interviewer: Would that mean a difference? 
 
Interviewee: When I say the culture is not whether it is the same race Chinese-Chinese. It is 
more like how these young people think about area and territory where there's a lot of young 
people. You said Vietnam is very rich 30 years old  
 
Interviewer: Traditional, yeah. 
 
Interviewee: Ten years ago, they are rich 20 years old I do not count things like that. In China, 
it is a mixture right now getting much older but last time remember when I was in Thailand. 
My friend from Thai he hired many people from Laos but he does not like Laos, and Laos are 
living in a small native hut that fit for them. I said why you do not like, he said in Laos they 
can work but when they want to leave they leave and throw down anything. That is the kind of 
culture that I am talking about. 
 
Interviewer: So, you mean that is the responsible thing. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, they do not have that responsibility. They can do work, mind you they can 
do, but after that, if they know, they got some girlfriend or mother or family or whatever they 
can throw down the tools, and they go. 
 
Interviewer: So, they are different from people in China? 
 
Interviewee: You see China today and Laos still quite far apart. 
 
Interviewer: You mean Chinese are more ethical or more responsible? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. The Chinese are still dependable. They got families but a lot of those people 
over there in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos they are all broken family, a broken family from 
the wars not too long ago maybe 20 years ago or 30 years ago. So, a lot of these kids got no 
parents. They may be brought up by a grandmother or distant relative or whatever. Thus, these 
guys are they just fighters.  
 
Interviewer: So, you mean they do not go to school and learn to be a responsible individual? 
 
Interviewee: No, they do but the guardian. One good thing about them like I always said they 
are accommodating; they do not want to improve themselves very much. After work, they go 
to school, nice school. Everybody goes to nice school. Every school is full. 
 
Interviewer: But the literacy is 95 %. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, I know that is why I said they are right in that. 
 
Interviewer: When I was there, maybe you are talking about the Vietnamese language, but I do 
not come across the English language maybe there are many people can speak English but I do 
not know what you think. 
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Interviewee: They speak more... because of comfortability. They are not moving away from 
the comfort zone, or they may feel that if they are going to speak English, they are not speaking 
well, they are shy. They are timid people, they are very shy, but they are a fighter, but they are 
shy. 
 
Interviewer: For the females or the males? 
 
Interviewee: Males and females also the same and then you noticed their language I always 
think. However, for us, if we want to school somebody it can be very hard in our language, in 
our tone, in our expression but when they are with people "gee, gee, gah gah" speak through 
the nose, but schooling is like talking you know what I mean. 
 
Interviewer: But sometimes in conversation, I need a translator okay, I got a translator I speak 
one sentences and I do not know how come this person translates and speaks for so long, and 
he is not worried to say, did I talk so much? I speak one sentence, and he is translating like five 
or six sentences. [Laugh] So, is a language a problem? Do you think language could be a 
problem in investing in a country like Vietnam? 
 
Interviewee: It is because this person they want to impress-- 
 
Interviewer: They wanted to tell you how much I know? 
 
Interviewee: Yes also, and then they also want to interpret what you say, and they are also 
interpreting in that way, and they speak to the person in that way. Okay, maybe this is a cultural 
difference, you speak one sentence you need to complete to your fellow. You speak one 
sentence it means nothing to him. So, the other guy may want to know a bit more. He will be 
taking their she, let say a lady translator, speaking of you and her---  
 
Interviewer: So, she is telling something else to convince that person, and that frightened the 
investment because I did not say so much how come he says so much. I do not know whether 
you are saying the right thing. Is that a problem? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, it is, could be a problem because I tell you the talking is always a big problem 
when writing is not a problem. Talking is still a big problem. 
 
Interviewer: Why, why is that? 
 
Interviewee: Because talking even between us, you speak English? 
 
Interviewer: Yes.  
 
Interviewee: Sometimes we talk too much. 
 
Interviewer: What you mean? 
 
Interviewee: We talk too much just to carry on the conversation. We talk too much, okay. 
Because I want your attention I am going to tell you about this-- 
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Interviewer: That is the reason why everybody is talking I always keep quiet. I am always 
listening; then you can interpret you are a bit passive, and you are not engaging. Could it be in 
that way? 
 
Interviewee: No, no, no cannot be because-- 
 
Interviewer: If everybody talks nobody is listening. 
 
Interviewee: Nobody is listening. 
 
Interviewer: So, someone needs to listen, right? 
 
Interviewee: Someone has to listen. For us, we come to a point in our position that we do not 
need to impress people anymore, okay we do not need to whereas for them they still need to 
say, who I am versus who you are? Okay, so you highly looked upon by this people, and they 
can become your translator. Remember one thing; translators are not technical people. They 
are not business people. They know some initials here and there, and they translate.  
 
Interviewer: You are talking about culture, right and you are talking about being responsible, 
if I want to leave the place I will let my employer knows I would not come back and I am 
resigning and stuff like that. Some countries do not have this kind of protocol and don't think 
that-- What about the countries such as China, Vietnam, and Myanmar... like this culture of 
resistance to change or they want to avoid uncertainty. Take, for example, Japan; you want to 
gain to Japan's market it is very difficult, you got a kind of licensing, kind of documents and 
documents, proof and evidence and specimens and samples and everything. Do you think 12 
years to get a license to sell barbeque pork in Japan? So, Japan is a country of avoidance of 
uncertainty right? They have a culture like, I do not trust you, I do not know your company, I 
want to know you better, then I would be willing to let you have a license which causes people 
investing in their country just so difficult, right? What about a country like Vietnam, what about 
a country like Myanmar or Singapore? Do you think resistant to change is not being very 
trusting would impede you from investing in those countries?  
 
Interviewee: First and foremost, before you investing just what I mentioned all those things, 
you look at the country, are they progressive or are they regressive, meaning going backward. 
If they are going to be progressive, okay, they want to encourage the track investment. You 
look at the investment; you looked at China 10 years ago, don't be too far. When we always go 
there, they have… foreign investment, they tell you all their projects, but today… no more.  
 
Interviewer: Is it because that they preferably have it adequately organized rather than every 
province fighting for investment, they are offering all kinds of incentives without the central 
government's approval? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, they do that way at that time. Now, they still but they have to be all guided 
power. 
 
Interviewer: So, there's a kind of policy this is what you can do. 
 
Interviewee: Last time if you are...in China...they also...they are so many thousands in one 
project they have for you at that time because a lot of those companies were government-run 
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companies. Inefficiency was there then. Would you want to invest in an inefficient company 
then versus now? Maybe it was an excellent choice to invest in the site and then bring it up.  
 
Interviewer: But what about when you are saying that the most important thing is to make sure 
that country is progressive it means people are very proactive for a change, people are receptive 
to change. 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, people are receptive to change. Vietnamese are very responsive to change. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that Japanese culture is receptive to change? 
 
Interviewee: No, the Japanese-- 
 
Interviewer: This is why exactly they avoid uncertainty, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: What about the Chinese/China? 
 
Interviewee: The Chinese side they always want a change from the very beginning. They 
always preferred...So, that is why when I was in...13/20 years ago. They loved all products 
from France, from the US, from Germany, anything you talked there. Price is not a problem 
they will buy. 
 
Interviewer: So, a country with people that are receptive to change is something that you... 
because you are implementing change, it would become more comfortable right, and the 
country is progressive? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: What about Singapore, progressive or not progressive? 
 
Interviewee: We think that way out first class. [laugh] We always feel that we are first class, 
but we are not. Okay, I tell why-- 
 
Interviewer: When it comes to a question, do you think we are a culture of change? 
 
Interviewee: Singapore is not a culture of change. We are a culture of following. 
 
Interviewer: Conformist? 
 
Interviewee: Conformist. 
 
Interviewer: So as a result, there, do you think Singapore because change brings innovation 
right? Do you think Singapore is innovative? 
 
Interviewee: Singapore is not innovative at all. 
 
Interviewer: Why do you say so? 
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Interviewee: It is not innovative because you just look at the government...  
 
Interviewer: Yeah, they go for stringent criteria. 
 
Interviewee: Strict criteria are fine, but the one thing is that they always say proven products 
even it fails it proven for 30 years, then it fails they still like it. It is not a progressive society 
whereby they encourage people to take the risk; we do not. When I said take the risk not the 
kind of blatantly or things like that. Take risk is okay. This is my idea calculator...One of the 
biggest problem in Singapore maybe sixth most innovative country-- 
 
Interviewer: Index...In fact, there's a report that says that Singapore is least innovative like 
Malaysia or Indonesia.  
 
Interviewee: You know because of all the regulations here. Besides the iPhone you got the 
latest iPhone, you want to bring in the latest technology that's for me water tank cleaning. 
Before knowing what, you are doing no, no, no, no… because it does not conform to the 
chlorine, does not conform to this, or I never used it before. I will only use it if the whole will 
use it, then Singapore will use it.  
 
Interviewer: So, is there concerns resistance to change then? 
 
Interviewee: It is resistance to change. 
 
Interviewer: So, our culture is not very open to change? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, it is not open to change. 
 
Interviewer: Is the government open to change or we are not open to change? 
 
Interviewee: Now the problem is like that. If you look at the government level whatever project 
they implement they push the full responsibility to a consultant and the main contractor the 
responsibility. They will just talk I just want to have this proven thing, I want to have this...but 
the responsibility of it they will never carry that is the biggest problem. Singapore cannot be 
like Malaysia or Indonesia because down there they are governing body not so strong, they are 
not engaging, they let you do what you do, but that is also a big problem because of the 
pollution--- 
 
Interviewer: It is short-lived but that still innovation, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, that is still innovation so on and so forth. So, if you keep on saying this one 
cannot, that one cannot, this one cannot, and we have the WTO and what is the WTO? World 
Trade Organization. Because you in the WTO you let all kinds of anything come in where 
Japanese they restrict you too much but down here you let all kind. You got the ship from India 
coming, the ship from Thailand coming, you know all the ship works and we think that we are 
the first class-- 
 
Interviewer: So, we are very open, right? 
 
Interviewee: What is so open, we are not open, then that thing is that whatever let's say a 
consultant, you know how much a consultant can-- 
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Interviewer: What is like a culture avoidance is not like that but do you think many investors 
are coming to Singapore? I do not know whether it just financial investment coming in rather 
than building a factory in Singapore.  
 
Interviewee: You say an investor is coming in who are they? Exxon-Mobil, all the big players, 
all those conformities, okay. GE all the compliances are here. When they first come in here 
they have resistance taxi, but now they got no choice they got Uber, but now we take away 
Uber, so you got one monopoly, and Singapore hates monopoly. Like my product, even though 
my product is so good, I save so much water which the country's requirement to save water 
they do not want to. Basically, I endorsed my product because I am the only one. 
 
Interviewer: But then you said Singapore hates monopoly, but you have PUB, you have many 
others also a monopoly or oligarchy or whatever is the difference. However, I think the most 
important thing is the mindsets of the civil service need to change from a Singapore context 
and so is the other country. Other countries civil service you know have many corruptions 
going on, in Singapore is very clean. However, there's a difference from a mindset than my 
mindset is there's a criticism to say that, okay if you want to take mega projects or construction 
you must have certain credentials, specific demonstrations that you carry out this project 
before.  All these SME does not have these experiences. So, when they went.... they go to this 
big Japanese company, Bitcoin company and all the SME...and then on the flip side you request 
SME to internationalize, to globalize, to go overseas. How they are going to monitor they 
cannot even support their own country, not even joint ventures with big manage players so that 
they can tender for Singapore project. So, the question here is that the policies are not 
supporting the SME, on the flip side you asking SME to go overseas when you do not support 
them in your local projects? Isn't it ironic?  
 
Interviewee: It is. 
 
Interviewer: So, many investors coming to Singapore and they keep saying that I used 
Singapore as a benchmark, and if I can pass Singapore licensing approval I can show to the 
world that my product must be of excellent standard. I can use anywhere. I can send to Thailand 
or Philippines or Indonesia no problem because I qualified in Singapore. So, is Singapore just 
being a test bait now? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, number one, Singapore is a very small market. 
 
Interviewer: In fact, no market, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, it is just too small and no market. Okay, all those investments...educate us. 
All my guys here are all educated, poly or NUS or whatever graduates they are not engineers. 
So, they managed to bring in the MNC. MNC was very important at that time. In younger days, 
we worked in the MNC.  
 
Interviewer: But now, MNC does not want to come into Singapore unless there's a market, 
right? They'd instead go to China or Vietnam or eventually Myanmar or Thailand where there's 
a market. So, in your opinion, if you would invest in developing countries, market size is 
important, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes -- 
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Interviewer: Given the chance that China I can build many factories in China, sell domestically 
or export overseas from China, or I make in Singapore-- 
 
Interviewee: It all depends on what kind of product you are doing. Let say...global...Seagate 
and all. These people one container load, 20-footer is already a million-dollar product insight 
you can put inside. If you are going to a few of those other products one container 10,000 to 
15,000 how much you make from it? So, regarding producing the wafer, you need to have 
qualified people, engineers and so on. However, one of the problems is that Singapore lacks 
engineers. So, do you know if you go to Utah and all those places? Many are from the 
Philippines, from India-- 
 
Interviewer: So, it comes to the point that why do in Singapore right? 
 
Interviewee: Why do in Singapore? 
 
Interviewer: Where I can do in China I got a bunch of engineers. 
 
Interviewee: Cheaper... 
 
Interviewer: Or in the US where they have a tax cut anyway right? 
 
Interviewee: You are right, so all you have to do is that those who have worked in Singapore 
before you know where they roughly... 
 
Interviewer: That is why we talked about the leader, we spoke of culture, we talked about 
ethnicity, we talked about language, but okay varying all of that, if you got no market would 
you invest? 
 
Interviewee: Well, it depends on what you are looking. 
 
Interviewer: If I said Singapore, the domestic market is zero probably poor compare to China 
local market is huge. Would you do in China-- 
 
Interviewee: If I do the right pick I will not pick Singapore. I would not do in Singapore. I will 
do whichever the market is there; I will be there okay? If it is Vietnam alone, put it in Vietnam. 
 
Interviewer: To investors, as far as your opinion, as far as your perspective is a concern-- 
 
Interviewee: You follow the market, okay. 
 
Interviewer: Market size is important? 
 
Interviewee: Market size is important. That is why I said when it comes to electronic side wafer 
effect it is an entirely different technique. The good thing about Singapore is that we have a 
high-speed internet system as compared to China or anywhere. 
 
Interviewer: Fast one? 
 
Interviewee: Internet, 4Gs you know. 
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Interviewer: But do you know China is 5G now Huawei? 
 
Interviewee: You can talk about 5G, but the country 5G system is not there. It is not so easy to 
internal. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah, the connectivity in Singapore is probably excellent but what's the point of 
having connectivity when you do not have a market at all? 
 
Interviewee: No, no, I know that is the whole thing. Right now, what is this policy about 
cleaning down on websites is also hurting China a lot. Okay, it hurts China in the sense that 
when the local people want to search the world for something they could not find because they 
could not get access to Yahoo or Google.  
 
Interviewer: They can always do China version. I do not know whether they will come up with 
the China version where they can surf to China's Baidu-- 
 
Interviewee: Baidu and all these stuffs but the Baidu and all these you know they are not into 
that because if you do that what's the difference between Yahoo and Google, still open to 
scrutiny. So, the thing about Singapore our connectivity is high that is keeping us humming 
away. 
 
Interviewer: But do you think it will last? 
 
Interviewee: But connectivity it works well for shipping, for finance, for transportation. For 
the internet, things are going on right now, not all your Bitcoin and all your Blockchain and all 
those... for. 
 
Interviewer: But China got Tencent. 
 
Interviewee: But, but I know.  
 
Interviewer: China got WhatsApp. 
 
Interviewee: Yes correct. 
 
Interviewer: China got Alibaba.  
 
Interviewee: Alright. 
 
Interviewer: China got Baidu. 
 
Interviewee: Alright. 
 
Interviewer: Singapore what? 
 
Interviewee: Singapore... [laugh] 
 
Interviewer: So, yeah, you said we have these, and that is because we are small. We can 
integrate and-- 
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Interviewee: Change everything fast. 
 
Interviewer: But a country like Vietnam, Myanmar and China they are still in the infancy stage 
but they will at some point in time, one day, very soon come together and become massive 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou they are just as good if not better, 
right? They are not advanced. They come and get their country to use the cashless thing, use 
WhatsApp to pay cashless. Everybody in China pays cashless, right? Singapore still needs cash. 
So, you see we are a small country, and we cannot become cashless society when China is such 
a big state can become a cashless society. What does it say to you? That is a culture thing, 
right? 
 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, that is a cultural thing, you see in China-- 
 
Interviewer:  Then why do they use so far in saving money under the mattress in China. 
 
Interviewee: The big difference is like that. In China, the Tencent and Alibaba take their own 
money to develop on what they want to do-- 
 
Interviewer: Because they got the big market. 
 
Interviewee: They got the big market. In Singapore, you are going to wait for the government 
to do.  
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
Interviewee: You need the... to tell whatever company to have something cashless to come up 
with an encrypted QR code or whatever damn stupid things they are doing, okay, whereas, in 
Tencent, they do the [ang pao] do you know how many minutes they have WeChat? 
 
Interviewer: That is what I say this is innovative society about when you do not have 
government interference, but in China, I am not saying there's not really government 
interference, right? In fact, China to me is probably more regulated in some fashion, but still, 
people innovate. 
 
Interviewee: But people innovate, and they do not stop the innovation. The good things about 
in China is over the last 20 years; they have been subjected themselves all the humiliation of 
producing the cheap stuff. They took some money back. Now, with just the money they have, 
okay. Do you know that Alibaba dividends are meager? He made all the money whatever, you 
say he is very cash rich, and he really invested back into his Alibaba city, Tencent city. 
 
Interviewer: Because these people, they say I know my market, I know my return would not 
be so shortened, it has to be very long, fast like that-- 
 
Interviewee: Yes correct. 
 
Interviewer:  But in Singapore when you invest in something... Five years or ten years before 
you get the return, right? That is a long damn horizon. So, there could also be a counter 
perspective that people are brought up here would expect the very short duration of return 
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versus people in another country, and sometimes it is like where I am going to see my paybacks. 
It never happened. However, you have a very long...it will come, but you think long, right? 
 
Interviewee: You see the long-term... comes from you know your stuff. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah but the ironical part is that we support Singapore has a policy that promotes 
long-term strategy, right? However, is it really true? If it is, then why are people still thinking 
about short-term payback. Even the government... every project, every system they implement 
hospital, transportation, SMRT or whatever we expect the payback of the situation-- 
 
Interviewee: You know one of the biggest problem-- 
 
Interviewer: So, we consider ourselves as a very long-term policy. 
 
Interviewee: The part of the biggest problem here in Singapore we are lack of ideas in a 
different discipline. 
 
Interviewer: All the engineers go to work in a bank. 
 
Interviewee: [Laugh] Now, we are bean counters who counts all the beans, one bean by one 
bean...one bean by one bean, so when your country or company is run by a bean counter, this 
is what you are going to expect. 
 
Interviewer: Well, the problem is, do I want to be an engineer? No. Because I have meager 
pay.  
 
Interviewee: Yup. 
 
Interviewer: And you do not expect engineer in this country compares to the United States and 
other countries in Europe. Engineers here are like second-class citizens versus doctors, lawyers, 
and all these things. So, I do not know I mean I am a trained engineer... can do all the 
calculations and formulas and all the...because it is damn low pay. 
 
Interviewee: When I was working...I was an engineer down there even the [ang moh] contract 
engineer 50 over years that was 20 years will listen to people because we are all engineers, we 
do our feasibility study. When it comes to the government side, we can tell PUB... whatever 
damn thing you want to say to them. They never believe you, and the first thing they ask is the 
[ang moh] consultant whether you are speaking the right thing or not. They will never trust 
people like us saying it correctly. They would instead because they say the money is already 
spent hundred million for the consultant, so they have to tell me not on this site. Because as 
Singaporean we will become SME also one of these days correct, so how are we going to 
expand our horizon with our people shut us down. When they are doing the deep tunnel job 
because they are so happy to put the internet, the design of the basins....and everything and 
okay I am not the export, okay and I asked one of the doctors in Finland to command on it, and 
they just make it a big swimming pool. They got four stages of swimming pool, and you are 
going to keep the level of the first to the last one about one meter in differential height, can or 
not?...stupidity. The guy wrote a report, and I just put a letter...blah, blah, blah...and brought in 
to PUB/NEA that letter was circulated many, many, many times two of the consultants, and 
you know they never comment on the content of the message it was not written by me anyway. 
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You know what they comment on my cover letter, this guy is a Singaporean, he is not an expert 
on this thing, he is just a salesman, so what word can you say?  
  
Interviewer: The mindset has never changed. 
 
Interviewee: The mindset has never changed. It is not that I do not know about all of these but-
- 
 
Interviewer: But my question here also the fact that was many years ago, right? Civil Service 
can replace people each and retire, and a new generation will take over...also follow the same. 
 
Interviewee: It was actually even worse. 
 
Interviewer: Why you think so? What is wrong? That is why we are studying investment in 
developing countries; you are not investing in developed countries. 
 
Interviewee: Because you know whenever a new guy in Civil Service, they first ask to read the 
book, this is what you need to do, this is what you need to do. You must not take responsibility, 
but you have the authority to tell people on what to do, mainly is that. So, when a person does 
not hold trust for my own business if anything my men do I become responsible. 
 
Interviewer: So why are we training entrepreneurs? We have all these startups at Ayer Rajah 
Block 77, 76 whatever all these ecosystems, and then we are trying to encourage more students 
to go on their own startups. Are these do not work?  
 
Interviewee: How much startups it was? 
 
Interviewer: I do not know. That is why I was skeptical. 
 
Interviewee: You see from day one like creative side you go to Johor Bahru and meet the sultan 
or whatever, after that he... his company in the US. 
 
Interviewer: Ten or twenty years ago you do not even hear about ecosystem or startup or 
incubator, pilot test run, and all these things. The last 10 years you keep hearing all these things. 
Twenty years ago, in the Clarke Quay who started businesses did not have all these things. 
They created all these structures, all iconic works right, incubator, startup, this, that...I go to 
Vietnam I see Saigon innovation hub and all these startups and co-working space and all the 
things. Fifteen or twenty years ago, there were no such things, right?  
 
Interviewee: No, it is 20. 
 
Interviewer: Forgot the steel was being used, forgot being designed, forget being implemented, 
right? So, I am always skeptical about this ecosystem thing is like a doctrine that you follow 
these steps on and on, and then like one day the step is not there nobody knows what to do. 
 
Interviewee: Is always the same, everytime you bring up something the first thing you got to 
check, is this prototype or not, is this what is this that. So you see the biggest problem with our 
people here, our engineer is not an engineer, okay why I say so. Let say if I propose to you, 
you are the head, but you may not be the engineer or disciplined engineer whether it is high 
tech or mechanical or electrical, and everything but you must get someone to do it. However, 
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if I give you a proposal all these somebody or even including yourself, let's say you are. 
However, the head first thing you look at is the price.  Everything is the price first then after 
that; we talk about the technical and then the technicalities, sure you can do this, sure you can 
do that that is all. What is this?   
 
Interviewer: So, this becomes a cultural mindset, so with that kind of thing how do you think 
Singaporean can be successful in developing country where the rules and regulations are not 
concrete, there are no procedures that you follow A, B, and C, consequences will be D right? 
Not necessarily true. You follow A, B, C your consequence is F failed. So, my concern is that 
okay in Singapore people have all these cultural mindsets this way. How can you be successful 
in developing country? 
 
Interviewee: Don't talk about Temasek or GIC when they invest in matured businesses they 
buy at the high price and they expect a sudden gain or whatever. They buy matured businesses 
but do you expect SME also to do that; you got so much money to buy a matured business or 
buy into a mature business? 
 
Interviewer: No.  
 
Interviewee: You have to develop it by yourself.  
 
Interviewer: Why buy a matured business when you do not even have a big pocket to also buy 
a startup business because of the risk. 
 
Interviewee: The risk, okay. The next thing is that why during our year it was important maybe 
20 years ago that most of the SME are poly students. 
 
Interviewer: What's wrong with that? 
 
Interviewee: Nothing wrong. Why not university students? Many are poly students to SME 
because first of all is the government. The government says that you are poly, diploma holder 
technician for life. When I worked in the big American company in.... they called application 
engineer but at least at the end of the day I was a chief engineer doing all ... compression. I was 
sent to the US for training also like you, but the thing is when the government stereotyped you, 
you have no other choice...poly students, all eyes...no need to find girlfriend only university, 
then one poly student comes up because you see how many poly students worked for the 
government asked them? 
 
Interviewer: Because they know that you have the qualification to be successful in the 
government Civil Service right because if not you will be stagnant, right? So, many poly 
students do not want to do that. Because there's a barrier to cross -- 
 
Interviewee: You become what? Thirty years too late already.  
 
Interviewer: Even 30 is too late, do you believe this is happening? You got assurance you want 
your sons to be a hawker if he can study and wish to graduate right? No need to go to university 
which parent will do that. 
 
Interviewee: In this day and age. Everybody... then a poly degree. They are not a degree or the 
master or even Ph.D. or whatever it is. Every year changes. 
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Interviewer: No, no the policy is that you do not have to have a degree to be successful, I agree, 
but you cannot say don't study just go and get skilled. Is not correct right?  
 
Interviewee: It is not correct. You need to do some study, actually is to train your logical 
thinking.  
 
Interviewer: You look at Vietnam people are studying very hard, China, America and Europe 
people too. I do not understand our policy here that we say it is okay to get a skill rather than a 
qualification, are you sure? 
 
Interviewee: Who said that? 
 
Interviewer: From all these ministers are saying that their children will not be going to 
university.  
 
Interviewee: Nowadays, I do not read the newspaper anymore. 
 
Interviewer: Okay, let's finish this. So, you strongly agree that the market must be there before 
you are going to invest right? 
 
Interviewee: Depends on what? Services and products. 
 
Interviewer: If I got a product whether services or manufacturing right as long there's a market 
there's hope. 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: But if the market is not there-- 
 
Interviewee: For export orientated? Then it is a different-- 
 
Interviewer: Provided the cost is right, and so you say that I am okay to invest in a country like 
Vietnam where the legal system is not perfect-- 
 
Interviewee: Not perfect but still coming up...still there. 
 
Interviewer: Market is there. 
 
Interviewee: Yup.  
 
Interviewer: I do not like the inconveniences. 
 
Interviewee: Yup. 
 
Interviewer: I do not like taxation cost, at the end of the day my revenue outweighs all these 
inconveniences. 
 
Interviewee: Alright. 
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Interviewer: Hey, that is it I am willing to go in. 
 
Interviewee: Alright. Because as an investor you are going to understand all of these 
inconveniences it is not you have the inconveniences is your down the line is going to have all 
the inconveniences. As long as you are down the line can stay there and do the work that needs 
to do and maintain the quality, I think that is fine. You, as the investor you give much 
money...actually there's nothing to worry, the people down will do the work.  
 
Interviewer: That is true. 
 
Interviewee: Alright, so at the end of the day after venture all these inconveniences and you 
still can make your money whether your money will stay in the different country... 
 
Interviewer: The Japanese, Koreans are very successful in Thailand, in China, in Vietnam, in 
everywhere, you see them everywhere you believe that the business psychic of those countries, 
the Koreans and Japanese match those countries like Vietnam, China-- 
 
Interviewee: You see the Japanese are a homogenous country. Homogenous meaning many old 
Japanese. Americans are mixed of thing. They got very good laws and antitrust laws. They set 
the big corporations into work, and it goes down to SME. However, still, of course, there's 
corruption. However, the bloody problem with the Japanese is the cultural difference also. The 
Japanese always think very highly of themselves; they are the best.  
 
Interviewer: Maybe yes. 
 
Interviewee: And they do not make a single decision. 
 
Interviewer: Consensus decision. 
 
Interviewee: A good consensus decision. So, they make consensus decision, and I have ever 
gone to a meeting with them I am alone in Tokyo. They come in batches and batches of people 
coming in and talk to me, from the electrical guy, from the mechanical guy, from process guy, 
from whatever... they walk out...they come back, and then one of them speak India broke 
English to me, and say I think this one...You know they are not clear. You want to know why 
actually is not that they do not know, but they are not clear themselves because they are also 
thinking what the other guy is thinking about when you cannot make an absolute decision, and 
you are thinking for everybody you cannot be clear. 
 
Interviewer: But they have a very successful-- 
 
Interviewee: With India, they are what...but you are going to see how much cost they incur just 
to make a decision, okay, versus a German. German guy/Germany...he got one person talk to 
the chairperson. Efficiency is very high. They can work for hours, but he can work for half day 
only...half day rest. The bloody Japanese every day is paying the office until 11 or 12 o' clock 
does not want to go home, Saturday also works, Sunday also work. What can you say? 
 
Interviewer: They still penetrate Vietnam market, China market you can see why? 
 
Interviewee: First and foremost, because number one, they do have the money, they have the 
money. 
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Interviewer: They do not mind to pay for this corruption. 
 
Interviewee: They do not mind to pay for this. 
 
Interviewer: Same culture thing. 
 
Interviewee: They still don't mind the... 
 
Interviewer: And even big companies. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, and they make use of the low cost. 
 
Interviewer: That is why they are successful? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, that is why. They also know how to calculate everything and do everything 
but the whole thing I would say any inconvenience is not inconvenient because it actually 
pushes you to the low cost to do it. 
 
Interviewer: Just because of the corporate culture like Americans love working in Europe. 
 
 
 
Interview transcript with respondent B. 
Respondents have been briefing on the IRB and the confidentiality of the unstructured 
interview. The purpose is to seek their opinion on managerial perception on investing in the 
frontier economy. How will (if any) the legal system affects their decision, Will culture, 
language, and ethnic differences moderate the level of investment. Also, the managerial 
perspective on market size, change adaptability and economic policies moderating the effect 
of market commitment and manager willingness to invest.   
Interviewer: Here's the summary of the research survey, let start by discussing what are the key 
factors you are considering when investing in developing countries? 
 
Interviewee: Developing countries? 
 
Interviewer: You go to Guangzhou, you go to China. 
 
Interviewee: The important thing will be the infrastructure, the capability, the technology, 
quality of the products, price point whether it is value for money, then also credibility. 
 
Interviewer: Credibility of the system, people buying products. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, exactly. 
 
Interviewer: So, what do you think of the legal system? In your opinion, do you think investors 
would care about the legal system in their country or is it something if I am going into Vietnam 
for example, I wanting to know the legal system there, do you care, do you think it is important, 
what do you think? 
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Interviewee: Legal system, maybe what we are concerned about is the laws that are protecting 
businesses. 
 
Interviewer: Property rights. 
 
Interviewee: Property rights of protecting your business, and then also maybe when you are 
entering into contracts with your counterparts, how well do these contracts hold up in any 
disputes whether will they honor it, whether the law will fight for-- 
 
Interviewer: Every time we are looking at investing in a developing country legal systems are 
not so perfect. For example, a country needs to be prosperous. The first thing is the property 
right, the ownership of the property has to be respected. Intellectual property or assets or even 
the physical and honoring of contracts. What do you think about online contract based on trust 
and honesty, do you think if you go to Guangzhou and the guy said don't worry about the 
contract, you know we are suppliers of shoes, trust us you will be okay, do you agree with it?  
 
Interviewee: No, automatically there has to be some black and white document or agreement. 
  
Interviewer: Do you think those countries will honor black and white especially in China? 
 
Interviewee: In China I think should be okay because especially in many other countries they 
really have partners in many other countries who do the same thing. You are not going there 
as a first mover, I mean you are not entering a totally new market.  
 
Interviewer: So, a better legal system is always better for investment? 
 
Interviewee: Of course, of course. 
 
Interviewer: Trying to encourage people to go overseas for investment is not just there's a 
market maybe, but you go to Vietnam, you go to China their Chinese and your Chinese, does 
it give you comfort? 
 
Interviewee: Yes of course, actually it plays a part. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think it is important? 
 
Interviewee: It plays a part. Because when you are communicating with them, of course, you 
converse in Mandarin is much better than you converse with Vietnamese probably the English 
is only halfway there.  
 
Interviewer: Okay, so China is Chinese? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: Vietnamese is also Chinese?  
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: In a way, right? 
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Interviewee: In a way. 
 
Interviewer: But the language is different. 
 
Interviewee: There is a barrier, there's still a barrier. 
 
Interviewer: But ethnicity is the same, their Chinese, your Chinese, their Chinese a lot of 
Confucius Asian. So, if you look at this context from culture wise, language-wise, ethnicity 
wise, give you some conservation of where you should invest right now, so you would instead 
invest in a country with the same culture or similar culture, similar language and similar 
ethnicity? 
 
Interviewee: It is interesting I went through the same talk pushes when I decided whether to go 
to China or Vietnam to find my suppliers. So actually this point is one of a very important thing 
I actually considered before choosing. 
 
Interviewer: Why? 
 
Interviewee: Because ultimately, I mean you communicate with Chinese still culturally we are 
a lot closer to the Chinese than to the Vietnamese. 
 
Interviewer: Vietnamese also looks typically like Chinese.  
 
Interviewee: Not all and maybe some of the habits, their food, their lifestyle perhaps could be 
slightly different. 
 
Interviewer: So, would you go to India? Because India has a different culture-- 
 
Interviewee: Yes, yes, I agree. 
 
Interviewer: And India speaks English. 
 
Interviewee: Yes correct. 
 
Interviewer: But ethnicity is different. 
 
Interviewee: Different, so that is why maybe the sense of familiarity might not be there.  
 
Interviewer:  I do not think I got because I do not eat their food, I do not speak their language, 
do you think that it is a factor? 
 
Interviewee: For other people maybe yes, for me perhaps not so much because I have been to 
India also. I mean I understand their culture quite okay, but still, if you ask me to choose of 
course I will select-- 
 
Interviewer: You choose which country that is closer to you. I am sure the Indians will choose 
the Indians, the Chinese will choose the Chinese, and the Americans will want their own 
European race or European country. However, okay, you decided to choose all these things 
based on, I gave you the comfort. However, let say, the market size, I could go into Vietnam 
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which is a different language, but the market size is so big compared to China the market size 
is not significant, so if that is the case what will you choose? Would you rather go in a country 
with culture the same, like Malaysia it is safe but market size is small or would you rather go 
with market size that's big but language is different, and culture is different which would be 
your priority? 
 
Interviewee: Okay, let say, the market, for example, Vietnam offers is a much more competitive 
advantage over China. Obviously, the familiarity with these things in a way are intangible the 
secondary, ultimately your job is still to make focused on your business, but all else equal let 
say-- 
 
Interviewer: Go to a market where the advantage is different, it is okay the culture is different-
- 
 
Interviewee: Let say, they are offering you a 50% of the price of the cost in China but the same 
quality of course I go. 
 
Interviewer: I always think market size is excellent regardless of the things, you go there, and 
there's no market size what the heck.  
 
Interviewee: Exactly. 
 
Interviewer: Just provided, market size is provided, and you are investing there, and you want 
to sell domestically, but market size... if I am going to export then it does not matter. If I go to 
Guangzhou, market size is so wide I am just going to manufacture and sell outside. If I go to 
Guangzhou to sell locally, market size is important so in the context of what it is important. 
 
Interviewee: You have to understand it is a quite complex process I mean you are starting your 
market, the product fit, which is a better market for you. Then also whether culturally if you 
understand the market better and then you think your product can sell better, for example, China 
and of course you go for Chinese. 
 
Interviewer: You are going to Guangzhou and order shoes and sell to Singapore market so to 
me Singapore market size is important. However, if you want to sell online-- 
 
Interviewee: Does not many boundaries. 
 
Interviewer: Whether in Singapore market... online promoting in Singapore or you are 
promoting in the region. 
 
Interviewee: Okay, there are two sides, there's the digital marketing side, then there are the 
physical/traditional marketing channels, so your digital once you brought... it will be available 
to the whole already. 
 
Interviewer: So, we are talking about digitalization, we are talking about artificial intelligence-
- 
 
Interviewee: It meets all these borders. 
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Interviewer: Culture, ethnicity, language does not care anymore because you put e-commerce, 
so I go to the computer I lock in, I choose what I want to buy, you can cover the language and 
anything else so this language, culture, ethnicity, and even the legal system-- 
 
Interviewee: You have to see what business is doing correctly first. 
 
Interviewer: Digitalization of online business, a lot of this concept of culture, language and 
ethnicity does not really matter right? Does it? When you put it online?   
 
Interviewee: If it is online then yes, all of these things may not matter much but still certain 
things you might need to tailor your digital marketing strategy, tailor it to the country also. 
 
Interviewer: Which are you try to focus on, you have to understand the culture... issue and the 
brand, the name.  
 
Interviewee: Exactly. One thing is that you understand their culture, but you go there you 
negotiate, probably they will see you as one of their brother rather than a foreigner compared 
to let say an American go to China and negotiate business. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think that past prejudice, let say the Japanese in China and negotiate, 
Japanese and Chinese are little bit different but Asian culture right? I am negotiating with you 
as suddenly I have a different strategy or maybe I just don't like. 
 
Interviewee: I mean all these things many, many factors all come into play in negotiating, of 
course, it all adds up and then-- 
 
Interviewer: For the Japanese say, hey you invest in our country market size is very big, is very 
rare for Chinese to invest in Japan, right?  
 
Interviewee: It is more the other way around because you see Japan actually the whole country 
they actually closed off. There are many companies dominating their domestic. 
 
Interviewer: It is up to the point where you see more Japanese companies investing in China, 
Vietnam, anywhere else but not the other way around.... invest in Japan-- 
 
Interviewee: Chinese a bit, yes. They are very nationalistic. 
 
Interviewer: But the uncertainty and avoidance culture mean that they do not trust you until 
they understand you well that means there are many levels of licensing, right? Everything must 
be appropriately documented. There's a very strong order to cross that is why companies are 
not able to get in Japan, right? It takes 12 years to get a license in Japan to sell the barbeque 
pork. So, if I have to invest in another country I have to go through all these steps to invest then 
I am not going to do it. 
 
Interviewee: There's too much work. 
 
Interviewer: Another question that if a country resistance to change would you invest? That 
means if a country they are not trusting that means that you do not really trust you at every 
step, they ask for documents, regulations, everything before you can invest. Would you invest 
in that country from a cultural standpoint? 
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Interviewee: I mean you can look at it from two sides. One thing, if there are so many barriers 
for the external company can join their market, it could also mean that their market is also quite 
adept that says not many people willing to go in. It could have a higher potential compared to 
another country which is very globalized, very easily accessible. It also means that you have to 
work harder to penetrate their market. 
 
Interviewer: So, do you think Singapore is very receptive to change? 
 
Interviewee: Singapore is quite okay. 
 
Interviewer: We invited allowing many investors are coming in because of our people, our 
culture... Japanese asking 101 questions before something to come in, we just let everybody 
comes in.  
 
Interviewee: Singapore is okay. Singapore is quite dynamic. So many US companies, so many 
Chinese companies they all come in easily they can penetrate our market. 
 
Interviewer: So, the Chinese companies from China come in, the Taiwanese, the Koreans, the 
Japanese okay they are comfortable with our culture right, our language, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: What about the Americans and the Europeans? 
 
Interviewee: For Americans coming to Singapore? 
 
Interviewer: Why do you think they come or what's your opinion? 
 
Interviewee: One reason why American company also come to Singapore is that because we 
shared the same language, English we are one of the few Asian countries that English as-- 
 
Interviewer: the Philippines speaks English, but the Philippines have never gotten before, why 
American...or I have not seen so much. 
 
Interviewee: One thing is not as the advanced market like Singapore. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think it has something to do with laws, corruption, legal system you know 
what I mean? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: I do not go to the Philippines I go to Singapore because the system in Singapore 
is more structured and more organized. I know what I am getting from. They honor my 
property, they protect property laws and everything else, but in the Philippines, you do not get 
them. 
 
Interviewee: I think so. Legal system or intellectual property rights part of bringing their 
country to where it is at the moment, probably in Singapore this is one of the key factors in the 
early days that actually brought us to our levels today. 
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Interviewer: We talked about legal, we talked about... Singapore is probably one of the best in 
battling with corruption as compares to Vietnam and everywhere else, but people still go and 
invest there, Japanese still go there and invest, so it does mean that corruption does not matter? 
What's your thought? 
 
Interviewee: Ultimately no need because you see the potential for. 
 
Interviewer: At the end of the day, market size still. 
 
Interviewee: So, it depends on whether you are going there to sell your things or you are going 
there to buy your things, or it depends on what context. 
 
Interviewer: To build a factory and to sell things locally... build factories or make the 
investment. I know the country's legal system is not perfect...but I am still willing to go there, 
the Japanese may be the way-- 
 
Interviewee: There is business potential. 
 
Interviewer: Cost, market size, and the revenue cheap outweigh all these extra costs. Are you 
still willing to go? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, because the main thing is as long as the country shows very good potential. 
All these things are probably secondary legal system, especially if I am going there to earn 
money if the total revenue that you can bring in from there it far outweighs of all these costs, 
facilitation cost-- 
 
Interviewer: But do you think culture plays a part, American or European company going to 
Vietnam with all these facilitation cost...no, no, no we would not play this game, right? 
However, the Japanese and the Koreans are different... 
 
Interviewee: It depends on which industry from what I know in fact the Americans and the 
Europeans they are just us. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think they will pay for facilitation cost? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, they will. Actually, I have seen a lot of these things first hand. 
 
Interviewer: But certain big companies would avoid that because of their reputation. 
 
Interviewee: That is why I said it really depends on which industry-- 
 
Interviewer: Multinational like big names. 
 
Interviewee: Let say, for example, you are in the shipping or the marine industry or the gas 
industry. All of these things are very common in fact its part-- 
 
Interviewer: Thus, what happened to the Keppel? [laugh] 
 
Interviewee: Exactly.  
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Interviewer: So, I always amazed at how we ever invest in OECD countries, Brazil, China with 
really big infrastructure project and all these countries facilitation cost, corruption is going on. 
How I ever become successful? So, if I go to Vietnam and I say so many I have to pay these 
bills, do you frighten the investor? 
 
Interviewee: That is why you have to do a study you see whether the market is potentially 
worth all these-- 
 
Interviewer: If you have a family business you do not really care? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: If your family business I can... 
 
Interviewee: Reputation maybe is not very important because you do not have external 
investors-- 
 
Interviewer: But if you are in a multinational company who is your shareholder probably they 
become more cautious? 
 
Interviewee: Of course.  
 
Interviewer: Two different thoughts right of SME more flexible than MNC. 
 
Interviewee: Alright. 
 
Interviewer: Even though they know the market size is bigger they cannot strap precisely what 
they can do. 
 
Interviewee: I mean of course all of these SMEs they are all autonomy in what they want to do. 
They do not have many people to answer to, and then also another thing whether reputation is 
really important to this company. For example, if you are an MNC you have millions of 
investors to answer to-- 
 
Interviewer: Singapore has own corruption guidelines or whatever you call it. Singapore is not 
probably OECD corruption guidelines that mean if I understand correctly is that the SME 
company is not supposed to bribe purposely like company/country in the OECD would have 
that requirement. Singapore it is not probably OECD, but Singapore has its own I do not know 
how reliable-- 
 
Interviewee: How robust is the system. 
 
Interviewer: The market size is important. 
 
Interviewee: Okay. 
 
Interviewer: And if the market size is not committed to the market then why would you come 
onto the market? In what sense you want to commit to the market, it means all, if the market 
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size is big and committed that is I know it is potential. If the market size is not big, I will not 
commit to it. Is that correct?  
 
Interviewee: Market size is not bigger. You have to see the countries let say this market the 
demographics are perfect for your business model. I mean, of course, you are willing. 
 
Interviewer: What if the market is not willing would you still coming to this market? 
 
Interviewee: Then it would depend on my resources. Let say; I have very limited resources if I 
only have to choose one market that I have to enter. Of course, I will choose that most confident 
bed. 
 
Interviewer: So as an investor you started working to Vietnam, can you say, I want to invest in 
Vietnam because I expect to have the market size, but you do not create the market size 
overnight, right?  
 
Interviewee: Of course, no, no. 
 
Interviewer: The market size is there, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes.  
 
Interviewer: But then if you say that I am not able to get so much revenue within a year I am 
not comfortable with this market, is that what investor's psyche is? 
 
Interviewee: No of course. 
 
Interviewer: What about I have to get a new market. I have to work for the next five years. My 
market size grows, if the market size increases I have to be committed to the market even 
though the market is not big for me-- 
 
Interviewee: In short, you are thinking about the future-- 
 
Interviewer:  From a strategist standpoint, I am coming to the market not based on market size 
but based on strategy. 
 
Interviewee: Based on future potential? 
 
Interviewer: Yes. A lot will go this way even if the market does not have a good market size. 
They think they can do it overnight, but the fact you have to go in there to the market and slot 
from a strategist standpoint I feel a lot of capability or capacity then I start growing my market 
size, right? So, if you are not going to commit to such process, you are not going to get a market 
size in front of people? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, yeah. 
 
Interviewer: Strategically, many companies are going there, I do not make good money 
because-- 
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Interviewee: That is why it depends on how much resources the company has. If the company 
has more than enough resources-- 
 
Interviewer: Some companies have such significant resources that they are willing to do it 
because they expect in one or two years. 
 
Interviewee: All these things are your return on equity.  
 
Interviewer: No, even investor cheat like I cannot get my return... so it is short term.  
 
Interviewee: Yes correct. 
 
Interviewer: So, does it help or hinder? 
 
Interviewee: Hinder my investment decision? Of course, that one plays a very big part in your 
decision making. For example, this company invests, you can give me 100% over one year, 
you compare it with another company it will take you maybe five years to give you maybe 
200% or 300%. Sometimes, you just go for the lower-- 
 
Interviewer: I will take the profit because I do not want the long-term project, right? 
 
Interviewee: Exactly. 
 
Interviewer: So, you are going to the shoe business, oh what's my expectations, what's my 
expectation of profit in a year or three years or five years, what's your opinion? 
 
Interviewee: For me, my end game is actually ventured overseas because Singapore market 
alone is not big enough. 
 
Interviewer: Even if you do venture overseas, timeframe let say my hurdle rate or my return 
can be two years or three years if it is not there I am not going to commit? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, my strategy is actually to take maybe one or two years to get the capital first. 
 
Interviewer: So, you are okay to be not making? 
 
Interviewee: Not making is okay. 
 
Interviewer: Getting you… 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: And for three years, but there's always a timeframe different between invested 
from country to country, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, correct. 
 
Interviewer: Singapore investor based on what I know they always want a very quick return. 
So when you invest in a startup, they expect the return to be fast, and if they do not get the 
return, they will not be willing to keep investing. Because they' are worried that I am not getting 
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more return as compared to the western world the return queuing is much longer five years or 
ten years. Singapore only in three years, two years... So, do you think somebody who has a 
very short timeframe but shorter for investment to mature versus somebody who's working for 
10 years and not making money?  
 
Interviewee: The guy who does that means when he is investing their money is really his spare 
money is not looking for any immediate returns on his equity-- 
 
Interviewer: ... I know next time I want to keep, but I am okay because I know what I want. 
 
Interviewee: It just like Uber-like that. They have burnt billions and billions of dollars to gain 
market share. 
 
Interviewer: Now, they are sudden regret, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah exactly. When they are investing all these startups, all these new business 
ideas I do not think they are looking for immediate returns-- 
 
Interviewer: Not immediate but like two or three years return versus five or ten years return. It 
will affect the strategy. 
 
Interviewee: Correct. For example, when they evaluate tech companies, they do not look at the 
P/E ratio which is the price-earnings ratio. Your earnings are just very, very small--  
 
Interviewer: They are looking for potential the future growth. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, the more important ratio that they are looking at is actually their earnings 
growth.  
 
Interviewer: The growth rate of that one. 
 
Interviewee: The growth rate of the earnings for tech companies. It is a different evaluation 
model compared to-- 
 
Interviewer: So at the end of the day which you said it does not matter what culture, it does not 
matter what language, it does not matter what ethnicity as long there is market size. Moreover, 
as long I am going to pick my returns, what the legal systems how good they are, how bad they 
are, it does not matter. Market size is the most important part of any businesses. If you certainly 
go by this market size, some market size does not come by itself you have to create the market 
size. So at the end of the day you know there's no right or wrong answers. 
 
Interviewee: No right or wrong in many you can go about. 
 
Interviewer: The point here is that if you want to go global, you must have a global mindset. If 
I understand correctly from the culture you said, you have to understand the culture; you have 
to lift that, you have to understand what probable things you have to put, you are selling the 
shoe from other people, you cannot go on your way and no different ways. So, it is a very 
global mindset you want to do to be successful that is what they say. There are no right or 
wrong answers in all these things. So, what I am trying to understand is that the legal system 
plays a part in the investment strategy or play a role but not that important? If I go overseas, 
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culture, language... you just can't go abroad like that to be successful, if not you go to the 
Middle East. How can you be successful if you do not understand the culture? -- 
 
 
Interviewee: Agree, agree. 
 
Interviewer: So many times we spend so much time thinking about market size, returns, and 
all these things but we failed because we did not address the culture and the language. In 
addition we do not address the way people the people think that they create the product, you 
create the product people will buy your product but if you don't understand why people buy 
your product, why they believe in your product, what you believe in your product, your product 
is not going to sell...online internet do you think I will buy your shoes? There are so many 
competitors like I can go to Amazon, I can go Lazada, I can go ezbuy, I can buy any of these 
stores, right? 
 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
Interviewer: What made you buy from this versus that? How are you going to do that? -- 
 
Interviewee: Differentiate yourself from-- 
 
Interviewer: I am not sure the shoe you put on your website or e-commerce or some of the 
vendors that mean your competition. 
 
Interviewee: Yes, correct because mine is more specifically, they are a specialized range of 
products so it only men's handmade leather shoes-- 
 
Interviewer: Product differentiation. 
 
Interviewee: Also, the main selling point of this is the quality that you can buy at affordable 
price. So far, the reason really any players in the market selling these kinds of products at this 
price point. 
 
Interviewer: So, do you think when you mentioned about quality right every product needs to 
be at certain quality standards but do you think people had shoes that last five years or three 
years or two years because of fashion changes so fast. I'd rather get a reasonable price; 
reasonable quality and I can keep changing my shoes. The last time I bought shoes from 
Germany, it can last for 10 years. Now, youngsters believe in those things. 
 
Interviewee: Correct, it so comfortable, now I am selling my product at a price point where 
people can just keep changing but yet at the same time the quality is still there, they are still 
buying it.  
 
Interviewer: Because fashion keeps changing. 
 
Interviewee: But for men's leather shoes right, one designed of shoes right now 10 years ago 
also look the same. As a leather shoe right it does not change as much as like sports shoes or 
lady shoes that one is entirely different cardboard but for example, for men shoes, there are 
only a few basic models like Oxford, Brocks-- 
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Interviewer: England, German shoes that right is so expensive. That is why it is like German 
camera, the last time German cameras they all priced themselves out, right? The Japanese 
Companies conquer all these German cameras or appliances, everything at the right price point 
and great product differentiation. They are so much better quality, so much product 
differentiation, so many more features people are willing to buy. So, the consumer tastes 
changed, and you have to understand consumerism-- 
 
Interviewee: The psychology behind-- 
 
Interviewer: The psychology behind, the culture behind and so forth and so forth. This thing, 
the culture I do not know whether you agree or not, culture is not fixed. It evolves. 
 
Interviewee: Okay. 
 
Interviewer: You look at the older generation they believe in certain things, the younger 
generation does not believe in the older, so the culture moves/shifts/change through times. So, 
it is an important aspect from an investment point of view also from a consumer point of view 
that don't expect the Chinese culture for always remained that way; it will evolve and don't 
expect the Chinese culture always follow domestic culture it could be the opposite.  
 
Interviewee: It could be. 
 
Interviewer: It is another complex form of cultural, language and other things. I think language 
is not so much of a barrier because you got translator with all these things. I think the most 
crucial is the one you said psychology understanding how people behave, what they like and 
the culture probably keeps changing overtime but a bit slower, but it is changing.  
 
Interviewee: Especially for the Chinese, they are buying has changed drastically over the past 
five to ten years.  
 
Interviewer: It is because of wealth effect-- 
 
Interviewee: And also, technology. 
 
Interviewer: Because if you are affordable... there's a chance that you go for something that 
you have always wanted but you never carried alright. An Apple phone is the...one, we never 
know what phone we have until we see Apple, Steve Jobs said, "Don't worry we will create 
something that you guys will love." You create something that there will be a market.  Just like 
you create a shoe then you say the market will come that is another school of... or there's a 
market then I create a product, or I create a product then I build the market.  
 
Interviewee: Correct then you are the market leader. You got the market to follow you.  
 
Interviewer: When you create a product, and the market will come. You also have to study 
what the market really...what the market really needs but if you do not understand what the 
market needs then you create a product and think the market will come to you... 
 
Interviewee: Correct it is a big risk to take, yes, you are right. 
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Interviewer: So, at the end of the day, I always feel that to invest overseas. You have all the... 
intuition/guts, guts, guts-- 
 
Interviewee: Yes of course. 
 
Interviewer: I do not know why I invest I just invest. You will calculate and analyze, all the 
paybacks and everything else. I do not do that I just go-- 
 
Interviewee: Just follow your intuition some sort of it, a lot of them they are like that. A lot of 
my affluent clients they do not know how they got rich but just got rich. 
 
Interviewer: I do not know how to calculate, calculate, calculate paybacks all these things I just 
buy. You have that gut feeling that you cannot explain why you do that way.  
 
Interviewee: This kind of thing you cannot substantiate. 
 
Interviewer: Then that is the biggest challenge how do you measure intuition, how do you know 
that...you can tell me 101 things at the end of the day analysis I do not invest, but I still invest 
and become successful. How do you explain that? I cannot explain to you why but I know it 
happens. 
 
Interviewee: Business...how do you call it? 
 
Interviewer: The Midas touch I call it. Okay, thank you for our conversation. 
 
 
 
 
Respondent C – Interview and Discussion Notes (reject recording) 
Respondents have been briefing on the IRB and the confidentiality of the unstructured 
interview. The purpose is to seek their opinion on managerial perception on investing in the 
frontier economy. How will (if any) the legal system affects their decision, Will culture, 
language, and ethnic differences moderate the level of investment. Also, the managerial 
perspective on market size, change adaptability and economic policies moderating the effect 
of market commitment and manager willingness to invest.   
Cultural, Language, and Ethnicity do have an impact on willingness to invest in a foreign 
location. The most host countries law is local. This is because it is geared to support their home 
country and its population. There is no such thing as universal laws and if we understand how 
laws are derived partly from the history of the country and partly from the culture and values 
some inherited (heritage) other progress to change with time.  
Global mindset will be desperately needed by firms that are going global or having to deal with 
different culture, language, ethnicity and this further complicated by some complex and 
ambiguous institutions, ever more issues especially in developing countries. For frontier 
economies it even more complicated which is why attracting investors to this region is slow 
and sometimes near impossible. The reason, firms may have other priorities or locations that 
they can invest and is less cumbersome and fewer risks. Shareholders sometimes frown or 
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object to risky investments or risk locations. Take Myanmar the Rohingya ethnic situation do 
not help Myanmar portraying to be opening up their economy for investors.    
Global mindset according to respondent X is the orientation of openness to other cultures, other 
people and different ways of getting the thing done. The global mindset has much meaning 
depending on whom we ask. He quotes “from my research we with many CEOs, many agreed 
that leaders of today organizations must have the ability and want to adapt to using a style that 
is most acceptable to that country, culture, and people with whom they are interacting to get 
tasks accomplished.”  Some of the important aspects that are important include – an openness 
to learning, adapting and managing to new and different culture, understand there is no one 
correct way to do things, have a passion for curiosity and embrace diversity. 
Culture, language and ethnicity differences and similarity is neither positive or negative. The 
ability to step outside of one base culture and the willingness of managers to take risks, to 
explore, to learn and to adapt will be a fundamental characteristic of managers to cultivate in 
today rising globalization.  Managers need to be more situation in style and cultural context, as 
talents today are drawn from many parts of the world. For example, some culture encourages 
entrepreneurship, other team works, and some authoritarian support leadership. In future 
successful company will need to have managers with global mindsets as a core characteristic 
of its leadership with the ability to manage talents across different culture, language and 
ethnicity including customers and host countries that they have operations and investments.  
The ability to step outside one base culture and to understand there is no universally correct 
way to do things. One of the prescriptions for managers to consider when investing in a country 
with different culture, language and ethnicity are to apply situational leadership attributes in 
dealing with legal system differences and complexity.  Be mindful at the end of the day 
investors are going to ask what is the return on investments and how have you as CEO in charge 
of this firm's to improve and increase profitability and if the firms do not meet investment 
return hurdle, you can expect shareholders to force changes. My comments may be different if 
it entirely a nonpublic or family-owned business that has more significant autonomy and longer 
return timeframe that public listed or global company. Which is why many public listed 
company say your country, Singapore is taking it private or get bought out.  
On your question about change and uncertainty avoidance, the Japanese are relatively 
successful in many overseas locations. They do not speak their languages, some places the 
cultures may be the same especially those in the confusion region like Taiwan, Hongkong, 
Singapore, Korea not sure about China due to bad blood in the past. There are very particular 
about change and trust. They decide based on consensus, excellent and wrong in some aspects. 
In my opinion, Japanese firms some have the very long-term horizon in term of profitability, 
focus much more on building up the base with a long-term strategy in mind and set managers 
abroad.  Stay, live and  breath there, not sure about play thou.  
My comments on a commitment to market are essential. Once you set the site on investing in 
that location, investors have done their home works before going in either thru partnership or 
JV typically with local and or government. I doubt you can be wholly owned firms in these 
countries. In my opinion, majority or priority will be infrastructure projects, and this is a long-
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term play, the Japanese and Korean are good at it, I assumed China come close. In my opinion, 
there are also investors who went in and then pull out for many reasons such as very complex 
business environment, not meeting the targeted return or some changes in government policies 
that do not meet their priorities. All those factors you mentioned are essential especially market 
size or opportunity. In the end, it is the equation or math one has, and that is a strategy, 
profitability, market share, market positioning..risk.     
We are reasonably connected today with digital technology and social medium platform. I 
would expect as time progress, globalization is going to be more pervasive, forget about current 
USA rhetoric, it will pass, and managers better be global savvy. I do not believe there is 
anywhere in the world that the legal system of that country is perfect, everyone speaks the same 
language, homogenous society like Japan and free of corruption. Its again how you define 
corruption it depends on whom you speak too and their values. Does this mean if a country is 
perceived to be corrupt and the market potential is large, you as an investor do not want a pie 
if you can get a good return, promotion..etc.?  In my opinion its all in the mindsets on how we 
view each of these factors. How we optimize it to the best for our stakeholders and with ethic 
and moral responsibility.  The school should teach more on globalization, global mindset and 
more obligation to society (ethic, moral, compliance). If this can be done who cares what other 
say about improper conduct in business in foreign countries, cos they never there to truly 
understand the constraints and challenges.    
How do policymakers learn from these gaps and improve? Well by implementing policies that 
attract investors not push them away. Policymakers got to get their legal system and litigation 
well-grounded so that people trust that it will be fair when there is a business dispute. They 
must provide adequate resources to support investors, like investment hub or office example 
the Singapore EDB. Improve the quality of education especially higher education, University. 
Etc. Do not train for the sake of teaching, train for skills to support economic reform and 
transition.  
In the end, it is all about how you define each meaning and how you do the right thing for 
mankind.  Quote “We bring good thing to life’, isn’t this the old GE motto, he laughs …etc 
 
 
 
Interviews with two respondents D and E. (Respondents suggested not to tape record) 
Respondents have been briefing on the IRB and the confidentiality of the unstructured 
interview. The purpose is to seek their opinion on managerial perception on investing in the 
frontier economy. How will (if any) the legal system affects their decision, Will culture, 
language, and ethnic differences moderate the level of investment. Also, the managerial 
perspective on market size, change adaptability and economic policies moderating the effect 
of market commitment and manager willingness to invest.   
Interviewer: Like to share with you the results of my dissertation research study. It is about 
behavior perception of investors in willingness to invest in the frontier economy. In a nutshell, 
 313 
 
I am studying how legal system affects managers investing decision and whether culture, 
language, ethnicity, physical distance, understanding the business culture moderate their 
willingness to invest. Here is the summary of data. Let chat and get your insights. 
Interviewer: What is your opinion on the legal system and how will this affect your investment 
decision. 
Interviewee D - It is essential to have at least flexible basic legal system in the country one is 
investing. There is no limit to how good should one legal system be. If it is too rigid, it will not 
attract investors if it is to chaos the same applies also. I like to go in where the law is not that 
perfect so I can navigate and get the best deals. 
Interviewee E- When investors do not know, or it was not written it anyone fault if it considers 
improper when legal system matter, so it is not a violation. When one knows, and its written 
into laws and then violate it, then that is legally wrong. In investment there will always be a 
risk as a result of many factors, yes legal is one. It boils down to how you deal and work around 
it. Got to be savvy lah.    
Interviewee D – it is best to let or hire the lawyer(s) from that country to support the investment 
and understand they do and don’t. I believe there are several well-reputable consulting 
companies based there to encourage foreign investments into the country; they are probably 
the best resources to approach. I recall when we acquire a European Company in Europe we 
get lawyers from Sg and several Euro Countries to deal with these complex acquisitions. You 
can leave it to the managers they are not trained, yes they have to ask the right questions 
hopefully. We got a case where are cargo is stuck in one customer (not to name the country). 
Our shippers did not fill the form correctly and declare correctly, due to interpretation. It was 
stuck for three months; we have to get lawyers from that countries to assist. There is absolutely 
no way we can deal this ourselves. They know the system, the connection..etc. Are they doing 
improperly, who is to judge as millions of dollars of goods are involved? You cant be a saint 
and live by the rules can one? Some legal professional has its ‘mafia way’ of getting things 
done in my opinion. I do not want to know how it gets done, just get it done when we have 
commercial issues. 
Interviewee E – Agreed but for small firms like SME, they may not want to spend this money 
on this resource or have the financial leeway. So they will have to be resourceful and try to 
work a way out. Does not come cheap, and sometimes you get standard template or answers to 
your queries. I am of the opinion they know as much as many others do, its all about networking 
and relationship in these countries. When there are issues networks, help. 
Interviewee D -but be mindful, there is a price for everything, you have to step into their shoes 
and ask what is in for them without them asking. You may think this is wrong well like you 
say J, you need to have an understanding of their culture. Agreed that is where you build 
confidence that you know these people, countries well to go in and invest. 
Interviewer D– let move to another area, how do you see culture, language, and ethnicity 
differences. Will you consider investments if these are similar or does not matter, 
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Interviewee E – Hmm I will prefer to invest in a country that I feel comfortable operating in, 
speak the same language and have a similar culture. In my opinion, language is more important 
than culture. Without having proper communication, you cant even strike a deal, so it does not 
matter if culture is the difference.  
Interviewee D- I think all are important, but it will not derail a potential investment and 
opportunity just because of differences. Yes if you ask me to go work in China or India, I will 
avoid India, cost I feel I am a minority. I feel I will not be respected, my voice will not be heard 
in the firms and I might not fair treatment. Hmmm to be honest the westerners as expats may 
be more respected than the Asian. If you ask me why, well it is the mindset, it is the heritage 
being rule by England before, and it is being told be their parents, they are wealthy…..etc. Must 
three legs (curry favor) also its also income gaps.     
Interviewee E – Coming back to the legal system, I think the weak system is not a deterrent to 
investment. At the end of the day is the profits and revenues outweigh all the other costs and 
the business is scalable, as an investor I will pursue. I will not let this frighten me away. If you 
are talking about developing countries which one have a perfect legal system. Even developed 
countries have gaps too. I am of the opinion laws should help shape to create an orderly society, 
it should not or do not have laws for law's sake, like Singapore. Every time there is an issue 
like the little India riot we enacted a law no selling beer after 10.45 pm or about, silly idea. Is 
this building a more innovative society and attract investments? I doubt. Its this central control 
of power and then legalize into law in parliament to make it look like democracy!   
On your question those similar or not similar to culture, ethnic and language, we as investor 
and managers must learn and be savvy and tolerant enough to lead in that environment with 
differences. Afterall to be successful globally, we need a team of managers that learn and be 
willing to work with different races, languages.  
Interviewer –let switch to another area, what is your thought on committing to the market. Do 
you invest because the market opportunity is there or do go in and create a base for growing 
the market? In short which is your priority, got market size then Cheong (invest), or got an 
excellent base like population or demographic. 
Interviewer –Beside market size,  the resources are cheap or others reasons. What makes you 
willing to invest? 
Interviewee D – the market opportunity is vital, if there is no potential why enter, Then again 
if one is not committed to investing in this frontier economy, the investment will not bear fruit, 
will fail. Even if you got a share because of the international brand, one still need to understand 
the market actively, so that one can design, sell products that the population one. Here we must 
be mindful of culture. For example, if you have brand name something called Nova; in Spain, 
you are not going to sell as its mean any good. A case in point on understanding language and 
culture. 
Interviewee E – its dependence on the strategy a firm takes. If you go in to make entirely profit 
asap one is going to be disappointed as it takes considerable effort to set something in foreign 
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countries where many things are different. Is it a long-term plan, yes in my opinion. Unless one 
is willing to ride it out, one must be committed. Willing to Invest s just the initial step.  
 
Interviewee D – I want to add to that legal system. I always wonder say in Sg we get so good 
in everything from where to smoke, how late one can drink,  where you can flag a taxi maybe 
now got grab we become so intolerant to deficiencies. When we go to these developing 
countries can we perform? So is this good or bad? If we get to a point where we cant perform 
in developing countries, we will not be successful. We say corruption is terrible, how one 
defines it depends on whom you talk too. Some say its gift exchange; some will say its respect, 
some will say its culture they way thing are done.  The worst is when you pay facilitation cost 
you go away not knowing you get the deal vs. one that you pay and know you get the deals. Sg 
is not sacred; we do have to pay facilitation costs but its disguise in legal ways vs. other 
countries in my opinion. Moreover, sometimes its more costly here than elsewhere.    
You think the Chinese come here to shops; you know how many of these bills are paid by local 
towkays in the pretext of buying branded watches, paintings…etc. Yup maybe now they have 
to tread more cautiously due to government official(s) catching the Tigers.  
 
Interviewer – Do you think countries with long-term plan fair better in attracting versus one 
that does not.  
Interviewee E – Its all depend on what benefits the countries can provide and how it fits your 
strategy. For investment we cant focus only long term, we need the long and short term. So 
host countries need to have policies that help investors achieve a return in short run and allow 
them to reinvest. Maybe its different for mega projects like utilities, road, ports..etc 
Interviewee D – long term is good but unless the firm has a long-term culture. If your firms do 
not have and people change every few years or even months its hard to drive commitment, 
motivate to commit and this is problematic. Yes, culture may help like teamwork vs. solo work!      
Interviewer – I have an opinion, do you think social media will improve the gaps in cultures, 
language, ethic, will this make globalization more essential in the third industrial revolution.  
Your thought? 
Interviewee E – Yes it will now everyone is one handphone 24/7, so it makes communication 
easier, knowledge travel faster, you learn faster and better to some degrees. You bring a good 
point why the debate on whether we should not invest, the market size will grow, and 
globalization will continue regardless of whether got great wall barrier or Mexico fence. If 
firms do not prepare to go global, I think their days will be numbered. The next generation of 
leaders will be so comfortable talking to any people in any language, anywhere and any skin 
color. I think you can research this?   How social media change the investment perception? 
 
Respondent - F 
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Respondents have been briefing on the IRB and the confidentiality of the unstructured 
interview. The purpose is to seek their opinion on managerial perception on investing in the 
frontier economy. How will (if any) the legal system affects their decision, Will culture, 
language, and ethnic differences moderate the level of investment. Also, the managerial 
perspective on market size, change adaptability and economic policies moderating the effect 
of market commitment and manager willingness to invest.   
Interviewer: Here's the summary of the research survey, let start by understanding a bit about 
you and your business and get your insight on investing in Vietnam and Myanmar and 
understand what are the key factors you are considering when investing in developing 
countries? 
 
Interviewee: --. My connection with Vietnam goes back to my roots. My parents were born in 
Vietnam, grew up here and left in the 70s. I was born in the USA, I’ve always kept an eye on 
Vietnam as well. I’ve been visiting here since 2001 when I was in high school. It didn’t take 
any particular genius to see that there was something exciting happening in Vietnam had 
already gotten so far in a short period after the economy opened but still had a long way to go. 
So even in 2001, I thought about what the ways are I could come back when I could come back 
to harness what’s happened here and add more resources and opportunity to fuel to the fire.  I 
studied at Harvard, worked in management consulting for a few years and eventually in 2012. 
I pulled the trigger on the idea of coming back over here to talk about early investments into 
Vietnam, and after several months of getting to know each other and getting them familiar with 
what's happening here in Vietnam, we decided to go and set up a fund together. The cost of 
setting up a company, the price of skill, the cost of shipping worldwide has gone down so much, 
orders and magnitude will last 10 years. We can now see and support industrial relations 
anywhere in the world including those of Vietnam.  
 
Interviewer: I just have few questions to dive right into. First one being, what are the strengths 
and gaps in Vietnam’s startup or tech ecosystem… Moreover, how legal system affects 
investment decision and what is your thought on these data that shows familiarity – culture, 
language, ethic moderate investment decision.  
 
Interviewee: The strengths are in two forms: One is the local market opportunity, the other is 
talent. Vietnam is a country of 90-plus million people with a median age of 30 years old, and 
they are increasingly connected. There are almost 50 million internet users today, language, 
not an issue esp. English About 30 million of those have smartphones. This is massive growth 
compared to around 10 years ago. So, there’s this greenfield opportunity to deliver products 
and services that internet consumers in other parts of the world are already accustomed to but 
have not necessarily entered into. It is Apple's fast-growing market in the world in the last few 
years. So, there are some international different relationship/platforms to have penetrated here, 
but then there are local platforms as well. There's a leading messaging service here called Zalo, 
an app built by VNG that's massive popularity here. The Amazon for Vietnam looks like it 
might be one of the homegrown players but the fight still going on of course but Amazon is 
not here yet, so there's that massive market opportunity. The second piece of it is the talent 
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primarily on technology. Grade schools here might be lacking in some things, but Math and 
Science we are strong. Grade school students score in the top 20 worldwide on mathematics 
tests. When they graduate, a lot of them go to universities here which are pretty strong at 
outputting engineers. So about 100,000 engineers are graduating a year in Vietnam. It’s the top 
10 in the world in engineering output. When they graduate, they are making just a few hundred 
dollars a month starting. Even after some experience, they are making a couple of thousand 
dollars a month. So, it is a lot cheaper to start up a tech company here than it is in other parts 
of the world. The last point of the talent piece is not just this low-cost tech talent, but it is also, 
but there’s also a growing diaspora community. There are 4 or 5 million Vietnamese living 
worldwide right now. A lot of them are in the US but also in Australia, France, Germany, and 
so on. Some of them are like me; they were born overseas. Others are folks who maybe grew 
up here but went abroad to study and work. Moreover, what we see now is an increasing 
number of people like us who are coming back to do something, you see the vibrant economy 
here, you look at the ingredients come together. So, a friend of mine referred to it as a kind of 
“Vietnam’s secret weapon.” So, you I am comfortable with investing here. Familiarity is key. 
   
Interviewer: My second question will be, what industries and technologies do investors usually 
have on their radar if they are not familiar here or that they are a concern with the legal system, 
business culture. 
 
Interviewee: Investors are very diverse, but I would say that tech in Vietnam they have two 
categories. One is the apparent clones, working at e-commerce at other sectors looking at 
business models and products elsewhere and bringing them here. However, it is more 
challenging, it is not just about translating into Vietnamese, but you really have to be very 
mindful and nimble about how to adapt for the local market, local consumer behavior, and so 
on. Then the other part is, there’s tech talent here that, unlike in certain other places like Silicon 
Valley, New York City, and London. They have to lose in the emerging markets context. There 
is much more deeply familiar with the challenges of the lower class and middle class in the 
emerging markets. So, all else being equal, they are probably better suited to solving those 
problems with tech. So, we love seeing things in fintech, adtech, healthcare tech, education 
tech, that are tackling emerging markets problems, and I hope that Vietnam can be a capital for 
innovation in the emerging markets around the world. 
 
Interviewer: I think that is interesting, sounds like you have a sense of tech scene and even the 
market and with your time spent here in Ho Chi Minh City I was wondering how would you 
compare the tech and VC scene here versus that of the United States like Silicone Valley? 
 
Interviewee: It is entirely different in ecosystem requires a lot of other elements. The regulatory 
and business environment, like talent, money, market, consumer… Vietnam has its chance with 
this, I think we are challenging difference is on the regulatory environment and business 
environment. When you sign a contract in the US, it is pretty clear how it is structured. If there’s 
any disagreement, we can go to arbitration or the court system – depending on how big the 
companies are. Generally, the case will be solved relatively in the span of a few months or one 
to two years. In Vietnam, that process is not as robust yet. The capital markets here are not as 
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efficient, which gives us the opportunity to right-size on valuation, whereas we see overvaluing 
companies in other parts of the world, the US notwithstanding. However, the bright side of it 
is, there are significant teams here that we think are world-class. When we invest around the 
world, we do not…invest heavily in Vietnam. Moreover, here in Vietnam, you have got 
founders who are hustlers. Yes, they are bitten by the startup bug a little bit, but they also know 
they have got to build something that can be a real business within a short period, or else they 
might not build it at all. So, there’s a real drive, a real hunger to get there. Some founders in 
some parts of the world, there’s almost an expectation that they are going to get funding. There 
is not that kind of hope they are very, very hungry… 
 
Interviewer: How do you see that is what impacting the dynamic between sort of…guides or 
sort of future community building and how’s the relationship between the employer and the 
employee or some kind of how you know the team dynamic works – business/work culture? 
 
Interviewee: Yeah. Before this will can start up wave over the last few years. There's a lot of 
companies here that are very traditionally structured, many, many levels of hierarchy or 
function specialized, very vague and static Vietnam. Moreover, they have been able to do that 
because there's just so much plenty of opportunity in Vietnam as one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world over the last 25 years. There has been so much pressure down here, but 
now the real pressures are from global companies because of technology in a lot of companies 
anywhere in the world who penetrate markets even though they do not have substantial-- 
 
Interviewer: Talent-based thing? 
 
Interviewee: As well as rising startups and the traditional rigid structures in the companies here 
that were not really suited to innovate. So, executives here now realized that they got to 
innovate faster than they have and they are starting to realize that their structures are not well 
suited for that, so the best that they can do is to start investing and building ventures. Some of 
them are setting up their innovative labs where they can… has its personal challenge. This is 
still going to play out, but in the 20 years span we are going to see a lot more there are smaller 
teams, larger teams with more trade formation combination cost spinoffs in different companies 
and this are pretty exciting. 
 
Interviewer: The popular opinion is Silicon Valley is the startup hub. I think you and I can both 
agree that is not the case now I believe you can build a company, find investors anywhere 
around the world but most definitely that is not going to be the future of Silicon Valley it is not 
the only place where you know the world's biggest companies are coming out. So, if Silicon 
Valley was the starting point which city or country do you think will take baton next? 
 
Interviewee: Already half of the unicorns arising these days are outside the US. They are 
pushing on cutting edge tech: AR/VR, AI, and robotics. Silicon Valley is a fantastic place to 
be but much great innovation that’s happening right now is not necessarily at pushing the 
science forward but it is on applying the existing science and technology that exists towards 
real everyday callings, and we are not there yet. Like I mentioned before, Silicon Valley is 
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great at pushing the science, but there's a little bit of bubble about how people live there. So, I 
love Vietnam as a place for innovation in the emerging world. I do not think it will be the only 
place, but I think it has some significant advantages versus China. Which is almost no longer 
an emerging market, India which has its own matrix of challenges within the country, so it is 
hard for companies to get out of it quickly and the same challenges with Indonesia. So, look 
around the world at how many countries have this nexus of emerging markets problems, good 
tech talent, and the right home ingredients to get out and beyond their own country and own 
market faster. Vietnam is a really unique place to live. Actually, its complex, and it not easy to 
have a formula for culture, language, and ethics to decide whether one should or should not 
invest, which is what your data kind of tells. It is not like the market you do where the markets 
are. 
 
 
 
